Essays on Dynamic Structural Models for Employment and Organization. by Knapp, David M. K.
Essays on Dynamic Structural Models
for Employment and Organization
by
David M. K. Knapp
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in the University of Michigan
2014
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Charles C. Brown, Chair
Professor John P. Laitner
Professor Brian P. McCall
Assistant Professor Xun Wu
© David M. K. Knapp, 2014
Dedication
To my Mother and Father
ii
Acknowledgment
I thank Charles Brown, John Laitner, Brian McCall, Brian Wu, Michael Nolte, Janet
Keller, Helena Stolyarova, Nancy Herlocher, Molly Saunders-Scott, Reid Dorsey-Palmateer,
Yu Zhou and Evan Starr for their thoughtful comments and assistance. Support for this
project has been provided by the Boston College Center for Retirement Research (project
BC12-D6) pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration, as well as Rack-
ham Graduate School and the Michigan Institute for Teaching and Research in Economics.
Any errors, opinions, or results herein are those of the author and are not to be construed
as representing the opinions or policy of the Social Security Administration, the Center for
Retirement Research, or the University of Michigan.
iii
Table of Contents
Dedication ii
Acknowledgement iii
List of Figures viii
List of Tables x
List of Appendices xii
Chapter 1: The Eﬀect of Social Security Auxiliary Spouse and
Survivor’s Benefits on the Household Retirement Decision 1
1 Introduction 1
2 Simple Two Period Model 7
2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Eﬀect of Spouse Benefit on Low Earner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Eﬀect of Spouse Benefit on High Earner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Model 13
3.1 Choice Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Budget Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Recursive Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Data 19
4.1 Health and Retirement Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.1 Primary Earner Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.2 Auxiliary Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.3 Benefit Taxation and Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
iv
4.3 Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Estimation 26
5.1 First Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1.1 Annual Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1.2 Health and Mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.3 Medical Expenses and Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.4 Preference Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.5 Remaining Calibrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Second Step (Moment Conditions & Identification) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4 Model Fit (In-sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4.1 Matched Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.4.2 Unmatched Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.5 Model Fit (Out-of-sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6 Policy Experiments 44
6.1 Elimination of the Spouse Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2 Elimination of the Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3 Increased Progressivity of Social Security Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7 Conclusion 52
Chapter 2: Old Age Divorce and Labor Supply 53
8 Introduction 53
9 Background 55
9.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.2 Frequency of Divorce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.3 Household changes before and after separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.4 Impact of divorce and widowhood on retirement benefits . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10 Model 70
10.1 Married Household Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.2 Single Household Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
v
10.3 Budget Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10.4 Individual Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
10.4.1 Before Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
10.4.2 After Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.5 How separations change Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11 Estimation 76
11.1 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.2 Initial Regression Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.3 Accounting for Financial Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
11.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
11.4.1 Leisure Complementarities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
11.4.2 Pensions and Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
11.4.3 Children at Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
12 Divorce and Delayed Retirement 91
12.1 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
12.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
12.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
12.3.1 Retirement Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
12.3.2 Leisure Complementarities, Pensions and Social Security . . . . . . . 97
13 Discussion and Conclusion 98
Chapter 3: Structured Contributions and Directed Search 100
14 Introduction 100
15 Structured Contributions 105
15.1 Modeling Complexity: Landscapes in the NK Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
15.2 Consistency across Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
16 Directed Search 112
16.1 Directed Search Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
16.1.1 Random Search Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
16.1.2 Directed Search Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
16.2 Directed Search Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vi
17 Decentralization with Consistent Interactions 121
18 Uncertainty 124
19 Conclusion 125
Appendices 130
References 199
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Growth Rates in Annual Benefit Payment of Defined Benefit Pensions, by Age
(Multiply vertical axis by 100 for percent growth rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Example of a Household Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Household budget constraint relative to Husband’s Leisure Choice . . . . . . 11
5.1 Asset Quantiles (by thirds) by Male Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2 Asset Quantile Shares by Preference Type
Type 1 (High Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for Spousal Leisure) 38
5.3 Participation by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.4 Male Labor Force Exit by Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.5 Social Security Claiming Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.6 Joint Labor Force Exit for Dual Career Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1 Labor Supply Response to Social Security Benefit Changes . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.1 Women: Frequency of divorce by age group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.2 Women - Percentage whose current marital status is married (by age) . . . . 60
9.3 Women - Percentage whose current marital status is divorced (by age) . . . . 60
9.4 Non-housing, net assets by timing of separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.1 Eﬀect of Divorce timing on Women’s Labor Force Participation . . . . . . . 81
11.2 Eﬀect of Widowhood timing on Men’s Labor Force Participation . . . . . . . 82
15.1 Interaction Matrix, (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
15.2 Landscape Characteristics - Random Contributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . 108
15.3 Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
15.4 Interaction matrix with Structured Contributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . . 110
15.5 Landscape Characteristics - Structured Contributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . 113
15.6 Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape with Structured Contributions . . . 114
15.7 Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape with Structured Contributions . . . 115
16.1 Averaged Performance Values by Search Mechanism with Structured Contri-
butions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
17.1 Centralized versus Decentralized Organizational Forms (K = 2) . . . . . . . 121
17.2 Centralized versus Decentralized Organizational Forms with Structured Con-
tributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
viii
18.1 Averaged Performance Values by Variance of   and Method of Search with
Structured Contributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
18.2 Quantity of Peaks by Variance of   with Structured Contributions (K = 2) . 127
E.1 Sample Selection by Labor Force Participation of Men . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
G.1 Median Earnings - Non-baseline jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
G.2 Median Hours - Non-baseline jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
G.3 Annual Earnings by Employment Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
H.1 Probability of being in bad health *Conditional on previous health status . 156
H.2 Probability of Death by Sex *Conditional on previous health status . . . . . 157
K.1 Asset Quantiles (by thirds) by Male Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
K.2 Asset Quantile Shares by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
K.3 Men Labor Force Participation by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
K.4 Women Labor Force Participation by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
K.5 Men Full-time work by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
K.6 Women Full-time work by Preference Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
K.7 Participation Rate by Health Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
P.1 Women - Percentage whose most recent marital status is Widowed (by Age) 185
P.2 Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is married (by age) . . . 185
P.3 Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is divorced (by age) . . . 186
P.4 Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is Widowed (by Age) . . 186
P.5 Eﬀect of Widowhood timing on Women’s Labor Force Participation . . . . . 187
P.6 Eﬀect of Divorce timing on Men’s Labor Force Participation . . . . . . . . . 188
Q.1 Landscape Characteristics - Structured Contributions (K = 2) . . . . . . . . 198
ix
List of Tables
4.1 Statistics from HRS sub-sample used in estimation (§5) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1 Preference Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2 Comparison of model fit in-sample versus out-of-sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1 Policy Experiment Results - Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.2 Policy Experiment Results - Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.3 Policy Experiment Results - Change in Benefits paid over lifetime . . . . . . 47
9.1 Summary Statistics from HRS Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.2 Before and After Separation - Summary Statistics from HRS Sample . . . . 62
9.3 Total household spending (in $1000s) relative to separation/loss . . . . . . . 65
9.4 Women: Poverty rates before and after separation/loss . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1 Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation . . . . . . . . . 79
11.2 Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation of Women ac-
counting for asset loss and loss of future spousal income following separation. 85
11.3 Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation of Men account-
ing for asset loss and loss of future spousal income following separation. . . . 87
12.1 Probit Estimates of Retirement (Women) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
12.2 Probit Estimates of Retirement (Men) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.1 Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
E.1 Sample Statistics from the selected HRS Sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
E.2 Sample Statistics from the portion of the HRS Sample used for Model Validation.146
M.1 Summary Statistics from HRS Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
M.2 Before and After Separation - Summary Statistics from HRS Sample . . . . 175
N.1 Before and After Separation Summary Statistics from HRS Sample (control-
ling for household size) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
O.1 Retirement benefit options for divorcées and widow(er)s . . . . . . . . . . . 178
P.1 Comparisons of Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation
of Women accounting for spousal leisure complementarities. . . . . . . . . . . 189
P.2 Comparisons of Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation
of Men accounting for spousal leisure complementarities. . . . . . . . . . . . 191
P.3 Probit estimates of retirement using alternative retirement definition (women) 193
x
P.4 Probit estimates of retirement using alternative retirement definition (men) . 194
P.5 Probit estimates of retirement - robustness checks (women) . . . . . . . . . . 195
P.6 Probit estimates of retirement - robustness checks (men) . . . . . . . . . . . 196
xi
List of Appendices
Appendix A: Tax Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Appendix B: Recursive Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Appendix C: Numerical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Appendix D: Moment Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Appendix E: Data and Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Appendix F: Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Appendix G: Earnings Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Appendix H: Health and Mortality Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Appendix I: Medical Expense Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Appendix J: Preference Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Appendix K: Additional Figures depicting Moment Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Appendix L: Calculating Divorce Rates by Cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Appendix M: Age Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Appendix N: Changes in Household Size around Divorce/Widowhood . . . . . . . . . 176
Appendix O: Impact of marital separation/loss on retirement benefits . . . . . . . . . 178
Appendix P: Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Appendix Q: Performance Comparisons across Landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
xii
Chapter 1:
The Eﬀect of Social Security Auxiliary Spouse and Survivor’s
Benefits on the Household Retirement Decision
1 Introduction
In 2011, 12.9 million age-qualifying Americans received $112 billion in spouse and survivor’s
benefits from Social Security based on their husband or wife’s earnings history. The Spouse’s
Benefit alone, while representing less than 4% of annual Social Security old-age expenditures,
amounts to $24 billion, which is larger than the individual 2012 budgets of 27 states, Canada’s
total military expenditures ($22.5b, 2013), and the entire Federal budget for assistance to
families with dependent children (TANF - $17.6b, 2012).1 Initially called the “wife’s bene-
fit”, these benefits were introduced in 1939 when only 15% of households had two earners,
compared to over 72% for households retiring after 1992.2 No study has examined the eﬀect
of both the Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits on household retirement behavior because of the
complexity associated with estimating a structural model of interconnected household deci-
sions. This study answers the question: how responsive are husbands’ and wives’ retirement
decisions to Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits?
This paper builds on the growing structural life-cycle retirement literature, which cap-
tures the dynamic interplay in people’s choices, to model the household’s decisions regarding
savings, labor supply, and benefit claiming. I model the complex Social Security rules that
reward and penalize spousal work choices, and allow them to interact with other key de-
terminants of the household problem including household savings, private pension plans,
and uncertain health, mortality, and medical expenses. I conduct counterfactual experi-
1Social Security figures are derived from SSA (2012), while the other information came from the U.S.
Census (state funding), SIPRI (military expenditures), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (TANF expenses).
2In the early days of Social Security, lawmakers from opposite sides of the political spectrum feared either
that the program would generate savings that would dwarf federal debt to that point, while others feared
low individual benefit levels. This provided the political opportunity to reduce the program’s savings while
expanding the social safety net to wives and widows, thus leading to the expansion of Social Security benefit
payments through old-age spouse and survivor’s benefits (Altmeyer, 1966). The expansion of Social Security
Old-Age Insurance to include spouse and survivor’s benefits meant that the Social Security Administration
would begin to pay benefits to individuals who were not contributing, weakening the notion of Social Security
as an earned benefit.
1
ments that show households respond sharply to changes in the Survivor’s Benefit, but little
to changes in the Spouse’s Benefit. Reducing both benefits between 50% and 100% cause
women to work 0.47 to 1.27 years longer. The eﬀect is nonlinear for men: increasing work by
0.29 years when both benefits are reduced by half, but decreasing work by 0.53 years when
they are eliminated. This result suggests the annuity provided by the Survivor’s Benefit,
even if reduced, creates a strong incentive for the couple’s high earner to continue working.
Finally, I find nonlinear savings to Social Security from reducing Spouse and Survivor’s Ben-
efits amongst the married, non-disabled population in my sample: when these benefits are
reduced by half, it achieves 74.1% of the savings from eliminating these benefits. The model
demonstrates these nonlinear savings arise primarily due to the structure of Social Security
benefits, not from changes in labor supply.
Before introducing where this paper’s contribution fits into the retirement literature, it
is important to understand how auxiliary benefits tie the household’s retirement decisions
together and the magnitude of these benefits. The Social Security Spouse’s Benefit specifies
that a worker’s spouse is eligible to claim an additional 50% of the worker’s Social Security
benefits, but the net gain is reduced based on the spouse’s own earnings history. For example,
consider a single income household where the husband is individually entitled to monthly
benefits of $1,200. The wife, in this household, would receive an auxiliary benefit of $600
to bring her to 50% of her husband’s monthly benefit level, yielding a combined $1,800 in
household benefits. In a dual income household, alternatively, if each person is entitled to a
benefit of $600 (the same baseline entitlement of $1,200 as above), then the spouse’s benefit
is zero. Despite the equivalent baseline entitlements, the single earning household would
receive $600 more in household benefits. Additionally, the survivor’s benefit specifies that
the surviving member of a marriage is entitled to the greater amount of her own benefit,
or the deceased’s benefit. Therefore, if the husband died in our example, the single income
household would have $1,200 in monthly benefits, while the dual income household would
only receive a total of $600 in monthly benefits. In addition, the worker’s spouse cannot
claim the Spouse’s Benefit until the worker has claimed his or her benefit.
In 2011, 5.16 million people received an old-age spouse’s benefit, and 7.78 million people
received an old-age survivor’s benefit, most of whom were women. The average monthly
benefit for a wife who was not entitled on her own earnings history was $608, and for a
widow or widower, it was $1,185. Approximately half of women who receive the Spouse’s
Benefit are dually entitled, meaning that they are entitled to a benefit on their own earnings
record, but that it is less than 50% of their husband’s benefit. Consequently, these women
receive the diﬀerence between their own benefit and the Spouse’s Benefit (i.e. in the end,
they receive the same amount as an individual who was not entitled to a benefit on her own
2
earnings record). The average monthly Spouse’s Benefit portion for these dually-entitled
women is $243.64. While the fraction of women entitled to auxiliary benefits has fallen from
61.2% in 1960 to 52.5% in 2011, these benefits still aﬀect the majority of the households over
the age of 62 in the United States.3
This is the first paper to use a structural retirement model to estimate the eﬀect of the
Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits on the household’s retirement decisions. Using a structural
model is important for understanding these benefits, because they have remained largely
unchanged since their introduction in 1939, preventing a natural experiment. Furthermore,
modeling the choices of each household member is important because households are be-
coming increasingly comprised of two income earners. Past studies have focused on models
of individual decision-making, ignoring the possibility that married couples may have corre-
lated preferences or derive benefit from each other’s company. Focusing only on individuals
misspecifies the impact of any entitlement or pension program. A weighted sample of the
Health and Retirement Study indicates that 92.82% of men and 95.17% of women have been
married, divorced, or widowed, implying an analysis based on men alone does not represent
a complete picture of retirement decisions. Studies of individual retirement decisions, how-
ever, highlight issues and explanations that are important for understanding the eﬀect of the
Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits.
The existing retirement literature on Social Security focuses on understanding the role
of Social Security’s primary earner benefit in explaining the decrease in male labor force
participation and explaining spikes in retirement at ages 62 and 65 (Social Security’s early
and normal retirement ages, respectively). Explanations include (1) actuarial unfairness to
benefit adjustments for delayed claiming, (2) borrowing constraints, (3) other beneficiary
programs such as Medicare, and (4) uncertainty surrounding future income and health ex-
penses (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986a; Rust and Phelan, 1997; French, 2005; French and
Jones, 2011). My model will reflect this literature by including medical expenses and health
uncertainty, variation in healthcare coverage, and limited savings (i.e. an individual will not
be able to borrow against Social Security or her pension).
More recently, the structural retirement models mentioned above have been extended to
capture the interconnected decisions of households. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000a, 2004a)
provide a framework for household decision-making that accounts for interdependence of
3A study conducted by the AARP (2011) indicates that 97% of people surveyed were aware of the survivor
benefit, while 51% of people who had not claimed Social Security benefits were aware of the spouse’s benefit.
Using my own calculations from the AARP’s data, I examined groups most likely to gain from the existence
of the spouse’s benefit. I find that 62% of women with less than 20 years of work who have not claimed
their Social Security benefit are aware of the spouse’s benefit. I also find that 60% of men whose wives have
less than 20 years of work and who have not claimed their Social Security benefit are aware of the spouse’s
benefit.
3
preferences, but abstracts from uncertainty and allows households to perfectly smooth con-
sumption by borrowing without limit across time. Blau and Gilleskie (2006) create a house-
hold model of labor supply and introduce uncertain medical expenditures and employment,
but do not allow for savings and do not separate labor supply and claiming decisions. More
recently, van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) made an important contribution by modeling
household labor supply while permitting savings and heterogeneity in preference for con-
sumption.
Relative to other retirement models, such as van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), I solve
my model separately for each household so that it captures how Spouse and Survivor’s
Benefits interact with the couple’s age diﬀerence, private pensions, and unique earnings
histories. Solving my model separately by household allows the model to parse preference
heterogeneity from heterogeneity in a couple’s earnings histories and a couple’s age diﬀerence.
I highlight here three diﬀerences from previous retirement models that are important for
identifying the eﬀects of Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits: (i) households diﬀer at baseline by
their preference for individual and joint leisure, (ii) households respond to each individual’s
unique pension incentives as part of the household labor supply decision, and (iii) household
members can claim benefits separately from each other and independent of their labor supply
decision.
(i) My model is estimated on the 1992 cohort of Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
which first observes a household when one member is between age 51 and 61, implying
that many of the long-term decisions of the household are established (i.e. who works,
how much is saved, how much time is spent together). Since I do not model household
formation and bargaining prior to when it is first observed in 1992 (baseline), I allow for
households to vary by how its members value their own and joint leisure. Some marriages
involve a substantial amount of shared time because the couple places a high value on that
interaction. Other marriages may be characterized by one member specializing in work, and
the other specializing in home production. Close relationships and household specialization
are characteristics of a social structure that was developed a long time before this paper’s
analysis begins, and so these individuals must be treated diﬀerently from couples who enjoy
separate activities or both work.4 Similar to van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and French
and Jones (2011), I account for these initial conditions by allowing households to belong to
one of a finite number of types. Each household is assigned to a time-invariant type that
reflects its preference for individual and joint leisure. The preference parameters of the model
4The Health and Retirement Study reports that of the married individuals in the 1992 cohort, 17%
somewhat or do not look forward to retirement with his or her spouse, and 18.6% somewhat or do not enjoy
time spent with his or her spouse.
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then diﬀer by type, leading to diﬀerent outcomes for otherwise equivalent households.
(ii) In my HRS sample, 33% of households have at least one current defined benefit
pension. Private pension plans will often have sharp financial incentives to delay retirement
until an early retirement age, and to retire by no later than a normal retirement age. Failing
to account for these incentives would bias the parameter estimates and any predictions made
using the model. Figure 1.1 shows, by age, the substantial variation in the growth rates of
annual pension benefit payments. At ages 55 and 60, there are peaks in the 95th percentile
of benefit payment growth rates, which is due to these ages being common early retirement
dates for defined benefit pension plans.
Heterogeneity in benefit payment growth is also common in Social Security, particularly
for individuals without the maximum 35 years of earnings history, which is common for
women. For one-fifth of individuals aged 62 with less than 35 years of earnings history, the
Social Security benefit payment growth rate exceeds 5% for an additional year of work.5
In order to avoid the retirement incentives induced by defined benefit pension plans and to
simplify the model’s estimation, many authors restrict their samples to households that are
without pension plans and do not keep track of Social Security earnings histories (Rust and
5When I refer to benefit growth rates, I am referring to the growth rate in annual benefit payments once
the beneficiary has claimed. I am not referring to the change in the expected present discounted value of
pension wealth.
Figure 1.1: Growth Rates in Annual Benefit Payment of Defined Benefit Pensions, by Age
(Multiply vertical axis by 100 for percent growth rates)
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Phelan, 1997; van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008). By omitting work histories and pension
plan details, these papers focus on a portion of the population that has lower incomes and for
which Social Security benefits represent a very important part of retirement wealth. These
household will be more likely to claim their benefit as soon as they are eligible, and the
implications drawn from these models are not representative of the eﬀects that a change in
the Social Security program would have on the broader U.S. population.
(iii) Benefit claiming and retirement are not equivalent, as indicated by the fact that
while more than 50% of individuals in my sample claim Social Security benefits at the early
retirement age, the majority continue to work. People with small incomes or poor health may
find it optimal to claim Social Security benefits as early as possible. Single income couples
may find it optimal for the earner to claim as soon as possible, so the nonworker can access
the Spouse’s benefit. The choice of when to claim annuitized benefits, like Social Security
and defined benefit pensions, is dependent on each couple’s unique incentives stemming
from their health and earnings history, their accumulation of non-annuitized liquid assets,
and their opportunity cost of delayed claiming.
Authors have often linked claiming of benefits with an individual’s retirement, but benefit
claiming is becoming more strategic as Social Security incentivizes delayed claiming, couples
live longer, and phased retirement or unretirement becomes more common (Shoven and
Slavov, 2013). Using the HRS, Maestas (2010) showed that 18.2 - 23.8% of workers who
initially exit the labor force with the intent of retiring return to full or part-time work
within six years. Furthermore, she finds that, of the individuals who exit their job with
the intent to fully retire, only 33.9% of individuals claimed their pension at the time they
exited the job. Other studies point to greater early claiming rates for Social Security than
are predicted by a typical life-cycle model (Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos, 2002; Coile,
Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten, 2002; Sass, Sun, and Webb, 2013). The puzzle surrounding
high early claiming rates of Social Security, and the more arbitrary claiming rates of pensions,
can not be captured by previous structural models because most do not separate the benefit
claiming decision from the labor supply decision, and those that do only model the husband’s
decision.
In section 2, I introduce a simple model to build intuition for the eﬀect of the Spouse’s
Benefit on the high and low earner’s work decisions. Section 10 introduces the dynamic, life-
cycle model, while section 4 describes the data selection from the HRS. Section 5 describes the
estimation method, the baseline results, and the ability of the model to replicate empirical
regularities. Section 6 conducts three policy experiments on Social Security benefits and
discusses the implications of these changes for individual labor supply, benefit claiming, and
average lifetime benefits received from Social Security. I conclude in section 7 by summarizing
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the key results and discussing the implications of my model.
2 Simple Two Period Model
The discussion in the first section demonstrated that a household’s Social Security primary
and auxiliary benefits can be a complicated result of household leisure choices. In this
section, I provide a simple two period model to help the reader understand the impact of
spouse benefits on the household’s labor supply. In the next section, I will introduce a more
realistic model that is meant to capture the complexities associated with the entire life-cycle
of a household.
2.1 Setup
To simplify the discussion, suppose that a household lives for two periods. The first pe-
riod represents the timeframe where the household chooses to work, and the second period
represents retirement. The household is comprised of two agents who choose their joint con-
sumption in both periods and how much to work in the first period. The household’s utility
is derived from joint consumption and individual leisure in both periods, where   represents
how the household discounts future utility, as in:
U = u (C1, LH,1, LW,1) +   · u (C2, 1, 1) (2.1)
where Ct represents the household joint consumption in period t, and LH,1 and LW,1 represent
the husband and wife’s leisure in period one, respectively.6 I assume that consumption and
leisure are normal goods.
The budget constraint is determined by each household member’s income, which is a
function of his or her first period leisure and potential income (e.g. Y (1  LH,1, Y ⇤H)), as
well as Social Security old-age and auxiliary benefits. An individual’s primary benefit is
determined by a three bracketed formula based on his or her indexed monthly earnings. For
illustrative purposes in figures 2.1 and 2.2, I use the 1994 beneficiary rules, where an earner
would receive 90% of the first $4,440, 32% of the next $22,320, and 15% of the remaining
$33,840, for a maximum annual benefit of $16,214. A household can save earnings from
period 1, but cannot borrow from the Social Security benefits due in the second period. The
auxiliary benefits for the low earner are equal to 50% of the high earner’s benefit level or
6The assumptions that I place on the household preferences described in (2.1) are that the utility function
is convex, monotonic, and inter-temporally separable.
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her own benefit level, whichever is greater.7 The household’s budget constraint in period 1,
assuming no preexisting assets, is
C1 + A1 = Y (1  LH,1, Y ⇤H) + Y (1  LW,1, Y ⇤W ), (2.2)
A1   0.
The budget constraint in period 2 is
C2 = (1 + r) · A1 + SSB (Y (1  LH,1, Y ⇤H), Y (1  LW,1, Y ⇤W )) , (2.3)
where A1 is the household’s assets saved in period 1 and SSB(·, ·) represents the house-
hold’s Social Security benefit, which is a nonlinear function of the husband and wife’s leisure
decisions in period 1 and their potential incomes, Y ⇤H and Y ⇤W .8 For ease of exposition,
I will assume, only in this section, that the husband is the high earner in the household
(i.e. Y ⇤H > Y ⇤W ).
2.2 Eﬀect of Spouse Benefit on Low Earner
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the wife’s budget constraint with the spouse benefit
kink point, assuming the husband works full-time (LH,1 = 0), and that the household has
nonnegative savings in the first period (A1 > 0).9 In this figure, point A represents the
outcome for households that find it optimal for the wife to work full-time. The indiﬀerence
curve, UB, represents a set of preferences for a household where the wife would optimally
supply a level of labor corresponding to point B without the spouse benefit, but with it, she
7In the simple two period model, I do not include delayed claiming increments or early claiming penalties.
8The Social Security benefit is function of each household member’s income. The Social Security Benefit
is defined by:
SSB (Y (LH,1, Y
⇤
H) , Y (LW,1, Y
⇤
W )) = max {1.5⇥ SSBH (Y (LH,1, Y ⇤H)) , 1.5⇥ SSBW (Y (LW,1, Y ⇤W )) ,
SSBH (Y (LH,1, Y
⇤
H)) + SSBW (Y (LW,1, Y
⇤
W ))} ,
where for i 2 {H,W},
SSBi (Y ) =
8>>><>>>:
0.9⇥ Y if Y<$4,440
0.32⇥ Y + 0.9 (4, 440) if $4,440Y<$26,760
0.15⇥ Y + 0.32 (22, 320) + 0.9 (4, 440) if $26,760Y<$60,600
$16, 124 if $60,600Y.
Also, note that legally households cannot borrow against their Social Security benefits, therefore Social
Security benefits only become available in the second period as in (2.3).
9Note that I am only considering the returns to working in the first period relative to consumption in the
second period, because the choice of consumption in the second period determines the consumption in the
first period through the typical Euler equation: @u@C1 =  (1 + r)
@u
@C2
if assets are nonnegative.
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reduces her labor supply significantly to point B’. The set of preferences described by UB
represent an example where the spouse benefit results in the wife’s leisure discontinuously
jumping to a higher level, an issue discussed in greater detail below. Point E represents the
outcome for households with a high preference for the wife’s leisure, indicating that the wife
would not work regardless of the spouse benefit’s existence.
Using this figure, the intuition for the eﬀect of the spouse benefit on labor supply can
be seen by the wife’s decision if she is a little to the right of the spouse benefit kink point
(point C in figure 2.1). In this case, each additional hour of leisure sacrificed increases second
period consumption by only the marginal savings from the wife’s earnings, because her Social
Security benefit is based only on her husband’s earnings history. Alternatively, if she works
enough to be to the left of the kink point, then her return from each additional hour of leisure
sacrificed is the change in Social Security benefits based on her own earnings history plus
the marginal savings from her earnings. Thus, the household’s budget constraint becomes
steeper.
For a household with strictly convex preferences over consumption and leisure, the exis-
tence of the spouse benefit kink point will cause the wife to work less in certain circumstances,
because it reduces her return to work. I consider three cases, represented by the letters in
Figure 2.1: Example of a Household Budget Constraint
Notes: The baseline budget constraint (solid line) assumes the husband earns $40,000 and saves none of his
income, and the wife’s potential income was $25,000 if she worked full time and the wife saves 20%
of her income.
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figure 2.1.
A The wife continues to maximize household utility by working the same amount regardless
of the spouse benefit’s existence. This can only occur where the wife optimally supplies
labor to the left of spouse benefit kink point in figure 2.1.
B The household would optimally supply labor to the left of the kink point without the
spouse benefit, but then jump to a higher level of leisure, to the right of the kink point,
with the spouse benefit. This is illustrated by a household with preferences represented
by UB at point B without spouse benefits, jumping to point B’ with a higher level of
utility, UB0 , with the inclusion of spouse benefits (as in figure 2.1).
D The wife would have optimally worked a positive amount at a level of leisure to the right
of the spouse benefit kink point. With the spouse benefit, she will now find that her
optimal choice is working less or not working (D’). This is because each additional
hour of leisure sacrificed increases second period consumption by only the fraction of
her income that is saved. At the extreme of this case, the household maximizes utility
by the wife not working, as in point E in figure 2.1. In this case wife’s work behavior
is unaltered by the existence of the spouse benefit, but consumption increases from E
to D’.
To summarize, the spouse benefit weakly discourages the low-earning spouse from working
by reducing her return from work because the income eﬀect (i.e. receiving more benefits
in retirement increases demand for leisure) and substitution eﬀect (i.e. lower returns from
working increases demand for leisure) act in the same direction.
2.3 Eﬀect of Spouse Benefit on High Earner
The spouse benefit also impacts the husband’s decision (i.e. the high earner) to work by
increasing his return to work if his wife earns a suﬃciently low income. As represented in
figure 2.2a, the spouse benefit increases both the husband’s return from work and increases
the household’s income if the husband’s first period earnings are suﬃciently high relative to
his wife’s earnings. Much like a change in wage, the spouse benefit induces an income eﬀect
that discourages work, but a substitution eﬀect that encourages it. Figure 2.2 shows the
impact of the spouse benefit on the husband’s first period leisure decision holding constant
the wife’s leisure decision. Similar to the impact on the wife’s budget constraint discussed
above, there are four possible cases for the husband that correspond to points labeled in
figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Household budget constraint relative to Husband’s Leisure Choice
(a) Dominant Income Eﬀect
(b) Dominant Substitution Eﬀect
Notes: The baseline budget constraint (solid line) assumes the wife earns $5,000 and saves 20% of her
income, and the husband’s potential income was $60,000 if he worked full time and the husband saves
20% of his income.
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A Husband works full-time and the introduction of the spouse benefit increases income but
does not alter his labor supply - pure income eﬀect.
B The income eﬀect from the spouse benefit dominates the increase returns from work
leading to an increase in the husband’s leisure, as in figure 2.2a.
C The increase returns from work dominate the income eﬀect from the spouse benefit leading
to a decrease in the husband’s leisure, as in figure 2.2b.
D For some original leisure choices to the right of the spouse benefit kink point, the husband
either chooses never to work or does not make enough income relative to his wife for
the spouse benefit to change his first period decision.
Unlike the low earner, the high earner is impacted by oﬀsetting income and substitution
eﬀects, making the final impact on his labor supply ambiguous.
2.4 Summary
The combined impact of the spouse benefit on the high and low earner is to discourage
the low earner from work but has ambiguous incentives on the high earner’s labor supply.
The existence of the spouse benefit will matter more to households where the diﬀerence in
potential earnings are the greatest.
In a model that includes more decision periods, which can capture the fact that Social
Security benefits are based on lifetime earnings histories, the appropriate comparison would
be households where the earnings histories are more disparate. A wife who has an earnings
history that is substantially lower than her husband’s earnings history would not benefit
from Social Security based on her own earnings history, and so earns no additional retirement
benefits from continued work. In the context of the life-cycle model presented in the next
section, this implies that spouse benefits help single earning households and discourages the
low earner from returning to work because she receives no retirement benefit from further
work. The impact on the husband is more ambiguous because it provides a lifetime income
eﬀect discouraging work while increasing the marginal return from work.
I will find, in the policy experiments of §6, that the husband’s substitution eﬀect will
dominate for my sample, implying that men would work 0.11 years less without the spouse
benefit (intuitively C 0 ! C in figure 2.2b).
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3 Model
In this section I introduce a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply and benefit claiming
for married couples who maximize their utility based on state variables in year t (Xt),
preference parameters (✓), and parameters of the data generating process ( ). This model
diﬀers substantively from most structural retirement models by considering the choices of a
couple instead of just the male head of household. Uncertainty arises from random mortality,
health changes, and medical expenses, while further permanent heterogeneity is based on
variation in households’ preference for work, leisure, and future consumption.
3.1 Choice Set
Every individual, i 2 {H (husband) ,W (wife)}, is part of a household, h, and each period
(year) the household decides (i) whether each individual works, (ii) whether each individual
claims his or her Social Security or other claimable pension benefits, and (iii) how much
income to consume, Ch,t.10
Individual decisions are made via household decisions. As a result, I will abstract away
from strategic decision making between household members. Intra-household bargaining
is assumed to be fixed at baseline and is reflected in permanent diﬀerences in households’
preference for own and spousal leisure (discussed in greater detail in §5.1.4). Household
preferences reflect the externality of each person’s leisure on the other member of the couple,
and the relative weight each individual has in the decision making process.
Retirement can be an ambiguous concept, with many workers retiring and then proceed-
ing to un-retire or return to the labor force within a few years (Ruhm, 1990). As a result,
I do not define retirement explicitly, rather, I focus only on the per period labor supply
decision. In this model, all individuals will eventually opt out of work, given a suﬃciently
advanced age. Each household participant’s labor supply, Ni,t, is restricted to one of four
states:
Ni,t =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if working full-time in baseline job
1 if working full-time in non-baseline job
0.5 if working part-time in non-baseline job
0 if not working.
I distinguish between baseline and non-baseline jobs both because the assumptions regarding
how earnings evolve over-time will diﬀer between these jobs and because only baseline jobs
10All consumption in this model is joint consumption because the HRS is unable to distinguish between
joint and individual consumption.
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will have pensions associated with them.
Assuming the household member is eligible to claim benefits, the household can also
choose to claim benefits, Bi,t = {1 for claim, 0 for no claim}. Depending on the types of
benefits an individual is eligible to claim, this can include both a defined benefit pension and
a Social Security benefit, just one of these benefits, or neither. These benefits do not have
to be claimed in conjunction with leaving the labor force, but current and future benefit
levels may vary with the household’s labor force decision (see §4.2 and §4.3 for a discussion
on claimable benefits). There is no “claiming” of defined contribution plans, because these
funds are treated as savings. All benefit claiming decisions are treated as absorbing states.
3.2 Preferences
A household, h, maximizes its expected present value of lifetime utility by choosing their
consumption, labor participation and whether or not to claim benefits. The household
instantaneous utility function in year t is given by:
U (Ch,t, LH,t, LW,t) =
C1 ↵h,t   1
1  ↵ +
DH,tL
1  H
H,t   1
1   H +
DW,tL
1  W
W,t   1
1   W , (3.1)
where the parameter ↵ > 0 captures the household’s diminishing returns from joint con-
sumption.
Each individual’s leisure, Li,t, is defined as:
Li,t = L Ni,t , (3.2)
where L is the endowment of leisure. Note that the relative value of part-time to full-time
work changes based on the parameter  i. I fix  i across time, thus only permitting age
to aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution for identification purposes.11 I do not include a
specific leisure cost for reentry into the labor force.
The coeﬃcient Di,t represents a modifier for each individual’s marginal rate of substi-
tution between leisure and consumption. It changes based on state variables, including a
constant term for the husband or wife, the age of the husband or wife, the health of the
husband or wife, and additional variables meant to reflect the change in the individual’s
substitution between consumption and leisure. In the case of the husband (i = H), it takes
11Alternatively, Gustman and Steinmeier (2005a) allow their equivalent of  i and Di,t to vary across time,
make identification harder to argue.
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the form
DH,t = exp ( H +  H,ageageH,t +  H,healthhealthH,t (3.3)
+ H,SP1 [NW,t > 0] +  H,SFT1 [NW,t = 1] + "H) ,
where the last two terms on the right-hand side represent how the wife’s participation in
the labor force and whether she works full or part-time aﬀect the husband’s preferences over
consumption and leisure. Analogously, the wife’s modifier, DW,t, is determined by
DW,t = exp ( W +  W,ageageW,t +  W,healthhealthW,t (3.4)
+ W,SP1 [NH,t > 0] +  W,SFT1 [NH,t = 1] + "W ) .
DH,t andDW,t capture the complementarity of spousal leisure time, and how it diﬀers between
part and full-time work. This setup, where I distinguish the impact of health, age, and joint
marital time on the rate of substitution between consumption and leisure will help identify
the eﬀect of changes in joint benefit programs like Social Security.
After controlling for age, health status, and leisure complementarities, there may still exist
a permanent level of heterogeneity across the population in the relative value of leisure (see
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004a)). This individual fixed eﬀect for higher value of retirement
to an individual, "i ⇠ N (0,  "i), is treated as permanent component of the individual’s
utility. If "i > 0, then the individual receives greater returns from leisure, and is thus likely
to leave the labor force sooner. Additionally, ⇢HW represent the correlation between "H and
"W . If households sort based on preference for leisure, then ⇢HW > 0.
These preferences are non-homothetic. Homotheticity constrains the share of income
to be spent on consumption to remain unchanged. If income doubles, so will the share of
income spent on consumption. While this often provides a reasonable baseline from which to
examine long-run behavior, it oversimplifies the relationship between retirement and savings.
Hypothetically, if household were to receive a surprise endowment in one period, it might
choose to save the entire sum and retire a year sooner. Homothetic preferences would not
permit this choice. I chose to allow preferences to be non-homothetic, similar to most of the
retirement literature (see van der Klaauw andWolpin, 2008; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2005a). The non-homothetic preferences allowed for in my model permit
the household’s willingness to substitute leisure across time to diﬀer from its willingness to
substitute consumption across time.
Individuals have a probability sit+1 = s(agei,t, healthi,t, i) of surviving until period t+ 1,
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discussed further in §5.1.2, and households discount the future at rate  . Households that
become single through widowhood are assumed to receive a 50% greater return from $1
of consumption than a two person household, Cwidow = 1.5 ⇥ Cmarried, and the deceased
individual i is assumed to not participate in the labor force, Ni,t = 0, and does not contribute
to household utility, Di,t = 0.12 As in De Nardi (2004); De Nardi, French, and Jones
(2010), households where both members are deceased value their bequests from assets, Ah,t,
according to the function
b(Ah,t) = ✓B
 
(Ah,t + )
1 ↵   1
1  ↵
!
. (3.5)
This a standard “warm-glow” bequest, where the household gets non-negative utility from
leaving assets to future generations. The bequest shifter, , and the bequest intensity, ✓B,
determine the value of the additional assets, in terms of utility, relative to the other states
where one or both members of the household are alive.
3.3 Budget Set
The household is able to accumulate assets, Ah,t, over its lifetime subject to the following
equation
Ah,t+1 = Ah,t   Ch,t  Mh,t + Yh,t + trh,t , (3.6)
where Ch,t is per period household consumption, and Mh,t is stochastic health expenses.
Additionally, Yh,t is per period income and trh,t are government transfers, which are defined
more explicitly below.
A household’s per period income can come from a number of sources: household interest
income, rAh,t, a household Social Security benefit, ssbh,t, and each individual’s annual earn-
ings, !i(Ni,t, agei,t), and defined benefit pension income, dbi,t, where all of these sources of
income are subject to tax, tx:
Yh,t = Y
 
rAh,t + ssbh,t +
X
i2h
(!i(Ni,t, agei,t) + dbi,t) , tx
!
. (3.7)
Taxation in this model is handled using the Internal Revenue Service rules for taxation in
1992 and assumes that individuals do not experience the changes to the tax code since 1992.
Further details on how taxes are calculated are included in Appendix A.
12This is equivalent to the implicit returns to scale assumed by the Social Security spouse and survivor’s
benefits.
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Finally, households are borrowing constrained based on their flow of income. Follow-
ing past work (e.g. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995)) I include a minimum level of
consumption that determines government transfers. Government transfers guarantee a min-
imal, positive consumption level, even if a household is uninsured and experiences a severe
medical expense shock. Government transfers are defined by
trh,t = max {0, Cmin   Ah,t   Yh,t} , (3.8)
so that an individual will always be able to consume at least Cmin (i.e. Ch,t   Cmin).13
The household Social Security benefit and private pensions are described in §4.2 and §4.3,
after the data source is introduced. The evolution of an individual’s annual earnings and
stochastic medical expenses, are described in §5.1.1 and §5.1.3, respectively, following the
description of the data and estimation strategy.
3.4 Recursive Formulation
Each period, a household chooses its consumption and each individual’s level of labor force
participation, Social Security claiming decision, and pension benefit claiming decision (if
applicable). The decision to claim benefits is irreversible, can only be done once the individ-
ual reaches early retirement age (62 for Social Security and as early as 55 for some pension
plans), and must be done no later than age 70. The household’s maximization problem is
Vt (Xt) = max
Ch,t,Lh,t,Bh,t
 
U (Ch,t, Lh,t) +  
 
1  sHt+1
   
1  sWt+1
 
b(Ah,t+1) (3.9)
+ 
 
1  sHt+1
 
sWt+1E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Lh,t, wife survives)]
+ sHt+1
 
1  sWt+1
 
E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Lh,t, husband survives)]
+ sHt+1s
W
t+1E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Lh,t, both survive)]
 
,
subject to a non-negative borrowing constraint and the consumption floor in equation (3.8).
Let Ch,t, Lh,t, and Bh,t represent the set of each household’s bundle of choices for consump-
tion, leisure, and benefit claiming, respectively.
The solution to the recursive formulation in equation (3.9) requires solving for each
household’s consumption, labor force participation, and benefit claiming choices at every
age at and after baseline (1992), collectively referred to as the decision rules. These decision
13 Cmin will depend on whether the household is single (i.e. widowed) or married. As mentioned in §10.1,
I set $1 of consumption in a two person household to be equivalent to $1.50 of consumption in a widowed
household, Csingle = 1.5⇥ Cmarried. This is done because households may benefit from economies of scale,
and this ratio reflects the implicit economies of scale assumed by the Social Security Administration when
handling single versus dual household benefits through the Supplemental Security Income program.
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rules are calculated by backward induction using the above mentioned model. I describe my
choice of recursive and numerical methodology in Appendices B and C, respectively.
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4 Data
4.1 Health and Retirement Study
The model in §10 is estimated using the original cohort of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), which was born between 1931 and 1941, and has 12,652 respondents and 7,704
households. The HRS follows these households every two years, and in this study I use
data from 1992 through 2010. It collects information on income, work, assets, pension
plans, health insurance, disability, individual health, and health care expenditures. It has
an impressive retention rate, with approximately 80.5% of the original, surviving cohort
responding as of the 9th wave (2008).14
The HRS is well suited to estimating my model because it also collects individual Social
Security Administrative data and detailed pension data from respondents’ employers. The
Social Security administrative data includes individual earnings histories for 79.77% of the
original cohort. Moreover, the HRS also contacted employers of respondents who reported
having employer-provided retirement plans. If the individual consented, then the HRS con-
tacted the employer to obtain a copy of the summary plan description of each plan the
employer oﬀered, and then extracted information about the plan or plans relevant to the
respondent from these documents. This information was then used in designing a pension
calculator for projecting a respondent’s benefit levels based on any future retirement date,
as described in §4.3.15
From the original HRS sample, I keep households that (1) are married in wave 1, (2) are
not missing information on their labor force participation in wave 1, (3) have never applied for
14“A total of 13,687 individuals are in the HRS sample since the baseline interviews in 1992. Over two-
thirds (67.1%) of the respondents in this sample have complete interview histories from their initial entry
through 2008. The remaining 32.9% have missed at least one interview: an average of 2.7 missed interviews
(7.3 average attempts)” (HRS Sample Sizes and Response Rates, 2011). This number is larger than 12,652
because new spouses are added to the sample if a respondent marries after baseline.
“The HRS cohort rate of 80.5% retention at 16 years of survey duration is slightly better than the National
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS)-Older Men (76.3%) and Mature Women studies (73.1%), but somewhat below
the record levels of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) cohort, which stood at 89%
among survivors after 16 years.”
15A number of studies have examined the selectivity of the Social Security and pension samples (Haider
and Solon, 2000; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999; Kapteyn, Michaud, Smith, and Soest, 2006). For Social
Security, sample selection occurs because individuals not permitting their earning profiles to be linked are
diﬀerent from those who do permit their earnings histories to be linked (95% of those who give permission are
matched). Individuals who are non-white, in the highest asset or education groups, and who never expect to
retire or do not report a retirement date are the least likely to give permission. For pensions, selection may
also occur on the ability of HRS to obtain a SPD, conditional on the person giving permission. Individuals
who are in the highest asset and earnings groups, are at firms with less than 100 workers, are in management
professions, and have a defined contribution plan are the least likely to successfully have their plans matched,
conditional on giving permission. In this paper, I use matched SPD only for defined benefits plans. I rely
on individual reports from defined contribution plans.
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Social Security disability benefits, (4) are not missing pension or Social Security information,
(5) have a spousal age diﬀerence of less than 10 years, (6) are not missing information on
individual earnings if household members report working, and, for computational reasons,
(7) households where no more than one member has a defined benefit pension.16 After
this sample selection, I am left with 1,728 married households. I use the Social Security
Administrative data for earnings and respondent reports for periods not covered by the
Social Security data. Doing so yields an average of 14.95 annual observations per household
(out of a maximum possible of 20), providing a long history of observations. My HRS sample
will not exactly reflect participation patterns observed from a cross-section of ever-married
individuals from the U.S. census, or similar sample. The omission of divorced, separated, and
previously-widowed households increases the sample’s labor force participation slightly, but
eliminating those households that ever apply for Social Security disability benefits increases
the sample’s labor force participation at all ages by approximately 10%. This result is not
surprising since individuals who credibly apply for disability will likely have a reduced ability
to participate in the labor force.
I use a subsample to estimate my model, consisting of all households with one member
born between 1931-35. This results in a final sample size of 948. I use the subsample born
between 1937-41 for testing the out-of-sample fit of the model after it is estimated. Table
4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the subsample used in the estimation of the model. A
more detailed version of the sample selection and sample statistics for the entire sample as
well as the out-of-sample fit cohort are included in Appendix E.
Given that I am looking at households where at least one member was born between 1931-
35, it is not surprising that the median age of men and women is 60.5 and 58.2, respectively.
The average diﬀerence in age of a married couple is 3 years. The sample is primarily white,
with slightly more than a high school education on average. Assets are heavily skewed, as
expected, with mean assets being $339,267 and median assets being only $182,558. Perhaps
the most surprising feature of the data is that the fraction of women eligible for the spouse’s
benefit is roughly equal across the asset distribution. This will be particularly noteworthy
when I discuss the reaction to changes in the spouse’s benefit by asset quantile in §6.4.
16Additionally, I drop annual observations if employment or health status of either household member
is not reported, and if health insurance status cannot be determined when the household is less than age
65 (Medicare age). Households with two defined benefit pensions are dropped (170 households) because
calculation of their decision rules takes the same time as the remainder of the sample.
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4.2 Social Security
This paper’s core research question is the eﬀect of Social Security’s benefit structure on the
retirement decision of a couple. Therefore, in this section I carefully detail the incentives
created by Social Security’s benefit structure, and which are included in my model. The
HRS has detailed earnings histories from the Social Security Administration, which permits
using true earnings histories to calculate an individual’s financial alternatives based his or
her own claiming and labor supply decision as well as the claiming and labor supply decision
of his or her spouse. Social Security is based on a worker’s best 35 years of earnings, but
similar models of life-cycle labor supply do not incorporate that benefit growth rates diﬀer
by individual because of the variation in individuals’ earnings histories. The model includes
the specific Social Security rules as they apply to the primary earner and the earner’s spouse
and survivor, as well as the special tax treatment of Social Security, the earnings test, and
each worker’s unique earnings history.
An earner is defined as someone who contributes to the Old Age and Disability Social
Insurance Program, which I will refer to as Social Security. This program has three major
parts: (i) a pension benefit for the earner, (ii) auxiliary benefits for an earner’s spouse,
survivor, and in some cases children and parents, and (iii) a disability benefit. In the next
two subsections I will focus on the first two parts of the Social Security program. I leave the
additional complexity of integrating spousal decisions with disability application decisions
to future work. In the final subsection, I describe how Social Security benefits can be taxed
or reduced due to work.
4.2.1 Primary Earner Benefits
An earner qualifies for a Social Security benefit (i.e. becomes insured) if he or she has 40
qualifying quarters of coverage (QC).17 His or her benefit is computed using a multistep
formula. First, the earner’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) is calculated by
taking the average of the best 35 years of earnings since 1950, where earnings before age 60
are indexed by the average annual wage at age 60 (earnings after age 60 are not indexed).18
Second, the earner’s primary insurance amount (PIA) is based on a progressive calculation,
where the earner receives 90% of his or her first $761 of AIME, 32% of the next $3,825 of
17In some cases, a worker can become qualified if he or she has less than 40 QCs. These include earners
who were born before 1928 who only need the the diﬀerence between the year they reach age 62 and 1950
to qualify (e.g. an earner born in 1926 will only need 38 QCs). An earner must have a minimum of 6 QCs
at any point to qualify for coverage.
18Alternatively, for those born before 1928, the number of years used in this calculation is only the diﬀerence
between the year they reach age 62 and 1955 (e.g. an earner born in 1926 will only use their best 33 years
of earnings since 1950)
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AIME, and 15% of AIME over $4,586 (assuming reaching age 62 in 2010). The PIA bend
points change every year based on the average U.S. annual wage. For an earner, they are
calculated using the bend points in the year the worker reached age 62. Third, the AIME is
increased each year by a cost of living adjustment based on the consumer price index.
Finally, if the earner claims his or her Social Security Benefit (SSB) in the month he or
she achieves the full retirement age, then the benefit is equal to the PIA. The full retirement
age is 65 for workers born before 1938 and increases gradually to age 67 for any earners
born after 1959. Alternatively, earners may choose to claim their benefits as early as age 62.
An early claimer’s benefit, however, is reduced by 6.67% for the first three years before the
full retirement age and then reduced by an additional 5% for any additional years. Earners
may also choose to claim their benefits after the full retirement age, in which case these
benefits are increased by up to 8% for each year of delayed claiming up to age 70. The
delayed retirement credit has been gradually increasing over the sample period in order to
avoid disincentivizing work - previously the delayed retirement credit was only 1% annually.
4.2.2 Auxiliary Benefits
An earner’s spouse or survivor, and in some cases children and parents, may be eligible for
a SSB based on the earner’s earnings history. In this paper, since I am looking at older
couples, I ignore the child and parent benefits since they are unlikely to apply.
A spouse’s primary benefit amount is 50% of the earner’s PIA. If the spouse claims the
benefit before his or her full retirement age, this amount is reduced by 8.33% per year for the
first 3 years and an additional 5% per year for any earlier years. The spouse is not credited
for delayed claiming. A spouse is eligible to claim a benefit on the earner’s earnings history,
only if the earner has also claimed Social Security benefits and the spouse is at least 62.
Therefore, for a spouse who claims the benefit at age 62 and has a full-retirement age of 67,
the maximum reduction is 35%. A spouse can only have the better of the spouse’s benefit
and his or her own benefit.
A survivor’s primary benefit amount is the greater of 82.5% of the earner’s PIA or the
SSB the earner would be eligible for if he or she was alive.19 A survivor may claim the SSB
as early as age 60. If the survivor claims the benefit before his or her full-retirement age, this
amount is reduced by the number of months before his or her full-retirement age divided by
the total number of months between his or her full retirement age and age 60 times 28.5%.
19If the earner was entitled to delayed retirement credits, then the survivor would receive the higher benefit
level after accounting for these credits. Alternatively, if the earner had claimed his or her benefit early, then
the survivor would receive the lower benefit level. The ability of the benefit reduction to impact the survivor
is capped at 17.5% (the equivalent of claiming 31.5 months before the earner’s normal retirement age).
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Therefore, regardless of full-retirement age, the maximum reduction is 28.5% for a widow
who claims the benefit at age 60.
There are complex ways of claiming benefits that can increase the lifetime benefit levels
of dual income couples that involve suspending benefits. For simplicity, I do not model the
choice to suspend one’s benefits after the normal retirement age.20
4.2.3 Benefit Taxation and Reduction
Social Security benefits can be taxed or reduced in four ways: the earnings test for early
claimers who continue work, income taxation, the windfall elimination provision, and the
government pension oﬀset. In calculating the decision rules and simulating my model, I will
only account for the earnings test and income taxation.
The earnings test applies to anyone who works after claiming Social Security benefits.
Prior to 2000, anyone between the age of 62 and the normal retirement age who had claimed
benefits would have their benefit reduced by $1 for every $2 earned above an exempt amount
(the exempt amount was $14,160 in 2010). Between the normal retirement age and age 70,
the reduction factor was $1 for every $3 earned. In 2000, the earning test was eliminated
for earners above the normal retirement age.21 Any benefits that are reduced or eliminated
by the earnings test, are returned to the worker at his normal retirement age. This is best
illustrated with an example. Suppose a worker claims his benefits at age 62, but continues
working until his normal retirement age. If he earns enough income to have his benefits
eliminated before his normal retirement age due to the earnings test, then his benefits at
normal retirement age would be equivalent to the benefits he would receive had he claimed
at his normal retirement age. The earnings test has been shown in previous studies using
structural models to have a significant impact on older workers’ incentives to work (French,
2005; van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008).22
Depending on the household’s adjusted gross income, part of its Social Security benefits
may be subject to the standard U.S. income tax. In 2012, for married individuals, incomes
below $32,000 were exempt, 50% of the total SSB was taxable for incomes from $32,001 to
$44,000, and 85% of the total SSB was taxable for incomes above $44,000. These taxable
20Claim and suspend is only available for individuals born after 1937, which is a small portion of my
estimation sample since his or her spouse would have to be born in 1931-35 to be included in the estimation
sample.
21It was also changed to $1 for every $3 earned in the year in which the earner reaches full retirement age,
with a higher exempt amount in that year. This was done for individuals, if their birthday occurred late
in the year, who would have their Social Security benefit eliminated by the earnings test if they claimed on
their birthdate, because of high earnings in the months prior to claiming the benefit.
22Using a reduced form model, Gruber and Orszag (2003), find no robust influence of the labor supply
decision on men, but some suggestive evidence for women.
24
amounts, unlike most of Social Security’s provisions, are not indexed to inflation, implying
they will become more binding over time. Further detail surrounding the taxing of Social
Security benefits is included in Appendix A, with the discussion of how all taxes are accounted
for in my model.
The windfall elimination provision and the government pension oﬀset pertain to benefit
reductions for individuals who have non-covered pensions. Currently, I am not able to
distinguish between covered and non-covered pensions, and, therefore, do not include the
windfall elimination provision and the government pension oﬀset as part of my estimation.
4.3 Pensions
There are two major types of pension plans made available to employees in the United States,
defined benefit and defined contribution retirement plans. Defined benefit plans (DB) pay a
monthly benefit once the earner has claimed benefits and the investment risk is borne by the
employer. Alternatively, defined contribution plans (DC) are accounts that an employer and
employee can pay into (e.g. IRAs, 401(k) or 403(b) accounts), and then the employee is able
to manage the account, and the investment risk is borne by the employee. Many employers
have developed combination plans which have both a DB and DC component, but these are
generally managed separately, the DC plan by an external investment agency (e.g. ING,
Fidelity, etc.) and the DB plan managed by the employer or someone contracting with the
employer (e.g. State Teacher Retirement Systems, unions, etc.) that absorbs a portion of
the investment risk.
The HRS collects information from study respondents about whether or not they have a
pension plan and, upon an aﬃrmative response, will approach the respondent’s employer to
collect the pension plan’s summary plan description (SPD). SPDs were coded into a pension
calculator produced by the HRS and made available to researchers.
In Appendix F, I describe the two types of pension plans, as well as a few additional
technical assumptions. For the purposes of the model presented here, the HRS pension
calculator is used to predict the benefit level upon leaving the firm for any period following
baseline. DB pension benefits are treated as income for tax purposes. Individuals who
reported having a DB plan but for whom there was not a SPD are dropped from the sample.
Defined contribution plans are converted to post-tax savings at baseline, and are treated as
post-tax savings in subsequent periods.23
23Appendix F describes this conversion in greater detail. This is done primarily as a simplification because
I do not retain separate state variables for pre- and post-tax savings.
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5 Estimation
In this section, I introduce the estimation strategy for the model. I use a two-step estimation
method that is increasingly common in the life-cycle literature (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
French, 2005). First, key parameters that can be identified from the data are estimated (i.e.
health transition rates, mortality transition rates, and earnings profiles), and others, such as
the growth rate of assets, are calibrated.
In the second step, using the first step estimates and calibrations,  ˆ, I estimate the
preference parameters, ✓, using method of simulated moments (MSM). Due to complexity
of the model, I can not solve for ✓ directly, but instead calculate the optimal decision rules
for a given “guess” of ✓, which I will refer to as ✓ˆ. Using the optimal decision rules for
✓ˆ, I simulate life cycle profiles of households’ labor supply, benefit claiming, and savings
decisions. I then match moments observed from the data (generated by the true ✓), to
their counterpart moments from the simulation model (generated by ✓ˆ). I iterate on this
process until the model matches the data moments as closely as possible. Identification of
the model’s parameters is heavily dependent on the choice of moment conditions, which are
discussed in §5.2. Further details about the econometric and computational procedures are
specified in Appendix B - D.
5.1 First Step
The model presented in §10 describes how a household makes choices across time and between
consumption and leisure, but does not specify how individuals’ earnings are determined and
evolve over time, nor how households transition between uncertain states of health, mortality,
and medical expenses. In this section I describe how I estimate part-time and full-time
earnings paths for each member of the household, how I use observed HRS data to estimate
transitions between uncertain states, and how I use subjective questions to estimate discrete
preference types that capture unobserved diﬀerences in household’s preferences for own and
joint leisure. These intermediate “sub-models” are assumed to be true when solving the
decision rules to estimate the preference parameters in the second step.
5.1.1 Annual Earnings
Earnings are known to the individual (i.e. there is no wage uncertainty). Assuming an
individual is working at baseline, he or she may continue to receive the same level of nominal
annual earnings in perpetuity.24 The assumption of constant wage growth is necessary to
24This implies, given the assumption that inflation is 2%, that the real value of annual earnings fall by 2%
per year. This is equivalent to the observed (negative) real wage growth rate of continuing workers from the
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remain consistent with the predicted defined benefit paths in the HRS pension calculator.
Every individual, regardless of whether he or she is working at baseline, may choose
to work in a full-time or part-time non-baseline job. The evolution of earnings for full-
time non-baseline jobs is determined from using a fixed-eﬀect regression on a quartic in age
and quadratic in firm tenure. The initial non-baseline earnings are determined from the
residual of the fixed-eﬀect regression, or, if that information is missing, is estimated from
the individual’s lifetime earnings (via the AIME), education, race, and baseline wage (if it
exists). A separate, but similar, procedure is followed for estimating part-time earnings. A
detailed description of the non-baseline earnings estimation process is included in Appendix
G.
5.1.2 Health and Mortality
Following other papers in the literature (Rust and Phelan (1997); Blau and Gilleskie (2008,
2006)), I assume that health takes one of two discrete states: good or bad. I consider an
individual in good health if he or she reports being in either good, very good, or excellent
health; otherwise, if he or she reports poor or fair health, I treat the individual as being in
poor health.
I estimate per period transitions using a logit model, where the probability of transition-
ing, ⇡ij, from state i 2 {good,bad} to state j 2 {good,bad} is a function of the individual’s
age, and previous health status. Obviously future health depends on current health, and it
is well known that diﬀerent ages and genders have higher propensities for poorer health.
Similarly, I estimate per period transitions from life to death using a logit model, where
individual i’s probability of surviving to period t + 1 conditional on surviving to period
t, sit+1, is a function of the individual’s age and previous health status. Since individuals
have information about their health when making their labor supply decision, the estimated
probability of mortality must be accounted for when making forward-looking projections of
income flows.
The transitions between health states as well as from life to death are as expected: rising
in age, and more favorable for women. A more detailed graphical analysis is provided in
Appendix H.
5.1.3 Medical Expenses and Insurance
Respondents report whether or not they have access to health insurance through their current
employer and whether that insurance continues into retirement. The HRS also identifies
sample used in the model’s estimation.
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if the respondent’s spouse has insurance coverage and whether that persists in retirement.
Therefore, I identify three possibles states for health insurance: retiree coverage, no coverage,
and tied coverage (i.e. insurance coverage that only exists as long as the employee continues
to work). I assume that if one household member has health insurance, then they both have
health insurance.
In the model, stochastic medical expenses are realized after the household’s labor sup-
ply choice. Medical expenses are assumed to be log normally distributed. The mean and
standard deviation of medical care expense are estimated conditional on the household’s
health status, access to health insurance, work status, and age, with a discontinuity at age
65 to capture Medicare eligibility. I include details about how the medical distribution is
calculated in Appendix I.
Due to computational concerns, I model medical expenses only as a transitory shock to
income, which will have the eﬀect of biasing the precautionary savings incentive downward,
thus reducing an individual’s attachment to the labor force. There will be some persistence in
medical expenditures because I model persistence in health status, which will aﬀect medical
expenses.
5.1.4 Preference Types
Households can vary based on characteristics that will be reflected in their preference for
consumption versus leisure, but are not otherwise captured by the typical state variables.
For this reason I include a finite number of discrete preference types, as in Keane and
Wolpin (1997), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), and French and Jones (2011), to capture
heterogeneity in preference for own and joint leisure.
My model is estimated on the HRS cohort of households that are married in 1992, with
one member born between 1931 and 1935, implying that many of the long-term decisions
of the household are established (i.e. who works, how much is saved, how much time is
spent together). I allow for households to vary by how its members value their own and
joint-leisure to account for the fact that the model will not capture household formation and
bargaining prior to when the household is first observed at baseline (i.e. 1992).
The preference for own-leisure is determined, as in French and Jones (2011), by questions
such as “Even if I didn’t need the money, I would probably keep on working” and questions
about how much each individual enjoys his or her job. The second source of heterogeneity is
likewise determined by questions regarding if the couple enjoys time together, looks forward
to joint retirement, and who controls the family finances. I convert the responses to these
questions, asked in 1992, into binary measures and include them in predicting the husband
and wife’s labor force participation after 1998, while controlling for the state variables in
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the model (i.e. age, health, assets, earnings, health insurance, Social Security benefit level,
private pension levels, and marital status). For each individual, the own-leisure preference
index is the sum of the work preference coeﬃcients multiplied by their respective independent
variables, and similarly for the spousal (or joint) preference index. The household’s work or
spousal preference index is simply the equally weighted sum for each household member’s
respective preference indices. By partitioning the indices at each measures’ median, the
index is converted into a binary measure (i.e. high and low) of the household’s preference
for own-leisure or joint-leisure.
I observe that a high preference for own-leisure is positively correlated with earnings,
assets, AIME, defined-benefit pension flows, and negatively correlated with health. A high
preference for spousal leisure is positively correlated with assets and health, but negatively
correlated with earnings and AIME. An “out’ preference index is created for households who
were not asked the work questions in the first period because they were not working. As
noted in Table 4.1, the initial distribution consists of 17.4% of the “out” preference type
and a relatively even distribution between the four other preference types. In Appendix J,
I describe the questions in detail and provide additional information on how the preference
index is calculated.
The subscript ⌧ represents diﬀerent preference types based on preferences for own and
joint leisure. If model parameters vary only based on preference for joint leisure, they are
denoted ⌧(s). Since household preference heterogeneity is expected to aﬀect consumption,
time, own-leisure, and joint leisure, I allow the parameters that directly augment these to
vary my preference type (i.e. ↵⌧ ,  ⌧ ,  i,⌧ ,  i,⌧(s),  i,SP,⌧(s), and  i,SFT,⌧(s)). As  i,SP,⌧(s), and
 i,SFT,⌧(s) reflect the eﬀects of joint leisure, I allow these to only vary based on household
preference types pertaining to spousal leisure in order to ease the computational burden.
5.1.5 Remaining Calibrations
I calibrate the real growth rate of assets, r, to 4%, and normalize the endowment of leisure,
L, to 4. I choose this endowment of leisure because it implies that full time work is equivalent
to a quarter of the leisure endowment. A quarter of leisure endowment falls between the
annual equivalent, 2000 hours8760 hours , and the daily equivalent
8 hours
24 hours for full-time work. Finally, I set
$1 of consumption in a two person household to be equivalent to $1.50 of consumption in a
widowed household, Csingle = 1.5 ⇥ Cmarried. This is done because households may benefit
from economies of scale, and this ratio reflects the implicit economies of scale assumed by the
Social Security Administration when handling single versus dual household benefits through
the Supplemental Security Income program.
Similar to other papers in this literature, I set a maximum age for claiming benefits and
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working, age 70, and a maximum lifespan of 110 to reduce the computational burden.25
5.2 Second Step (Moment Conditions & Identification)
The purpose of the MSM is to find the simulated moments that approximately match the
same moments calculated from the observed data. In this section, I specify which simu-
lated moment conditions I match to moment conditions from the observed data in the HRS
sample, and discuss how they will identify the model’s parameters. The full set of pref-
erence parameters include: ✓ = {↵⌧ ,  ⌧ ,, ✓B, cmin,  i,⌧ ,  H ,  W , ⇢HW ,  i,⌧(s),  i,age,  i,health,
 i,SP,⌧(s),  i,SFT,⌧(s)
 
, where ✓ 2 ⇥ and ⇥ ⇢ R48.
I divide any moments using household assets into thirds to capture the dispersion of
assets in the data. The moment conditions which are matched include:
1. Mean assets by tertile, for the first two “thirds” (thirds⇥ age = 2⇥ 12 moments),
2. Share of households within each asset tertile by preference type, for the first two “thirds”
(⌧ ⇥ thirds⇥ age = 5⇥ 2⇥ 12 moments)
3. Labor force participation by preference type, (⌧ ⇥ sex⇥ age = 5⇥ 2⇥ 12 moments)
4. Percent working full-time, conditional on working, excluding first preference type which
does not work in the first period, ((⌧   1)⇥ sex⇥ age = 4⇥ 2⇥ 12 moments)
5. Labor force participation by health (health status⇥ sex⇥ age = 2⇥ 2⇥ 12 moments)
for a total of 34 ⇥ 12 = 408 moments.26 The technical details of how these moments are
calculated, the MSM, the optimization algorithm, and the calculation of the standard errors
are included in Appendix D.
Households vary at baseline by their potential earnings, accumulated assets, spousal
age diﬀerence, race, and many other factors fixed at baseline based on previous decisions.
While there is not space to discuss the identification for each of the model’s 48 preference
parameters, I provide an argument for identification, using ↵⌧ and  ⌧ as examples. For the
remaining parameters, I indicate where I expect the primary sources of identification.
Consider households A and B, identical except for the fact that in household A the
couple is the same age, and in household B the wife is 10 years younger. Variation in
25Age 70 corresponds to the last age where Social Security benefits are adjusted for delayed retirement.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Toossi (2012)), 2010 male [female] labor force participation
between 70-74 was 22.0% [14.7%], and between 75-79 was 14.5 [8.2%].
26I exclude the highest asset tertile because these households, with an average of over $800,000 in combined
assets, are likely to be very sensitive to the rate of return, which is fixed in this model.
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these two households’ savings will identify the willingness of the household to substitute
consumption across time (i.e. ↵⌧ ), because household B will find it necessary to consume
less and save more to account for the extended lifetime of the wife (moment cases (1) and
(2)). If households highly value a smooth rate of consumption over time, then we would
expect a large ↵⌧ . Alternatively, the discount rate ( ⌧ ) aﬀects the instantaneous utility, a
composite of household consumption and the husband and wife’s leisure, so it is identified
by variation across time from households with the same consumption and leisure choices.
If households’ instantaneous utility decreases over time, then  ⌧ < 1. Unlike models of
infinitely lived households, the discount rate can exceed 1 if the household values higher
levels of future instantaneous utility.
The preference parameter for leisure,  i,⌧ , for gender i 2 {H,W} and household preference
⌧ , is identified by variation in participation and full-time work (moment cases (3) and (4)).
The time-invariant household bargaining parameter,  i,⌧(s), weights i’s leisure relative to
household consumption and is identified by variation in how households weight each member
i’s leisure relative to consumption when making decisions. Variation in how the household
members weight consumption versus leisure over time identifies  i,age. Finally, the joint
retirement parameters,  i,SFT,⌧(s) and  i,SP,⌧(s), are identified by time-invariant variation in
husband and wife’s preference for own leisure based on the other’s leisure choice.27
The bequest parameters and the minimal consumption level are determined by the upper
and lower asset quantiles respectively from moment cases (1) and (2), because they are
treated as both time and preference invariant.
The last 48 moment conditions help to identify the impact of health by gender on the
relative value for leisure,  H,health and  W,health. Finally, the variance and covariance of the
fixed eﬀects by gender,  H ,  W and ⇢HW , are identified by time-invariant individual variation
not otherwise described by the model.
5.3 Parameter Estimates
Using the procedure specified above, I estimate the model using the subsample of the married
households from §4.1, specifically those households where one member was born between 1931
and 1935. The remainder of the sample is used in §5.5 to provide an out-of-sample test of the
model based on the parameter estimates. Individual labor supply varies across the life-cycle
due to changes in preference for leisure,  i,age, increased risk of falling into bad health or
dying, and spousal labor supply decisions.
27Consider the husband’s return from his wife working full-time,  H,SFT,⌧(s), within joint preference type
⌧(s). All else constant,  H,SFT,⌧(s) is identified by variation in the husband’s willingness to work when his
wife moves from full-time work to either part-time or no work.
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Table 5.1 presents the parameter estimates and their standard errors. Recall that ↵⌧
represents constant relative risk aversion with respect to consumption. High values of ↵⌧
imply that a household is highly risk averse and hence does not want to substitute consump-
tion across time. As a result, it is willing to consume less today if it can be guaranteed
the same level of consumption tomorrow. Conditioning on the discount rate, a high ↵⌧ can
shift consumption across time and lead to precautionary savings. I would expect this to be
particularly important for this sample because older individuals are at risk for substantial
medical expenses, and risk averse agents would stockpile assets to guarantee a specific level
of consumption in every period. The estimates in table 5.1 show values for ↵⌧ between 2.81
and 3.15, which is consistent with estimates for the CRRA coeﬃcient with respect to con-
sumption, commonly found in the macro literature on consumption smoothing. It is lower
than 3.72-7.27 found by French and Jones (2011), and much greater than estimates typically
found in the structural retirement literature, such as 1.072 (Rust and Phelan, 1997), 1.26
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005a), and 1.59-1.67 (van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008).28 I
believe this results from my choice to match asset holdings across time and modeling both
husband and wife: the data indicates that many households accumulate assets over their 60s,
building up large stockpiles of assets. This pattern is hard to match without significant risk
aversion. Of the papers that match moments based on asset measures (e.g. van der Klaauw
and Wolpin (2008); French and Jones (2011)), my estimates fall in between. Furthermore,
since I use respondent data from 10 interview waves of the HRS, my estimation method will
put more weight on the ability to describe asset accumulation at older ages (as compared to
3 waves in van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)).
Households discount future flows of expected instantaneous utility, described in (3.1),
by  ⌧ . Specifically,  ⌧ acts as a temporal weight on combined utility in period t relative to
period t+1. For example, if  ⌧ = 1, then the individual values utility today the same as the
utility tomorrow (conditioning on survival). Alternatively, if  ⌧ < 1, then the household’s
utility will decrease over its life-cycle if it does not face liquidity constraints because utility
(and hence consumption) is valued more today. Alternatively, if  ⌧ > 1 this implies that
a household weights utility tomorrow more relative to today, which is possible if a finitely
lived household demands more utility in old age. The estimates in table 5.1 show that  ⌧
ranges from 0.890 to 0.942, which is consistent with existing values found in the literature
and implies significant heterogeneity in the population in rates of time preference.
Each individual in a household earns diminishing returns from leisure based on  i,⌧ ,
28There is also a separate literature using behavioral questions from the HRS to determine the CRRA
coeﬃcient. Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) find risk aversion to be very heterogenous across
the population, with many people being very risk averse. Correcting for measurement error, they find the
mean CRRA to be 12.1.
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Table 5.1: Preference Parameter Estimates
Parameters based on type
Preference Type Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
(Own L.,Joint L.) (Out) (High , Low) (Low , Low) (High , High) (Low, High)
↵⌧ 3.1480 2.8592 2.8193 2.9502 2.8736
Consumption (0.0924) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0082)
 ⌧ 0.9072 0.8903 0.9242 0.9414 0.9013
Discount Rate (0.0205) (0.0079) (0.0095) (0.0089) (0.0083)
 H,⌧ 1.7676 1.5762 1.6042 1.7080 1.5685
Leisure (0.1173) (0.0521) (0.0666) (0.0492) (0.0440)
 W,⌧ 1.2338 1.0051 1.0065 1.0595 1.1624
Leisure (0.0913) (0.0682) (0.0246) (0.0343) (0.0518)
 H,⌧(s) -18.8057 -19.8134 -19.9252
Leisure Weight (0.6725) (0.1032) (0.1237)
 W,⌧(s) -19.7558 -19.7589 -20.2805
Leisure Weight (1.4704) (0.1018) (0.1207)
E
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H
us
ba
nd  H,SP,⌧(s) -0.0910 -0.0203 -0.0201
Participation (0.8783) (0.0015) (0.0010)
 H,SFT,⌧(s) -0.0661 -0.1411 -0.0817
Full-time work (0.7060) (0.0089) (0.0039)
W
ife
 W,SP,⌧(s) -0.0698 -0.0055 -0.0222
Participation (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0014)
 W,SFT,⌧(s) -0.0845 -0.0857 -0.1224
Full-time work (0.2974) (0.0071) (0.0042)
Parameters common to all types
 H,age 0.1852  297,050
Husband’s Age-60 (0.0039) Bequest Shifter (3465)
 W,age 0.1904 ✓B 114,364
Wife’s Age-60 (0.0046) Bequest intensity (2708)
 H,health 1.1037
Husband’s Health (0.0262)
 W,health 0.9233 cmin 5667
Wife’s Health (0.0367) Consumption Floor (70.59)
 "H 0 ⇢HW 0
Husband’s Leisure shock n.e. Corr. between n.e.
 "H 0 Husband and Wife’s
Wife’s Leisure shock n.e. Leisure shock
Degrees of Freedom 363
q
⇣
✓ˆ,  ˆ
⌘
2552.6
Notes: n.e. = not estimated. Degrees of Freedom = 408 moments in MSM procedure - 45 preference
parameters. Parameters are estimated using method of simulated moments - see Appendix D for
technical details.
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which can be interpreted as the willingness to spread leisure across time. A lower  i,⌧ implies
an individual is more responsive to changes in earnings, and is more willing to substitute
leisure across time. Alternatively, a higher  i,⌧ , common for men, indicates labor supply is
unresponsive to changes in earnings. My results support that women’s labor supply is more
responsive than men’s labor supply, as in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
In a model with no joint leisure ( i,SFT,⌧(s) = 0 and  i,SP,⌧(s) = 0), the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is given by 1 i,⌧ . I consider what my estimates imply about the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply if I ignore the joint leisure term, since the rareness of a factor that accounts
for non-separability in spousal leisure prevents a more meaningful comparison. My estimates
of  i,⌧ for men [women] indicate that it falls between 1.56 [1.01] and 1.77 [1.23], implying that
the Frisch Elasticities without joint leisure are between 0.56 [0.81] and 0.64 [0.99]. For men,
these are generally higher than estimates found using panel studies of male labor supply in
the micro-labor literature, which typically fall between 0 and 0.5. Additionally, these values
are less than the range of Frisch elasticities usually necessary to capture aggregate volatility
in macro labor models, which usually fall between 2 and 4 (see Peterman (2012) and Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) for useful surveys). For women, the estimates for  W,⌧ are similar to
U.S. studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which have found values closer to
1 (Trieste, 1990; Hausman, 1981). The diﬀerences for men may be explained in part by the
older sample used here, since previous studies have typically focused on younger men who
tend to always work.
Beyond the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, gender variations within a household occur
based on age and health status (i.e.  i,age and  i,health). If older and sick individuals value
leisure more, then we would expect that  i,age,  i,health > 0, which is confirmed by my results.
Additionally, I allow each spouse to exhibit an external influence on the individual’s
return from leisure based on whether the spouse is participating in the workforce,  i,SP,⌧(s),
or, working full-time,  i,SFT,⌧(s). If  i,SP,⌧(s),  i,SFT,⌧(s) < 0, then the individual considers his
or her spouse’s leisure as complementary, implying if one’s spouse takes more leisure-time,
then the individual will also take more leisure-time. The point estimates indicate that men
in general find their wives’ leisure time to be complementary for their own leisure. Women
from households with a low joint leisure preference type find their husbands’ labor force
participation to have little eﬀect on their own preference for leisure. Similarly, Gustman and
Steinmeier (2004a), using a similar model and assuming no uncertainty, find that while the
husband values joint retirement, the wife is indiﬀerent.
Finally, permanent and unobserved changes arising from diﬀerences between individuals
in a marriage are captured by the realization of "i, but as of this draft, estimates for the
variance and correlation between "H and "W have not been completed. These will be included
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in a future revision.
The consumption floor, cmin, is primarily identified by the lower asset quantiles, and is
considered time-invariant. It represents the household’s guaranteed per period consumption
as a result of government welfare plans. The estimate of $5,667 is below $7,687, which is the
annual value of 2012 SSI benefits for a couple (discounted to 1992 dollars). It is not surprising
for this value to be lower. As in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), the consumption
floor aﬀects all portions of the asset distribution because households fear the uncertainty
of substantial medical expenses late in life that would make this constraint binding. A
consumption floor below SSI levels may indicate loss aversion, an additional disutility of
ending up in a bad state due to significant medical expenses, that is not otherwise captured
by the model.
Finally, as in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), the bequest parameters ✓B and  rep-
resent the bequest intensity and a bequest shifter, respectively. Using these parameters, and
comparing the marginal utility of consumption in the last period to the discounted marginal
utility from the bequest, I derive a marginal propensity to bequeath of 0.98. Moreover,
 · (✓B ·  )  1↵ , represents the minimal flow of per period assets where the bequest motive
begins to impact the individual’s consumption choices. This implies a very low level where
the bequest motive becomes eﬀective of around $5,850. Taken together, this implies that
the bequest motive in this model is very strong, driving many households to save.
5.4 Model Fit (In-sample)
The over-identification test in table 5.1 rejects the model at the 1% level (428.6). The model,
however, is able to capture important details of the household lifecycle such as the gradual
decline in labor force participation among both sexes, with pronounced labor force exit at age
62. It is also able to capture asset accumulation across the population when the husband
is in his 60s. Finally, the model captures phenomena observed in the data that are not
matched as part of the estimation: the twin peaks of labor force exit at ages 62 and 65 (as
in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986a)), the large claiming of Social Security benefits at age
62, and the joint retirement of dual-career households.
In this section, I report the moment profiles from both actual and simulated data to
develop an understanding of how well the model matches the moments specified in the
estimation process. For moments that are matched for all preference types, I only include
graphical illustrations of households that have a high preference for their own-leisure and
low preference for joint-leisure (the rest are included in Appendix K). Additionally, I analyze
non-matched moment profiles for SSB claiming based on HRS’s linked Social Security claims
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histories, male labor force exit rates, and the prevalence of joint retirement.
5.4.1 Matched Profiles
Figure 5.1 reports the data and simulated moments for asset quantiles. The data indicate
that household assets rise from age 58-69, as individuals save assets for retirement. The
mean asset level for a household in the lower third of the asset distribution at age 62 is
approximately $80,000, while the average asset level for someone in the second third of the
asset distribution is slightly more than double that amount, at about $200,000. Note that the
highest third have assets that grow very quickly, from an average of approximately $800,000
at age 62 to over $1.2 million at age 69. The model is able to match the means of the first two
asset quantiles well. These are the only ones that are matched because the third quantile is
sensitive to extreme asset values in the HRS data, something the model is not well-equipped
to capture because the real rate of return is fixed at 4%.29
Household types have diﬀerent propensities to save as noted in Table 5.1. As a result, the
share of each household type in a given quantile varies. For households with a high preference
for their own-leisure and low preference for joint-leisure (i.e. type 1), the household needs to
accumulate assets in order to retire early. A disproportionate share of households therefore
fall into the middle and top thirds of the asset distribution. Figure 5.2 reveals that the share
of this household type in a given asset quantile is matched well by the simulation. Similar
descriptive relationships exist for the other preference types, such as households that have
high preference for joint-leisure (i.e. types 3 and 4) are more likely to have lower incomes.
Figure K.2, in Appendix K, reveals that the model does a good job of matching the asset
distribution of the overall sample as divided by preference type.
Next, I consider the impact of preference type on individual labor force participation.
In figure 5.3, both men and women’s labor force participation by age is charted for type 1
households. For men in households with a high preference type for own-leisure, the men are
far more likely to exit the labor force after the age of 61. This results in a sharp 40-45%
decrease in labor force participation between age 62 and 69 for these types. For women,
the decline in labor force participation is less dramatic, because fewer women are working
to begin with. The model over predicts initial participation, and predicts a sharper than
observed exit between ages 60-64. Figures K.3 and K.4, in Appendix K, reveal that, among
all the preference types, the model is able to predict the downward trends in participation
for men and women over their 60s.
The remaining moments on full-time work and health’s influence on participation are
29Figure K.1 in Appendix K provides a closer view of the first two thirds to verify that they do indeed
match well.
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Figure 5.1: Asset Quantiles (by thirds) by Male Age
captured in figures K.5, K.6, and K.7 in Appendix K. The model has the most diﬃculty
reproducing the employment composition of the workforce (i.e. part-time versus full-time),
which could reflect my coarse discretization of labor supply - using 2 discrete states instead
of hours. As expected, figure K.7, in the appendix, indicates that individuals in bad health
are more likely to not work.
5.4.2 Unmatched Profiles
Specifically excluded from the estimation procedure was matching any moments directly
related to labor force exit, benefit claiming, or joint retirement. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, a puzzling aspect of retirement behavior is that there exist spikes in retirement
at ages 62 and 65, the early and normal retirement ages for Social Security (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1986a). The model does not include an age-specific preference parameters, mean-
ing that spikes in retirement ages can only arise from the structure of the constraints. As
demonstrated in figure 5.4, my model is able to reproduce the spikes in labor force exit at
these ages.
The HRS has access to administrative data from the Social Security Administration,
which I use to judge the performance of the model in matching Social Security claiming
rates. Figure 5.5 shows the benefit claiming history of the men and women in our sample.
37
Figure 5.2: Asset Quantile Shares by Preference Type
Type 1 (High Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for Spousal Leisure)
Figure 5.3: Participation by Preference Type
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Figure 5.4: Male Labor Force Exit by Age
In comparing the benefit claiming rates in figure 5.5 to figure 5.3, it is clear that male
participation rates remain high, despite over 50% of the male population claiming their
benefit at age 62. The model correctly predicts that a substantial amount of the population
claims at 62, and that women are more likely than men to claim at age 62. This means
that my model can rationalize claiming at age 62 through economic incentives, contrary
to most of the literature on Social Security benefit claiming (i.e. Coile, Diamond, Gruber,
and Jousten, 2002; Shoven and Slavov, 2013; Sass, Sun, and Webb, 2013). It also correctly
captures that very few individuals in my sample actually delay claiming beyond age 65.
Figure 5.5 shows that the model over-predicts the number of individuals who claim bene-
fits at age 62. The model also captures some benefit claiming at age 65, but not nearly to the
degree observed in the data. This is due to the disproportionate number of people claiming
at age 62. It is possible that the diﬀerences are the result of the earnings test, which may
discourage people with imperfect knowledge of Social Security from claiming until it expires
at age 65. This would not happen in the model, because individuals perfectly understand
the Social Security rules, including the fact that if benefits are taxed away through the earn-
ings test, then they are returned in future benefits in an actuarially fair way.30 The model
30Individuals who claim at 62 but continue to work until after 65 will have their benefits reduced or
eliminated until age 65. The reduced or eliminated benefits do increase the final benefits in such a way as
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overpredicts the number of men and women aﬀected by the earnings test, which is expected
because of the large number of early claimers in the simulations.
Finally, figure 5.6 shows the year diﬀerence in labor force exit rates for the subset of
households where both individuals are working full-time at baseline. A positive value in
the figure indicates that the husband retires after the wife. The model reproduces a spike
where husband and wife exit the labor force at the same time, but it cannot capture the
entire magnitude of joint labor force exit in the data. This may be due in part to the
biannual nature of the HRS survey (from which I imperfectly approximate annual labor
force participation), whereas the model predicts annual decisions.
Overall, the model is able to capture an impressive array of empirical regularities which
are not included in the model’s estimation but are able to be reproduced by the structure of
the model.
5.5 Model Fit (Out-of-sample)
Similar to French and Jones (2011), I use a subsample of the HRS population that was
not used in the estimation to confirm the out-of-sample fit of predicted results. The results
presented in §5.3 use the sample of the HRS where one individual in the household was
born between 1931 and 1935. In this validation exercise, I use the sample of the HRS
population where at least one member of the household was born between 1937 and 1941.
Some households may overlap between the two samples, but the two samples generally do
not use the same households. Since the estimation sample was between the ages of 66 and 70
in 2001, when the earnings test was eliminated, and had smaller delayed benefit increments,
their labor force participation rates are lower relative to the out-of-sample cohort.
Table 5.2a reports labor force participation rates for both the estimation sample and the
out-of-sample group. The model columns report the predicted labor force participation of
husbands and wives respectively for each sample. The over-prediction of the model columns
report the diﬀerence between the model’s prediction and the rate observed in the data. The
model over-predicts labor force participation for husbands, and under-predicts labor force
participation for wives. My model captures the higher participation rates of both men and
women in the out-of-sample group. In the out-of-sample cohort, the over-prediction of male
labor force participation relative to the data is amplified (i.e. 0.63 > 0.31) and similarly for
the under-prediction of female labor supply (i.e. -0.50 < -0.35). The diﬀerences are primarily
from households with a low preference for joint leisure (results available from author). The
to make the final benefits of someone claiming and continuing to work from 62-65 to have the same benefits
as if they had not claimed. Since the model defaults to claiming if it is indiﬀerent, this may increase the
claiming rate at age 62 relative to the normal retirement age.
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Figure 5.5: Social Security Claiming Rates
Figure 5.6: Joint Labor Force Exit for Dual Career Households
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Table 5.2: Comparison of model fit in-sample versus out-of-sample
(a) Participation Rates by Subsample and Sex
Husbands Wives
Baseline (1931-1935) Out-of-Sample (1937-41) Baseline (1931-1935) Out-of-Sample (1937-41)
Age Model Over-predictionof model Model
Over-prediction
of model Model
Over-prediction
of model Model
Over-prediction
of model
58 0.86 0.04 0.90 0.03 0.59 0.03 0.67 0.07
59 0.83 0.03 0.89 0.06 0.55 0.00 0.60 0.01
60 0.80 0.03 0.87 0.08 0.49 0.00 0.58 0.03
61 0.77 0.05 0.85 0.10 0.44 -0.02 0.51 -0.01
62 0.67 0.02 0.75 0.06 0.37 -0.05 0.41 -0.06
63 0.63 0.03 0.71 0.07 0.31 -0.05 0.35 -0.08
64 0.59 0.08 0.64 0.06 0.27 -0.07 0.32 -0.08
65 0.51 0.05 0.57 0.04 0.24 -0.04 0.27 -0.10
66 0.45 0.03 0.53 0.06 0.22 -0.03 0.25 -0.07
67 0.39 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.19 -0.03 0.22 -0.07
68 0.35 -0.02 0.45 0.04 0.17 -0.05 0.20 -0.06
69 0.31 -0.03 0.38 0.00 0.15 -0.05 0.16 -0.08
Total
(58-69) 7.16 0.31 8.03 0.63 4.00 -0.35 4.53 -0.50
Husbands Wives
Model Data Model Data
Age Baseline Diﬀerencewith Baseline Baseline
Diﬀerence
with Baseline Baseline
Diﬀerence
with Baseline Baseline
Diﬀerence
with Baseline
62 0.727 -0.002 0.577 -0.040 0.923 0.001 0.645 0.026
63 0.083 -0.001 0.076 0.004 0.023 -0.007 0.084 -0.031
64 0.060 0.005 0.136 0.022 0.015 -0.01 0.115 -0.001
65 0.075 0.006 0.162 0.047 0.015 -0.006 0.097 0.009
66 0.024 0.004 0.010 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.018 -0.012
67 0.012 -0.007 0.018 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.016 -0.007
68 0.004 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004
69 0.004 -0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.002
(b) Claiming Rates by Subsample and Sex
Notes: Table A reports the model’s predicted labor force participation rates for the stated samples. The
“over-prediction of model” columns represent how much greater the respective rate is compared to
the sample’s observed rate. Table B reports the cohort diﬀerences in benefit claiming rates predicted
by the model and observed in the data. The “Diﬀerence with Baseline” columns represent how much
greater the benefit claiming rate is in the in-sample cohort relative to the out-of-sample cohort.
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amplification could be driven by diﬀerences in how cohorts value own and joint-leisure since
the diﬀerences are driven primarily by specific preference types.
Table 5.3b reports Social Security benefit claiming rates for both the model and the
data. The baseline columns reports the predicted benefit claiming of husbands and wives
respectively for the estimate sample. The Diﬀerence with Baseline columns report the dif-
ference between the benefit claiming by the estimation sample (i.e. 1931-35 cohort) and the
out-of-sample group (i.e. 1937-41 cohort). Husbands in the younger cohort delay claiming
at age 62 by approximately 4 more percentage points relative to the older cohort. Wives in
the younger cohort increase claiming at age 62 by approximately 2 percentage points. While
the model is able to replicate the decrease in husband’s claiming at age 62 and the increase
in wives’ claiming at age 62, the changes are significantly smaller than what is observed in
the data.
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6 Policy Experiments
Using the preference parameter specification estimated in §5.3, I conduct three counterfac-
tual policy experiments: (1) the impact of eliminating or reducing the spouse’s benefit, (2)
the impact of eliminating or reducing both the spouse and survivor’s benefits, and (3) the
impact of making Social Security more progressive as proposed by the 1994-96 Social Security
Advisory Council. In each case, I will examine the policy’s predicted eﬀect on (i) household
labor supply, (ii) household benefit claiming, and (iii) the amount of Social Security benefits
paid on average per contributing earner.
6.1 Elimination of the Spouse Benefit
Using the preference parameters in §5.3, I first, using the original sample of households
(i.e. those where at least one individual was born between 1931-35), simulate eliminating
the Social Security spouse’s benefit. I then repeat the same exercise reducing the spouse’s
benefits by 50%. In tables 6.1a and 6.2a, I report the change in labor force participation from
ages 58-69 for men and women. Figures 6.1a and 6.1b show this information graphically.
The average gain in labor force participation for women with the elimination of the spouse’s
benefit is an additional 0.078 years of work (4 weeks), over ages 58-69. The eﬀect is smaller
but still positive, 0.062 additional years, when the benefit is reduced by 50%. Surprisingly,
the eﬀects for men are larger and negative. If the spouse’s benefit is eliminated [reduced by
50%] then male labor force participation decreases by 0.11 [0.07] years or 5.5 [3.4] weeks.
This suggests that the substitution eﬀect from lower returns to work dominates the income
eﬀect (see figure 2.2).
The reduction or elimination of the spouse’s benefit has a diﬀerential impact by household
types. For women, elimination of the benefit causes households with a low preference for
own-leisure and high preference for joint-leisure to increase their labor supply by 0.14 years
of work. For men, the eﬀect is largest for households with a low preference for own and joint
leisure (type 2) where work falls by 0.21 years.
Households also change their claiming behavior in response to the elimination or reduction
of the spouse’s benefits (see tables 6.1b and 6.2b). Following the elimination of the spouse’s
benefit, a small percentage of men (3.4%) and women delay claiming (5.3%), mostly to the
latest possible retirement age. Alternatively, when the benefit is reduced by 50%, claiming
behavior is largely unaﬀected.
Since benefit claiming and work histories change because of this policy experiment, I
can estimate the change in lifetime Social Security benefits. I estimate the average benefits
paid per contributing earner by simulating each household through the end of life. Using
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Table 6.1: Policy Experiment Results - Men
(a) Change in Average Labor Supply
Age Baseline Reduce Spouse’s Benefits Reduce Sp. & Surv. Benefits Increase SSby 100% by 50% by 100% by 50% Progressivity
58 0.8644 0.8593 0.8595 0.7871 0.8606 0.8647
59 0.8301 0.8253 0.8253 0.7604 0.8377 0.8413
60 0.7953 0.7895 0.7928 0.7014 0.8029 0.8032
61 0.7701 0.7659 0.7671 0.6857 0.7756 0.7744
62 0.6708 0.6680 0.6694 0.6049 0.6988 0.6986
63 0.6325 0.6261 0.6296 0.5854 0.6602 0.6612
64 0.5856 0.5764 0.5823 0.5428 0.6182 0.6209
65 0.5084 0.4922 0.5003 0.4782 0.5488 0.5559
66 0.4494 0.4401 0.4438 0.4384 0.4998 0.4998
67 0.3905 0.3772 0.3835 0.3939 0.4297 0.4347
68 0.3525 0.3405 0.3427 0.3442 0.3873 0.3874
69 0.3058 0.2890 0.2935 0.3002 0.3307 0.3349
Avg. Years 7.1554 7.0495 7.0897 6.6228 7.4501 7.4770Worked (58-69)
Diﬀerence -0.1059 -0.06570 -0.5326 0.2946 0.3216
Average Years Worked between 58-70 (Diﬀerence with Baseline)
Type 0 0.0190 -0.0003 0.1194 0.0266 0.0164
Type 1 -0.0732 -0.0293 -0.8957 0.3484 0.3454
Type 2 -0.2063 -0.1204 -0.7149 0.1402 0.2499
Type 3 -0.1940 -0.1271 -0.9649 0.3952 0.4358
Type 4 -0.0669 -0.0534 0.0625 0.4639 0.4708
Asset Quantile 1 -0.0483 -0.0405 -0.9304 0.1564 0.1675
Asset Quantile 2 -0.2028 -0.1273 -0.4900 0.2961 0.4018
Asset Quantile 3 -0.0589 -0.0235 -0.2483 0.3723 0.3500
(b) Change in Percentage Claiming at a given age
Age Reduce Spouse’s Benefits Reduce Sp. & Surv. Benefits Increase SSby 100% by 50% by 100% by 50% Progressivity
62 -0.0338 -0.0099 -0.0489 -0.0665 -0.0532
63 -0.0094 -0.0104 -0.0318 -0.0188 -0.0088
64 -0.0062 0.0015 -0.0193 -0.0084 -0.0067
65 0.0186 0.0124 0.0481 0.0572 0.0478
66 0.0024 -0.0014 0.0096 0.0125 0.0107
67 0.0064 0.0065 0.0152 0.0154 0.0037
68 0.0015 0.0015 0.0056 0.0067 0.0051
69 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0017 0.0009
70 0.0213 0.00010 0.0208 0.00030 0.0003
Notes: The first column of table (a) reports the percentage of the observed sample participating in the
labor force at each age (58-69) as predicted by the simulated model. The standard errors for men at
each age are less than 0.0020. The average years worked is calculated by summing the averages of
each age between 58 and 69. As a result, standard errors cannot be produced for the average years
worked, or the diﬀerences with the baseline model for each of the policy experiments.
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Table 6.2: Policy Experiment Results - Women
(a) Change in Average Labor Supply
Age Baseline Reduce Spouse’s Benefits Reduce Sp. & Surv. Benefits Increase SSby 100% by 50% by 100% by 50% Progressivity
58 0.5943 0.5936 0.5929 0.6899 0.6171 0.6142
59 0.5468 0.5500 0.5496 0.6440 0.5824 0.5740
60 0.4943 0.5011 0.5005 0.6067 0.5345 0.5219
61 0.4436 0.4449 0.4477 0.5527 0.4898 0.4761
62 0.3731 0.3840 0.3807 0.4858 0.4212 0.4099
63 0.3130 0.3287 0.3255 0.4365 0.3643 0.3463
64 0.2723 0.2798 0.2756 0.3857 0.3177 0.3012
65 0.2405 0.2501 0.2469 0.3600 0.2873 0.2663
66 0.2192 0.2261 0.2254 0.3251 0.2534 0.2387
67 0.1880 0.1946 0.1939 0.2889 0.2190 0.2093
68 0.1684 0.1731 0.1724 0.2657 0.2031 0.1929
69 0.1462 0.1517 0.1505 0.2282 0.1756 0.1667
Avg. Years 3.9997 4.0776 4.0616 5.2693 4.4653 4.3174Worked (58-69)
Diﬀerence 0.0779 0.0619 1.2697 0.4657 0.3178
Average Years Worked between 58-69 (Diﬀerence with Baseline)
Type 0 -0.0059 -0.00020 1.5332 0.0424 -0.0022
Type 1 0.1008 0.0765 1.6577 0.6056 0.3958
Type 2 0.0772 0.0560 0.5913 0.4124 0.2918
Type 3 0.1472 0.1128 1.8492 0.6341 0.4198
Type 4 0.0565 0.0549 0.6780 0.5245 0.4059
Asset Quantile 1 0.1338 0.1014 0.9549 0.4602 0.3060
Asset Quantile 2 0.1015 0.0820 1.2185 0.6398 0.4332
Asset Quantile 3 0.0088 0.0091 1.5345 0.1991 0.1385
(b) Change in Percentage Claiming at a given age
Age Reduce Spouse’s Benefits Reduce Sp. & Surv. Benefits Increase SSby 100% by 50% by 100% by 50% Progressivity
62 -0.0526 -0.0073 -0.057 -0.023 -0.0166
63 0.0014 -0.0003 0.0119 0.0099 0.0073
64 0.0033 0.0031 0.0063 0.0041 0.0007
65 0.0067 0.0044 0.0091 0.012 0.0069
66 0.0013 0 0.0035 0.0013 0.0004
67 0.0011 0 0.0041 0.0017 0.0009
68 0.0008 0 0.0046 -0.0004 -0.0005
69 0.0007 0 0.0048 0.0009 0.0006
70 0.0373 0 0.0127 -0.0064 0.0004
Notes: The first column of table (a) reports the percentage of the observed sample participating in the
labor force at each age (58-69) as predicted by the simulated model. The standard errors for women
at each age are less than 0.0017. The average years worked is calculated by summing the averages of
each age between 58 and 69. As a result, standard errors cannot be produced for the average years
worked, or the diﬀerences with the baseline model for each of the policy experiments.
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Table 6.3: Policy Experiment Results - Change in Benefits paid over lifetime
Sex Baseline Reduce Spouse’s Benefits Reduce Sp. & Surv. Benefits Increase SS
by 100% by 50% by 100% by 50% Progressivity
Men $175,312.88 -$1,211.43 -$1,052.08 -$1,764.32 -$103.07 -$30,246.92
Women $134,245.69 -$19,837.99 -$14,651.02 -$42,314.88 -$32,577.96 -$21,396.43
%  Due to
Men
Reduced Benefits n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 104.04%
Changed Labor Supply -4.04%
Women
Reduced Benefits 97.82% 99.27% 108.58% 104.38% 101.61%
Changed Labor Supply 2.18% 0.73% -8.58% -4.38% -1.61%
Notes: n.a. = not applicable because the change in lifetime benefits is too small to be informative. All
monetary values in 1992 dollars.
the simulated claim and work histories, I can estimate the direct reduction in benefits paid
through lower benefit levels, and the indirect eﬀects of increased benefits from longer work
histories and reduced benefits from the earnings test. While the elimination of the spouse’s
benefit should induce women to work more, it is only binding for lower earners implying the
replacement rate on the spouse’s own earnings will be high, mitigating the combined benefit
of eliminating the spouse’s benefit. The budgetary benefit will be largest if the women for
whom the spouse’s benefit is binding also work very little.
Table 6.3 presents the change in benefits paid over men and women’s lifetimes. In the
baseline case, I find that the average male will receive $175,313 in benefits, while the average
female will receive $134,246 in lifetime benefits. The elimination of the spouse’s benefit has
a negligible eﬀect on lifetime benefits for men, but decreases women’s lifetime benefits by
14.8% if spouse’s benefits are eliminated and by 10.9% if spouse’s benefits are reduced by
50%.
Recall from the analysis of claiming and labor supply that women are induced to work
more and claim later if the spouse’s benefit is eliminated, but only work longer if it is
reduced by 50%. In the second part of table 6.3, I separate the reduction in benefits into
the direct eﬀect from reducing benefits, and the indirect eﬀect from changes to claiming and
work behavior. I find that while most of the change is attributable to the direct impact
of reducing benefits, the indirect eﬀect varies based on whether benefits are reduced or
eliminated. Regardless of how much of the benefit is reduced, the longer work history,
induced by the benefit change, further reduces lifetime benefits.
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Figure 6.1: Labor Supply Response to Social Security Benefit Changes
(a) Men
(b) Women
Notes: This figure presents results from counterfactual experiments of changes in Social Security’s benefit
structure based on the model of household savings, labor supply, and benefit claiming. The model
incorporates uncertain longevity, health, and medical expenses. Sp-100% refers to eliminating the
Spouse’s Benefit. Sp-50% refers to reducing the Spouse’s Benefit by 50%. SpSurv-100% refers to
eliminating the Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits. SpSurv-50% refers to reducing the Spouse and Sur-
vivor’s Benefits by 50%. Progressivity refers to increasing the progressivity of the Social Security
Benefit formula from 90-32-15 to 90-22.4-10.5 according to one of the proposals from the 1994-6 Ad-
visory Council on Social Security. NR age + 2 refers to increasing everyone’s Normal Retirement age
by two years. 48
6.2 Elimination of the Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits
Similar to above, I first simulate eliminating the Social Security spouse and survivor’s ben-
efits. I then repeat the same exercise, but instead reduce these benefits by 50%.
The elimination of the survivor’s benefit has a significant eﬀect on lifetime benefits,
particularly for women, and has large labor supply eﬀects on both men and women. Elimi-
nating the spouse’s benefits causes female labor force participation in increase, on average,
1.27 years (66 weeks), while men decrease their labor force participation by 0.53 years (27.7
weeks). Interestingly, the model predicts that men’s labor supply response is very diﬀerent if
spouse and survivor’s benefits are reduced by 50%. Men increase their labor supply by 0.29
years (15.6 weeks) and women increase their labor supply by 0.47 years (24.2 weeks). The
diﬀerential eﬀect on men is driven by whether or not they are able to increase the annuity
value of Social Security for their surviving spouse (See figure 6.1a). If they are unable to,
as in the case of benefit elimination, then they are more likely to retire sooner - similar to
when just spouses’ benefits are reduced or eliminated. However, if the husband still has some
ability to improve his surviving wife’s income security through a higher spouse’s benefit, as
in the case when survivor’s benefits are only reduced, then he will choose to work longer (i.e.
the income eﬀect would dominate the substitution eﬀect).
Heterogeneity plays a large role in individual labor responses. Women who are out of
labor force at baseline (type 0), return to the labor force to work, on average, another 1.53
years. Women with a low preference type for own leisure work longer, but the increase is less
than one year. Changes to spouse and survivor’s benefits also have a heterogenous eﬀect on
men’s attachment to the labor force. Removal of spouse and survivor’s benefits leads men
with a high preference for own leisure or low preference for joint leisure (e.g. intuitively,
the more selfish) to work 0.71-0.96 years (37-50 weeks) less. Moreover, changes in claiming
behavior when both spouse and survivor’s benefit is eliminated look similar to when only the
spouse’s benefit is eliminated, with the exception that claiming of benefits is only delayed
to the normal retirement age instead of age 70.
Eliminating spouse and survivor’s benefits will reduce lifetime benefits by 31.5% [1.0%]
for women [men], while decreasing them by 50% still reduces lifetime benefits by 24.3%
[0.1%].
6.3 Increased Progressivity of Social Security Benefits
As mentioned in §2, Social Security benefits follow a progressive formula that pays out a
higher fraction of average indexed earnings to low income earners. In 2013, Social Security
paid out 90% of a worker’s first $9,492, 32% of the next $47,724, and 15% of the rest. Follow-
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ing one of the recommendations of the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council, I consider
the impact of making this system more progressive by reducing the second replacement rate
from 32% to 22.4% and the third replacement rate from 15% to 10.5%. This would have
the eﬀect of reducing an individual’s annual benefit by approximately $4200, or 18.7% for a
worker whose average indexed earnings were equivalent to $60,000 in 2013 dollars.
In tables 6.1a and 6.2a, the result is a dominant income eﬀect, inducing men and women
to work an additional 0.32 years between ages 58-69. However, the aggregate results actually
disguise some very interesting variation by type. For couples with a high preference for own
and joint leisure (i.e. type 3), the eﬀect is to increase labor force participation by 0.44
years for men and 0.42 years for women. Alternatively, for households with a low preference
for own and joint leisure (i.e. type 2), the impact on labor force participation is only an
additional 0.25 years for men and 0.29 years for women.
As reported in tables 6.1b and 6.2b, there is no substantial eﬀect to changes in the
claiming age for women, and 5% of men delay benefit claiming from age 62 until 65.
Similar to the previous two analyses, I analyze the direct reduction in average benefits
paid, and the indirect benefit of increased Social Security revenues from longer work histories.
As would be expected, increasing the progressivity of the Social Security’s primary insurance
amount leads to a reduction in lifetime benefits equal to 17.3% for men and 15.9% for women.
The smaller change for women is likely due to smaller lifetime incomes.
6.4 Discussion
The previous three analyses permit a comparison of the budgetary impact from changes
to the Social Security System. Because my model internalizes both benefit claiming and
labor supply, I am able to separate how a change to the Social Security old-age and survivor
benefits are likely to alter the program’s funding along these two important margins.
Relative to one of the 1994-1996 proposals to improve the solvency of Social Security
through increasing the progressivity of Social Security benefits, I find that eliminating both
the spouse and survivor benefit would achieve 85.4% of the savings, while eliminating the
spouse’s benefit would achieve 40.8% of the savings (at least among the married and aged
beneficiary population that my sample reflects). Put another way, eliminating both the
spouse and survivor benefits reduces average lifetime Social Security payments to a household
by 14.2% while just eliminating the spouse’s benefit leads to a lifetime benefit reduction of
6.8% in my HRS sample.
Eliminating or reducing the Social Security Spouse and Survivor’s Benefits cause a very
large increase in women’s labor force participation rates and encourages delayed benefit
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claiming. For men, reducing both benefits increase male labor force participation, while
eliminating both benefits causes a large decrease in male labor force participation. Specif-
ically, eliminating spouse and survivor benefits increases women’s labor force participation
by 1.27 years and decreases men’s labor force participation by 0.53 years. Reducing both
of these benefits by 50% increases women’s labor supply by 0.47 years, and increases men’s
labor supply by 0.29 years.
These results highlight the importance of structural modeling in the context of complex
life-cycle programs like Social Security. Since the above analysis does not specifically account
for the additional income to SSA through payroll taxes, the reduction in male labor supply
is significant. If males earn on average $28,175 (in 1992 dollars), then this implies losing
out on $2,445 in payroll tax income. Failing to account for the impact of the policy change
on labor force participation would paint a better financial picture of the savings from these
policy changes than would actually occur.
The model also points to a very important nonlinear relationship between benefit re-
duction and actual savings. Reducing the spouse’s benefit by 50% achieves 74.6% of the
savings that are achieved by eliminating the spouse’s benefit. This nonlinear relationship
comes from the fact that many women have at least small Social Security earnings histories,
and by reducing the spouse’s benefit, only those who were never eligible for Social Security
benefits on their own earnings history would receive the spouse’s benefit. Similarly, reducing
both the spouse and survivor benefit by 50% achieves 74.1% of the savings that would be
achieved from eliminating both benefits.
Finally, allowing for heterogeneity in the model, tables 6.1a and 6.2a show that the impact
of benefit changes on labor force participation depend very much on the preference type and
the asset levels of the diﬀerent individuals at baseline. Changing only the spouse’s benefit
most significantly alters the labor supply of men in the middle of the asset distribution and
women in the lower third of the asset distribution. Eliminating both the spouse and survivor’s
benefit most significantly alters the labor supply of men in the lowest third of the asset
distribution and women in the highest third of the asset distribution. Alternatively, changes
to the progressivity and normal retirement age (results available from author) primarily
alter the labor supply of the middle part of the asset distribution. As the population shifts
towards more dual income households, the prevalence of certain preference types is likely to
rise, indicating that any change to Social Security can be better informed by accounting for
the heterogeneity in household responses to proposed policy changes.
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7 Conclusion
Social Security provides benefits to a worker’s spouse and survivor that alter the work incen-
tives of both household members. These benefits, despite being relatively small in size when
compared to the rest of Social Security disbursements, are large relative to other federal
government expenditures. In this paper, I construct a life-cycle model of household savings,
labor supply, and benefit claiming decisions that accounts for health, survival, and medical
expense uncertainty. The model allows me to answer the question of how altering Social
Security’s spouse and survivor benefits would change the work and retirement decisions of
each household member.
Applying my model to a sample from the Health and Retirement Study, I confirm the
theoretical implication that spouse benefits encourage the household’s low income earner to
work less and encourage the household’s high income earner to work longer. For a household’s
high income earner, this implies that the increased return from work (i.e. the substitution
eﬀect) dominates the eﬀect of higher benefit levels (i.e. the income eﬀect). Among those
households nearing retirement, I find that eliminating both spouse and survivor benefits
cause wives, who are statistically the household’s low earner, to increase their average labor
force participation by 1.27 years, while decreasing husbands’ labor force participation by 0.53
years. This eﬀect is important because it implies that the impact of spouse and survivor
benefits is large for both women and men. Furthermore, if the spouse and survivor benefit
is reduced by 50%, then husbands increase work 0.29 years longer. The diﬀerential response
of men to the elimination versus the reduction of both benefits suggests that a household
values the option of increasing guaranteed annual income over the household’s lifespan with
the annuity provided by a Social Security benefit. If this option is taken away, as in the
case of the elimination of the survivor benefit, the incentive for the high earner to work is
significantly reduced.
Additionally, I demonstrate that there are positive but diminishing savings from reduc-
ing spouse and survivor benefits. Specifically, I show that reducing these benefits by 50%
achieves about 74.1% of the savings that result from eliminating these benefits. The model
demonstrates these nonlinear savings arise primarily due to the structure of Social Secu-
rity benefits, with only a small impact due to changes in labor supply. The non-linearity
in savings from auxiliary Social Security benefit reduction is important for policymakers to
account for when considering any alterations to Social Security’s auxiliary benefits.
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Chapter 2:
Old Age Divorce and Labor Supply
8 Introduction
Divorce is an extremely disruptive event, causing a redistribution of finances between house-
hold members and altering long-term objectives, such as retirement. When separation occurs
near or after retirement, individuals have a limited time horizon to adjust their labor sup-
ply and savings decisions. Divorce for married women aged 55-59 has increased from 3.9
per thousand in 1980, to 4.8 per thousand in 1990, to 13.1 per thousand in 2010, yet little
research has been done on divorce’s eﬀect on individual’s labor supply decisions. In 2010,
a married woman had a 14.2% chance of divorcing in her 50s, up from a 6.3% probability
in 1990. This paper provides a descriptive analysis of late-life divorce using the Health and
Retirement Study, a panel survey of households over fifty. In doing so, I ask the question:
what is the immediate eﬀect of divorce on men and women’s labor supply and the long-run
impact of these separations on retirement?
Divorce means that a two-person household has become two one-person households. As-
sets are split, not necessarily in half, and incomes are based on the individual: his or her
education, past employment, and life choices made during the marriage. Households that
separate late in life face a shortened time period where they can be gainfully employed
and save for retirement to make up for the asset loss. Two one-person households lose the
economies of scale enjoyed by a two person-household. The separated households generally
require two living locations, two cellphone plans, two health insurance plans, and more.
Both new homes need to be cleaned and two separate meals must be prepared. Divorce also
means social and psychological upheaval. Forty percent of divorcees between age 40 and 69
express concern about “the uncertainty of their future” and 29% suﬀer through depression
(AARP, 2004). At the same time, 41% report that the best thing about life after divorce is
the “freedom/independence to do what I want to do.” Motivated by a household life-cycle
model of near-retirement decisions, I separate the eﬀects of divorce into changes from loss
of household assets, future spousal income, and economies of scale, as well as changes in the
divorcée’s willingness to work.
I find that women increase their labor force participation by up to 17.1% in the 8 years
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following separation. I also find little evidence that women anticipate divorce and alter
their labor supply or savings behavior before the divorce occurs. Divorcing men respond by
decreasing their hours worked, similar to their younger counterparts (Johnson and Skinner,
1986). When parsing divorce’s eﬀect on labor supply into contributing factors, asset loss is
found to have the most significant eﬀect on female labor supply: the average non-working
woman would be 6.0 to 10.9 percentage points more likely to work per $100,000 lost in
divorce in the 8 years following separation. Other eﬀects, notably the loss of future spousal
income, are found to have an insignificant impact on a woman or man’s decision to return
to work after a divorce, or to delay retirement.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, there are few studies on the
financial eﬀects of divorce at older ages, although there are plentiful anecdotes.31 I document
a sharp increase in divorce for couples in their 50s and 60s, while also demonstrating the
substantial transitional changes to households’ assets, work, and spending choices. Between
1990 and 2010, divorce rates have jumped: doubling for women 50-54, quadrupling for
women 65 and above. Put another way, divorce rates for women 50-54 in 2010 are similar to
divorce rates of women 35-39 in 1970. Following a divorce, women retain only 35-43% of the
non-housing assets of the pre-divorce household, while the average post-divorce spending of a
newly single household is 78.9% of its pre-divorce level. Using the Census’ poverty definition,
the percentage of divorcing women in poverty rises from 6.5% before the divorce to 18.6%
after the divorce.
Secondly, this paper analyzes the contributing factors to short and long-term changes in
women and men’s labor supply, and consequently her or his ability to consume and avoid
poverty. A household life-cycle model is developed that captures the eﬀect of divorce and
widowhood on the labor supply of individuals who are near-retirement. Within the context of
a life-cycle model, a negative shock to savings combined with higher relative expenses should
increase the likelihood of the individual returning to work or delaying retirement. I use the
1992-2010 interview waves from the Health and Retirement Study to test the implications
of the model. The change in asset levels following a divorce is the largest determinant of a
women’s re-entry into the labor force and whether they will delay retirement. An analysis
of widowhood is included, as it oﬀers an insightful comparison since household assets are
generally not lost in widowhood.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 9 describes changes to the frequency of old-age
divorce and uses the Health and Retirement Study and its supplements to chart demographic
and financial changes around the divorce. The next section introduces a household life-cycle
model of labor supply and consumption that captures the transition from a two-person
31For an excellent collection, see Calling it Quits: Late Life Divorce and Starting Over by Deirdre Bair.
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household to two one-person households. The model is then used to motivate the empirical
specification in section 11, which is used to analyze short run labor supply responses around
the time of divorce. Section 5 adapts the specification to capture how retirement is aﬀected
by divorce. Section 6 concludes.
9 Background
Old-age divorce, like widowhood, brings to mind many issues related to the well-being of
individuals in old age. While there are many stories and anecdotes, there exists little di-
rect evidence of what happens to husbands and wives after divorce. Using the Health and
Retirement Study, I am able to report a number of statistics before and after the house-
hold separation, including assets, income, disability status, size of household, rental/home
ownership, and poverty status. It is particularly interesting to see how these develop in the
survey waves following divorce. In all cases, I also compare the divorced to widows, a notable
comparison group since they are also making the transition from a two-person to one-person
household.
This section is intended to provide a better understanding of financial and demographic
statistics around the time of the divorce. I describe the Health and Retirement Study,
focusing on the features which I use for the analysis in later sections. The advantage of the
Health and Retirement Study is that it follows the same households from their introduction
into the study (i.e. households where one member was between 51 and 61 in 1992, with
additional cohorts between ages 51-56 added in 1998, 2004, and 2010) until present day.
Despite the size of the Health and Retirement Study, the sample of aﬀected households is
still small when examining a rare and critical event like divorce. I augment the Health and
Retirement Study with data from larger surveys such as the U.S. Census, the American
Community Survey, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Vital Statistics
Report of the Divorce Registration Area. These large cross-sectional surveys can inform us
regarding broad trends in divorce, but they cannot capture how an individual’s situation
changes after a divorce.
9.1 Data
This paper uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel survey of over 29,000
respondents where one household member is greater than 50 years old. The HRS tracks
labor force participation, health, and other key demographics variables. I reduce the sample
to individuals who are at-risk for divorce and widowhood between the ages of 50 and 70 for
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the main analysis. This means that I exclude households that have never been married and
households that divorced or were widowed prior to 50 and then never remarried.
I measure time of separation based on reports of the month and year the individual
was divorced or widowed. In the case of divorce, I will examine waves prior to the oﬃcial
divorce event and observe whether the individual reports being separated or divorced from
his or her spouse in previous waves.32 If this is true, then I move the time of the separation
earlier, since the time of separation should reflect when the individual reevaluates his or
her expectations of future income and make adjustments to labor supply. Since separations
do not occur at the survey interview date, there will be heterogeneity in the time between
separation and when the individual is interviewed. This may lead to unclear results in the
period immediately following the separation if the individual has not had time to react, and
in the period immediately before separation if the eﬀect is at all anticipated.
Table 9.1 presents summary statistics for the sample. Divorced women are more likely
than both widowed women and the general female population to have participated in the
labor force within the past five years, and have worked more years in their lifetimes. They
are also more likely to be white, have fewer children, and are closer in age to their husbands.
Widowed women are generally from longer marriages, less educated, are much younger
than their spouse, have more children, and claim their Social Security benefits sooner. At
the time that their husband dies, widows are much more likely to be out of the workforce,
and will be less likely to remarry when he dies. Divorced and widowed women are more
likely than continuously married women to apply for disability, and their wages are lower on
average than the continuously married female population.
Divorced men are more likely than continuously married and widowed men to be white,
claim disability, have lower wages, and delay claiming their Social Security benefits. They
also are older on average relative to their ex-spouse. Widowed men are closest in age to
their ex-spouse, have the fewest years of education, claim Social Security the earliest, and
are much less likely to have participated in the labor force in the year prior to their first
interview by the HRS.
Death is an event that is more likely to happen later in a couple’s life, while divorce
is an event that is more likely to happen earlier in a couple’s life. In appendix M, I stan-
dardize the same statistics by age. In order to do this, that data are weighted based on
the age distribution of divorcées. The general trends mentioned above are robust to age
standardization.
In estimating the empirical specification in §11.1, I include a binary measure of bad
health, based on the respondent’s self-reported health at each survey wave. An individual
32Appendix L provides greater detail on how this is done.
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Table 9.1: Summary Statistics from HRS Sample
Women Men
Population Divorced Widowed Population Divorced Widowed
Age (Mean) 53.83 51.54 55.03 57.37 54.14 57.34
Before Separation 56.24 60.04 58.07 60.98
White (%) 0.83 0.86 0.72 0.82 0.87 0.84
Education in Years 12.47 12.60 11.84 12.42 12.66 10.88
Average years worked 21.79 23.34 23.17 35.16 32.51 33.51
Before Separation 26.05 25.26 34.16 36.50
Marriage Length (Mean) 28.15 19.61 28.73 28.11 17.66 27.45
Before Separation 20.33 31.96 17.98 31.09
Marriage Length (Median) 30.40 21.40 32.45 30.40 18.00 30.50
Before Separation 20.40 34.90 16.90 34.40
Remarried after 3 waves (%) 0.32 0.16 0.47 0.43
Age diﬀerence with spouse 3.50 2.58 4.92 -3.40 -5.42 -2.98
Number of Children 2.80 2.69 3.21 2.89 2.67 2.92
Worked last survey wave 0.73 0.83 0.75 0.81 0.90 0.74
Before Separation 0.62 0.43 0.71 0.52
Worked in last five years,
but not last survey wave 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.18
Before Separation 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.21
Not worked in last five years 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.07
Before Separation 0.21 0.35 0.14 0.26
Hourly Wage 25.30 18.27 16.47 37.77 26.13 31.53
Before Separation 19.92 14.35 26.65 19.39
Ever Applied Disability (%) 0.14 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.24
Age begin Social Security 62.42 62.08 61.80 63.23 63.35 62.39
Sample Size 8409 235 239 8475 237 102
Notes: Author’s calculations, Data from Health and Retirement Study. Separations occurring between age
50 and 70. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics refer to the first wave.
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is considered in bad health if he or she reports being in poor or fair health. Measures of
spousal labor force participation and full-time status are based on the spouse’s responses. For
asset measures, I use imputed values of individual’s defined contribution plans and RAND’s
HRS measures of household assets excluding primary residence. To create my measure of
household assets, I sum the net value of the household’s other residences, the net value of
businesses, and the value of vehicles, stocks, mutual funds, other investment trusts, checking
accounts, certificates of deposits, savings accounts, government savings bonds, treasury bills,
bonds, bond funds, defined contribution plans, and any other reported savings, and subtract
other debt.
9.2 Frequency of Divorce
Divorce is becoming more common at older ages. Figure 9.1 presents the divorce rate for
married women by age group. It combines data from the CDC’s Vital Health Statistics for
1970, 1980, and 1990, with data from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). We
observe that divorce at all ages over 50 has increased in the past 40 years. Divorce rates
for women between age 50 and 54 have more than doubled since 1990 from 8.2 divorces per
thousand married women to 17.4 divorces. Divorces for women 65 and older have nearly
quadrupled in the last 20 years, rising from 1.4 divorces per thousand married women to 5.5
divorces. An alternative perspective is that the 2010 divorce rate for women in their late 50s
is greater than the 1970 divorce rate for women in their early 40s.
This is in contrast to a decline in the aggregate divorce rate for married couples since
1980 (see Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007, their figure 1). One possible reason for the surge in
old-age divorce is that as women are becoming more educated and participate in the labor
force, they delay marriage and consequently the possibility of divorce. The marriage rate for
women at age 30 has fallen from a peak of 85.3% of the population in 1960 to 51.8% in 2010
(see figure 9.2). Alternatively, there could be cross-cohort diﬀerences in people’s expectations
for marriage and willingness to divorce. The baby boom generation (i.e. those who were
age 16-34 in 1980, and 26-44 in 1990) divorced more frequently when they were young, and
now that they are older (i.e. age 46-64 in 2010), the willingness to divorce appears to have
continued into old age.
Most large data sources (i.e. U.S. Census, etc.) have historically kept track of the number
of people whose current marital status is divorced. This number fails to capture people who
have since remarried, or when the divorce occurred. For example, a divorced woman at
55 could be a woman who divorced at 25 and never remarried, or could be a woman who
divorced just before being interviewed at age 55. Nonetheless, this measure does provide
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Figure 9.1: Women: Frequency of divorce by age group
Source: 1970-90 from Clarke (1995), 2010 from author’s calculations using the American Community Sur-
vey. 2000 is missing because data was not collected by any source (see Kennedy and Ruggles, 2013
for additional information on missing divorce measures).
an understanding of the growing number of divorcées. Figure 9.3 shows that the percentage
of aged 55 women, whose current marital status is divorced, has risen from 11.0% in 1980
to 22.7% in 2010. The trend in increasing rates of women whose current marital status is
divorced reflects a cohort eﬀect: being divorced and staying single is more frequent in the
baby-boom generation. Meanwhile, widowhood rates at age 55 have fallen from 11.5% to
5.5%, and female marriage rates at age 55 have fallen from 72.9% to 62.4%.
This is not the only change in marital trends. Marriages also appear to be lasting
longer. Figure 9.2 shows that marital rates after age 62 have significantly increased since
1940 (between 1880 and 1940 they were constant). For example, the percentage of women
who are currently married at age 75 has jumped from 33.1% in 1980 to 45.4% in 2010. The
decrease in widowhood at age 75, from 54.9% in 1980 to 36.2% in 2010, more than accounts
for this change. The increase in old-age married women is driven primarily by the large
decrease in widowhood.
Men have experienced similar trends to women before retirement age. At younger ages,
the percentage of men married has decreased (at age 30: 81.7% in 1960, 40.5% in 2010).
At near-retirement ages, fewer men are likely to be married. Men aged 55, whose current
marital status is divorced, have increased from 5.3% in 1980 to 19.5% in 2010.
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Figure 9.2: Women - Percentage whose current marital status is married (by age)
Source: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
Figure 9.3: Women - Percentage whose current marital status is divorced (by age)
Source: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
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We previously observed that more women in younger generations are married after age
62. This eﬀect is exaggerated for men. Male marital rates in 2010 stagnate between ages 38
and 49, but continue to rise after age 50, peaking at age 73 when 75.2% of men are currently
married. Men’s greater propensity to remarry after divorce, combined with longer lifetimes,
mean that a greater percentage of retirement-age men are ending up married. Similar to
figures 9.2 and 9.3, figures P.1-P.4 in the appendix chart the changes in widowhood for
women and men by age and cohort, and male marriage and divorce rates by age and cohort.
If future generations continue to delay marriage until later in life, and people’s willingness
to divorce remains unchanged, then we should expect that divorce near and after retirement
will remain common in the future. These aggregate studies, while helpful for recognizing
generational trends, do not allow us to observe the household around the time of the divorce.
The HRS’s panel of households has captured people approaching retirement, including their
experiences with divorce. The HRS continues to follow both household members after di-
vorce. In the next section, we will observe how an individual’s observable characteristics
change from before to after the household’s separation.
9.3 Household changes before and after separation
Transitioning from a two to one-person household results in significant changes to a person’s
finances as well as their future expectations. In this section, I use the fact that we can
follow households in the HRS before and after the separation (whether it is through divorce
or widowing) to explore changes to assets, rental rates, labor force participation, disability
benefit claiming, and the person’s self-reported expectation of working at ages 62 and 65.
The summary statistics before and after a household separation are presented in table 9.2.
All assets are reported in 2010 dollars.
Assets. Divorcing women experience a mean and median asset shock. The mean asset
shock is $161,000, leaving them with, on average, only $119,000. As is true of the general
population, the asset distribution is highly skewed. Median non-housing assets for the general
married female population are only $94,000, while the mean is $244,000, implying that a few
households have substantial net assets. Divorcing women usually end up with between
35-43% of the before separation non-housing, net assets. Figure 9.4 shows the change in
non-housing net assets around separation for both men and women.33 Divorcing individuals’
asset levels do not return to their pre-divorce state. Divorced women’s asset levels remain
generally unchanged, while divorced men begin to accumulate assets.
Widowed women experience little median asset loss because the survivor generally retains
33Recall that women are generally younger than men at separation, implying that the asset profile of
women pre-divorce should appear higher.
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Table 9.2: Before and After Separation - Summary Statistics from HRS Sample
Women Men
Population Divorced Widowed Population Divorced Widowed
Number in Household 2.89 2.95 2.95 2.89 2.99 3.12
Before Separation 2.70 2.56 2.76 2.72
After Separation 1.82 1.95 1.70 1.99
E
xc
lu
di
ng
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 2.44 1.97 1.55 2.59 2.47 1.15
Before Separation 2.80 1.31 2.66 1.53
After Separation 1.19 1.39 1.35 1.45
Assets ($100,000 - Median) 0.94 0.59 0.46 0.99 0.72 0.31
Before Separation 0.91 0.34 0.93 0.25
After Separation 0.32 0.30 0.40 0.29
In
cl
ud
in
g
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 3.50 2.85 2.29 3.61 3.47 1.70
Before Separation 3.71 2.23 3.60 2.18
After Separation 1.82 2.31 2.05 2.42
Assets ($100,000 - Median) 2.07 1.41 1.12 2.12 1.51 1.10
Before Separation 1.85 1.14 1.74 1.13
After Separation 0.79 1.09 0.90 1.33
Renting (%) 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.21
Before Separation 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.19
After Separation 0.38 0.20 0.41 0.17
1st wv. After Separation 0.35 0.21 0.33 0.20
Working (%) 0.60 0.71 0.56 0.73 0.85 0.66
Before Separation 0.62 0.41 0.71 0.51
After Separation 0.64 0.40 0.63 0.46
1st wv. After Separation 0.60 0.34 0.59 0.33
Applied for Disability (%) 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10
Before Separation 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.16
Ever Apply 0.14 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.24
Prb. Work at 62 (Self-rpt) 36.88 48.07 45.19 52.29 56.52 57.10
Before Separation 49.03 38.28 56.57 45.00
After Separation 52.58 33.42 54.33 33.03
Prb. Work at 65 (Self-rpt) 19.43 25.03 21.78 31.26 31.71 32.34
Before Separation 23.24 19.46 34.14 26.18
After Separation 31.48 16.03 36.34 15.11
Sample Size 8409 235 239 8475 237 102
Notes: Author’s calculations, Data from Health and Retirement Study. Separations occurring between
age 50 and 70. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics refer to the first wave. Separations occur
between waves. The interview wave response before the separation is marked as “Before Separation”,
and similarly for the response “After Separation”. “1st wv. after separation” refers to the interview
response in the first full wave since the separation occurred (minimum of 2 years). All assets are
reported in 2010 dollars.
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Figure 9.4: Non-housing, net assets by timing of separation
(a) Assets in waves before and after separation
(b) Assets in waves before and after widowing event
Notes: Author’s calculations. Data from Health and Retirement Study. Assets are reported in 2010 dollars.
Separations/losses occur between waves. Period 0 refers to the first interview after the separation/loss.
Period -1 refers to the last interview before the separation/loss. Total spending includes durable and
nondurable household spending.
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the household’s assets. We do observe a mean asset gain for widows in the wave following the
widowing event, but assets experience little subsequent growth on average. Assets change
little for men before and after the widowing event.
Household size does not alter any of these relationships. In appendix N, I examine how
changes in household size aﬀect the change in assets around the separation/loss. Conditioning
on households that transition from a two person household to a one person houshold, none
of the previously described relationships are altered in an important way.
Renting/Owning. Households that divorce or widow between age 50 and 70 are more
likely than the rest of the population to rent their home. Prior to the separation many will
have become home owners, but divorce leads to a 30 percentage point jump in rental rates
for women and 28 percentage point jump in rental rates for men. Rental rates remain high
relative to their peers in the waves following the divorce or widowing event. Rental rates
remain relatively constant for widows and widowers.
Labor force participation. Households that divorce between age 50 and 70 are more likely
than the rest of the population to be working, while widows are less likely to be working
during their first HRS interview. Prior to the separation (leading to a divorce), female
labor force participation declines from 71% to 62%. After the divorce, female labor force
participation increases to 64%, before beginning to decline again. There are two opposing
forces here: the ongoing retirement of individuals in this age group, and divorced women
evaluating their participation in the labor force. For widows, widowers and divorced men,
the decline in labor force participation continues after the separation or loss. Standardizing
by age, this relationship is preserved for men. Women, however, are more likely to work after
divorce or widowhood. This could imply that the generational shifts in women’s labor force
participation may also aﬀect how they respond to life events. In §11.1, I will consider how
other changes correlated with divorce, such as asset loss and the change in future spousal
income will alter a person’s labor force participation.
Disability. The HRS records when an individual applies for disability benefits either
through SSDI or SSI. A notable statistical regularity is that divorced individuals are more
likely to eventually apply for disability in the years following separation, while widowed
individuals are much more likely to have applied for disability prior to the separation.
Retirement. The HRS asks an individual his or her expected probability of working at
ages 62 and 65. Women in this sample are more likely than the rest of the population to
expect to work at age 62 and 65. Divorcing women increase their belief they will work at
age 65 by 8.3%, while their expected likelihood of working at 62 increases by only 3.6%.
This is an interesting eﬀect, implying that perhaps it is a certain group of divorcées whose
retirement is delayed as a result of the divorce. I will consider this in my analysis in §11.1.
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Table 9.3: Total household spending (in $1000s) relative to separation/loss
(a) Women
Divorcées Widows
Total Nondurables N Total Nondurables N
W
av
es
re
la
ti
ve
to
se
pa
ra
ti
on
-3 55.05 54.85 6 38.38 38.04 81
-2 48.76 48.36 12 38.01 37.81 149
-1 46.40 46.20 33 38.13 37.86 216
0 36.60 36.19 33 37.30 37.04 216
1 24.86 ** 24.61 ** 16 33.53 33.37 128
2 20.49 ** 20.41 ** 9 36.39 36.16 71
3 17.15 *** 16.57 *** 5 27.91 *** 27.60 *** 21
(b) Men
Divorcées Widowers
Total Nondurables N Total Nondurables N
W
av
es
re
la
ti
ve
to
se
pa
ra
ti
on
-3 50.04 49.86 10 44.70 44.70 22
-2 42.20 41.97 21 33.21 33.21 45
-1 44.42 44.09 47 34.97 34.97 71
0 35.32 * 34.91 * 47 34.60 34.60 72
1 25.91 *** 25.76 *** 21 28.28 28.28 33
2 16.98 *** 16.96 *** 8 26.96 * 26.96 * 14
3 21.47 *** 21.20 *** 4 26.96 26.96 5
Notes: Spending in thousands of nominal U.S. dollars. Data from RAND’s Consumption and Activities
Mail Survey, a supplement to Health and Retirement Study. Separations occurring between 2001 and
2009 (waves 5-9 of CAMS). Data weighted by person weight in wave prior to separation/loss. Separa-
tions occur between waves. Period 0 refers to the first interview after the separation/loss. Period -1
refers to the last interview before the separation/loss. Total spending includes durable and nondurable
household spending. Nondurable household spending includes mortgage payments, home/renter’s in-
surance, property tax, rent, electricity, water, hear, phone/cable/internet, auto financing charges,
auto insurance, health insurance, house/yard supplies, home maintenance, grocery, dining out, cloth-
ing, gasoline, vehicle servicing, drugs, health services, medical supplies, vacations, tickets, hobbies,
contributions, and gifts. Durable spending includes refrigerator, washer/dryer, dishwasher, television,
and computers. Vehicle purchases are excluded. The asterisks refer to a Wald-test of whether the
wave’s spendings is equivalent to spending in the wave prior to separation. Significance reported at
the 1% (***), 5%, (**) or 10% (*) level, for waves 0 through 3.
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Consumption/Spending. Starting in 2001, the HRS conducted a supplementary mail
survey between interview waves called the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS).
The survey captures annual spending by households, and the RAND Corporation produces
a data product that cleans this data and sorts it into aggregate, durable and nondurable
consumption. CAMS also tracks marital status, so I use changes in martial status between
CAMS interview waves as a means of tracking divorce and widowing events.34
Table 9.3 reports total and nondurable spending levels in the waves surrounding the
separation/loss. Total household spending for women decreases from $46,400 in the interview
wave prior to the household separating to $36,600 in the first interview after the separation:
a decrease of 21.1%. In the waves following the separation, spending declines further and
becomes significantly diﬀerent from the wave prior to the separation. The sample sizes,
however, are small and so we should be concerned about sample composition biasing spending
levels. Similarly, men experience a 20.5% decrease in spending around the time of divorce.
Both women and men’s spending continues to decrease in the waves following the separation.
This may imply that it takes several years for spending to stabilize. This could be in response
to it taking time to sell the couple’s house, or it may take time for an individual to learn
which expenses are important to him or her.
Widows and widowers spending declines, but very little, in the years following the spouse’s
death. This may reflect that the widow/widower stays in the couple’s home and does not
alter his or her routine expenses significantly.
The CAMS data are informative, but the results should be interpreted cautiously. The
sample sizes are generally small and, although the same sample is maintained before and
after the divorce, the waves surrounding them could be made up of very diﬀerent types of
households.
Poverty. The RAND Corporation produces a supplement to the HRS that calculates
whether or not a household is in poverty based upon the definitions used by the U.S. Census
Bureau. The two major components of a person’s poverty status are income and household
composition.35 The supplement only calculates poverty status for interview waves from 2002-
2010. In 2010, 4.9% of married women in their 50s, 22.3% of divorced women and 28.0% of
widowed women were in poverty. Table 9.4 shows women’s poverty rates before and after
34The CAMS survey is completed by a single household member for the household. There are not enough
instances where both members are followed after divorce to provide a direct comparison of consumption of
one two-person household versus two one-person households.
35Income includes before-tax income from: earnings, unemployment, workers’ compensation, Social Se-
curity, SSI, public assistance, veterans benefits, pension and retirement income, interest, dividends, rents,
royalties, income from estates and trusts, educational assistance, alimony, child support, assistance from out-
side the household, other sources, income of all resident family members. Income does not include: non-cash
benefits (e.g., food stamps), capital gains and losses.
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Table 9.4: Women: Poverty rates before and after separation/loss
Divorce Widowhood
In Poverty (%) N In Poverty (%) N
In
te
rv
ie
w
w
av
es
re
la
ti
ve
to
ev
en
t -2 .042 96 .052 76
-1 .065 112 .035 93
0 .186 117 .176 99
1 .211 106 .081 115
2 .234 91 .101 124
3 .292 95 .079 116
4 .210 97 .109 150
Notes: Author’s calculations, Data from RAND’s supplement to Health and Retirement Study, Version
M. Separations occurring between age 50 and 70. Separations occur between waves. Period 0 refers
to the first interview after the separation/loss. Period -1 refers to the last interview before the
separation/loss. Includes women whose separation/loss occurred between 50 and 70, where the sepa-
ration/loss was observed within the HRS survey, and whom did not remarry.
the divorce or widowing event for women whose separation/loss occurred between 50 and
70, where the divorce/loss was observed within the HRS survey, and who did not remarry.
For divorcing women, poverty rates jump from 6.5% to 18.6% after the separation. While
the jump is not significant, the diﬀerence between two waves before divorce and the two
waves after divorce is jointly significant at the 1% level. The poverty rates for divorcing
women remain persistently high for the waves following the separation. Widows experience
a statistically significant jump in the poverty rate at the time of the widowing event, but the
increase in the poverty rate does not persist into future periods. Widowhood poverty rates
are lower in table 9.4 because widows entering widowhood in this age range are going to
be somewhat wealthier than the aggregate of widows entering in this age range and widows
who were widowed at younger ages (i.e. what is captured in the cross-sectional statistic of
28.0% widowhood poverty in 2010).
9.4 Impact of divorce and widowhood on retirement benefits
When a household divorces, or one member dies, the change may aﬀect its employer-provided
retirement benefits or the household’s Social Security benefit. Employees are generally el-
igible for two types of retirement benefits: defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution
(DC). Some employees are eligible for a combination plan that consists of both. Appendix O
provides a summary of the impact of marital separation/loss on diﬀerent retirement benefit
types. In this section, I describe the retirement benefits that are correlated with divorce or
widowhood and may impact an individual’s labor supply decision.
DB plans, typically referred to as pensions, are common in public sector jobs and provide
67
the employee with a lifetime income. The employee who is eligible for the pension is consid-
ered a plan member, while his or her spouse would be considered a nonmember. Members
and nonmembers are only entitled to a lifetime benefit in the form of an annuity if the mem-
ber is vested, meaning they have worked for a minimum number of years at the employer.
In the event of a divorce, the time rule formula is a common provision for separating assets.
It can occur before or after the plan’s member has first received benefits. Benefits to the
nonmember spouse are calculated according to the following formula:
Nonmember Benefit = 50%⇥
Total service credits earned
while married and employed
Total service credits
at retirement
⇥ Retirement Benefit
The member’s benefit is the total benefit less the nonmember’s benefit. The time rule formula
need not be the 50% specified above. The time rule provision is important for households
with pensions, because this is where many of these households keep their retirement savings.
Shorter marriages mean a smaller future income loss for the member, but a larger future
income loss for the nonmember.
Pension funds do not have to immediately provide funds to nonmembers following a
divorce. Funds will often require the member to first retire before the nonmember ex-spouse
can begin drawing benefits. This means an ex-spouse’s pension fund is not a guaranteed
source of liquidity for the non-member after the divorce.
Social Security provides a lifetime benefit to spouses. While alive, a spouse is entitled to
the better of her own benefit or 50% of her spouse’s benefit. Social Security also provides a
divorced spouse’s benefit, that is nearly equivalent to the spouse’s benefit. One important
diﬀerence is that if an ex-spouse has been divorced less than 2 years, she must wait for
the high earner to claim his benefit before she can collect the divorced spouse’s benefit (in
addition to be age qualifying herself). After two years, as long as she is age qualifying, she
can claim the divorced spouse’s benefit, regardless of if he has claimed his benefit.
Social Security also provides a lifetime benefit to survivors. A surviving spouse is entitled
to the better of her own benefit or 100% of her spouse’s benefit. For example, a single
income household entitled to $1200 per month before widowhood, is still entitled to $1200
per month after widowhood. Alternatively, if a household is comprised of two equivalent
earners, each entitled to $600 per month ($1200 per month total), then widowhood results
in Social Security income falling to $600 per month for the household after one person dies.
We, therefore, would expect that households closer in lifetime earnings might be more aﬀected
by the loss of their spouse, because the combined household’s income is not protected in the
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event of survivorship.
Issues related to DC plans, non-vested pensions, and survivor benefits from pensions,
while important for the individual, are less important for our identification of the labor
supply eﬀects from divorce and widowhood in later sections. DC plans are generally split at
divorce, at which point the nonmember’s account is rolled over to an individual retirement
account (i.e. IRA). In the case of widowhood, spouses are the default beneficiary. Pension
plans, since the passage of Employee Retirement Income Security Act, are required to provide
a survivorship option.
9.5 Summary
Divorced individuals, particularly women, experience significant asset and spending shocks
around the time of their divorce. They become more likely to rent, and claim disability.
It takes these individuals years to rebuild their assets, and for some, they expect to work
longer.
The impact of separation near retirement is substantial, pushing many individuals, es-
pecially women, into poverty (Weir and Willis, 2000). While oﬃcial poverty statistics are
widely criticized (e.g. Citro and Michael, 1995), even alternative measures of well-being
indicate significant poverty rates among widowed and divorced individuals relative to their
married counterparts (Butrica, Murphy, and Zedlewski, 2007). While widowhood poverty
may have been a large issue in previous decades, divorcée poverty has the potential to become
the relatively larger social issue.
The numbers above suggest that near-retirement divorce is becoming more common and
that it has major financial consequences. Little is known, however, about how women and
men respond to the financial consequences of divorce near retirement. Johnson and Skinner
(1986) find that divorce leads women to increase labor force participation by 20 percent-
age points, but, their sample contains much younger women, with an average age of 32.8.
Compared to the women in their study, women divorcing near retirement are a very diﬀer-
ent population, both because their marriage are longer, 20.6 years on average, and because
they may face greater diﬃculty returning to the labor force in old-age. In the next section,
for a household near retirement, I extend a household life-cycle model of consumption and
labor supply to incorporate the impact of household separation on labor force participation.
The model does not include a disability application decision or a choice for renting versus
owning, but it is able to capture an individual’s saving, spending, work and retirement deci-
sions. Therefore, it is able to capture most of the important short and long-term decisions
an individual must make following a separation or loss.
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10 Model
In this section I present a household model of labor supply, and describe how I theoretically
account for the transition from a two-person household to a one-person household. This is
important for understanding my choice of empirical specification in the next section.
I model the household decision process prior to divorce as a finite-lived household that
maximizes joint utility from consumption and each individual’s leisure. Divorce is assumed
to be a sudden and unexpected change from a household of two individuals to two households
each with a single individual.36
I present a unitary model of the household that places fixed weights on each individual’s
leisure, which diﬀers from more recent economic models that incorporate divorce. Most
economic models of divorce focus on household formation and its interaction with labor
supply decisions (e.g. Fernandez and Wong, 2013). In this case, a collective model is useful
because it reflects the reallocation of decision weighting within a marriage if conditions
change, such as income potential. Older households, which have been married for a long
time (i.e. 28.2 years on average), have established within-household responsibilities. In most
cases, these couples have raised children together, bought a home, and survived economic
ups and downs. By choosing a unitary model, I assume that the within-household weighting
is fixed while the household remains married.37
Moreover, the model presented in the next section assumes intrahousehold separable util-
ity. Note that this is a strong assumption, abstracting away from leisure complementarities
at the household level. In examining variations to the empirical specification, I will relax
this assumption.
10.1 Married Household Preferences
Married households maximize the present value of their discounted lifetime utility by choos-
ing their consumption, labor participation and whether or not to claim benefits. The house-
36This could be modeled as an increased risk of entering the one person state. This has been done in other
work with younger individuals. Since I am looking at an older sample where marriages are in place longer,
I model it as a surprise.
37The model could be written as a collective model, as in Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013). In
their paper, Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013) assume that the household is pareto eﬃcient, implying
that by the second welfare theorem, that individuals provide intra-household transfers to maximize utility.
To achieve this, the weight the household places on each members utility must depend on a sharing rule
that would be function of prices, income, and distribution factors (i.e. factors with no direct impact on
preferences, technology, or the budget constraint, but may influence the decision process).
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hold’s instantaneous utility function is given by:
ut (Ct, LH,t, LW,t) =
C1 ↵t
1 ↵ +
DH,tL
1  H
H,t
1  H +
DW,tL
1  W
W,t
1  W , ↵ > 0 (10.1)
where the parameter ↵ captures the household’s constant relative risk aversion, and Dm,t
represents household member m’s relative preference between household consumption and
his or her own leisure in year t. All consumption is modeled as shared within the household
to match the fact that most household surveys, included the Health and Retirement Study
used in this paper, do not track individual consumption.
Each household member’s leisure, Lm,t, is defined as:
Lm,t = L Nm,t (10.2)
where Nm,t represents the household member’s labor supply and L represents the constant
endowment of leisure in each period.
Each household member’s relative preference between household consumption and his or
her own leisure, Dm,t. It depends on time varying state variables such the male or female’s
age and health. In the case of the man (m = H), it takes the form:
DH,t = exp ( H +  H,ageageH,t +  H,healthhealthH,t + "H) (10.3)
Analogously, the woman’s marginal rate of substitution (m = W ) is determined by:
DW,t = exp ( W +  W,ageageW,t +  W,healthhealthW,t + "W ) (10.4)
The constant term,  m, represents a scaling factor for the impact of an individual’s leisure on
household utility. I assume when the household is created its members negotiate the weight
of each individual’s contribution to total utility from his or her leisure, and it is considered
fixed for the duration of the household.
Each household member faces uncertainty over their continued survival and health. The
survival probability and the health transition probabilities depend on age, sex, and previous
health status.
Lastly, "m represents an individual fixed eﬀect for higher value of retirement to an indi-
vidual as in Gustman and Steinmeier (2004b). It is through "m that a couple’s preference for
consumption versus leisure are allowed to diﬀer across individuals and households in ways
that are not otherwise captured by the economic model. For example, if a woman loves
71
work, this would mean she would have a low draw for "W .
10.2 Single Household Preferences
A household comprised of a single member maximizes its present value of discounted lifetime
utility by choosing consumption, labor participation and whether or not to claim benefits.
The single household’s instantaneous utility function is given by:
ut (Ct, Lm,t) =
(s · Ct)1 ↵
1  ↵ +
D˜m,tL
1  m
m,t
1   m ↵ < 1 (10.5)
where the parameter s captures the economies of scale associated with a two person house-
hold. If s = 1, then all goods are public (perfect economies of scale), but if some goods are
private, then s > 1. With the exception of s and D˜m,t, the other terms are assumed to be
invariant to the composition of the household.
Similar to the married household, each individual’s relative preference between household
consumption and his or her own leisure, D˜m,t:
D˜m,t = exp
⇣
 ˜m +  m,ageagem,t +  m,healthhealthm,t + "˜m
⌘
The notation is chosen purposefully: I assume marriage status does not impact age and health
eﬀects, but does result in a re-weighting of leisure versus consumption
⇣
 ˜m
⌘
, and that the
person’s unobserved preference for leisure also changes ("˜m). This allows the model to reflect
that the tradeoﬀ between consumption and leisure changes discontinuously at divorce.
Each single household member faces uncertainty over their continued survival and health.
The survival probability and the health transition probabilities depend on age, sex, and
previous health status.
10.3 Budget Set
The household is able to accumulate assets, At, over its lifetime subject to the following
equation:
At+1 = At + Yt   Ct  Mt (10.6)
where Ct is per period household consumption, Yt is per period income, andMt is per period
medical expenses.38
38Log medical expenses are based in part on an individual’s health, and are assumed to be normally
distributed.
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A household’s per period income can come from a number of sources: household mem-
ber’s wage income, !m(Nm,t) , interest income, rAt, defined benefit and contribution pension
income, dbm,t and dcm,t respectively, alimony for divorced households, alimm,t, and a house-
hold social security benefit, ssbt, where all of these sources of income are subject to tax,
tx.
Yt = Y
0@rAt + ssbt + X
m2{M,W}
(!m(Nm,t) + alimm,t + dbm,t + r · dcm,t) , tx
1A (10.7)
Note that I assume the only additional income generated by work is the wage. Alternatively,
as in Knapp (2013), one could imagine additional work impacting retirement benefits, but
for simplicity that will not be considered in this paper.
10.4 Individual Labor Supply
In this section, I derive the individual labor supply curves for married and single households.
I then consider the immediate impact of the divorce transition on the individual’s labor
supply as well as the longer term impacts on retirement and benefit claiming.
10.4.1 Before Separation
A married individual will optimally choose to work if her marginal utility from leisure is less
than or equal to her return from working (sum of marginal wage and retirement benefits).
First order conditions with respect to labor supply from the household problem imply:
e( m+ m,ageagem,t+ m,healthhealthm,t+"m) (L Nm,t)  m   t · @Y
@Nm,t
(10.8)
where  t is the Lagrange multiplier and represents the household’s marginal utility of wealth.
Assuming constraint (10.8) binds, it can be rewritten for a household member’s leisure in
period t, (L Nm,t), as :
ln (L Nm,t) = 1
 m
⇢
 m +  m,ageagem,t +  m,healthhealthm,t   ln
✓
@Y
@Nm,t
◆
  ln ( t) + "m
 
=  m m +  m m,ageagem,t +  m m,healthhealthm,t    mln
✓
@Y
@Nm,t
◆
(10.9)
  mln t +  m"m
where  m = 1 m . Note that the individual’s labor supply is an aﬃne mapping of the in-
dividual’s leisure demand in equation (10.9), and the labor supply preserves the expected
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relationships including: (1) higher wages lead to less leisure, (2) if  m,age > 0 then older
individuals are less inclined to work, and (3) an additional dollar of assets will lead to more
leisure.
The spouse’s labor supply does not directly impact the individual’s labor supply be-
cause of the strong separability assumption in §10.1. Instead, it only impacts the household
member’s decision via lifetime wealth, and hence eﬀects the household’s marginal utility of
wealth,  t.
10.4.2 After Separation
A single household will optimally choose to work if her marginal utility from leisure is less
than or equal to her return from working (sum of marginal wage and retirement benefits).
First order conditions with respect to labor supply imply:
e( ˜m+ m,ageagem,t+ m,healthhealthm,t+"˜m) (L Nm,t)  m   ˜t
s
· @Y
@Nm,t
(10.10)
where  ˜t is the Lagrange multiplier and represents the marginal utility of an additional
dollar of assets when single. Assuming constraint (10.10) binds, it can be rewritten for an
individual’s leisure in period t, (L Nm,t), as :
ln (L Nm,t) = 1
 m
⇢
 ˜m +  m,ageagem,t +  m,healthhealthm,t + "˜m   ln ˜t   ln @Y
@Nm,t
 
=  m ˜m +  m m,ageagem,t +  m m,healthhealthm,t    mln
✓
@Y
@Nm,t
◆
(10.11)
  mln ˜t +  mlns+  m"˜m
Similar to the before separation labor supply, the single individual’s labor supply preserves
the same expected relationships. What separates the single household’s labor supply from
the married household’s labor supply is that the single household may tradeoﬀ consumption
and leisure diﬀerently based on  ˜m, the man or woman’s weighting of consumption versus
leisure following the separation; "˜m, an idiosyncratic shock to preference for leisure that
varies by gender of the household member, m, but not time, t; s, household economies of
scale; and  ˜t, the household’s marginal utility of wealth.
10.5 How separations change Labor Supply
In this section, I clarify what in the model drives labor force changes after separations. First I
consider changes in the budget constraint due to a separation, and second I consider changes
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to preferences.
The budget constraint of a newly single household is primarily altered by: (i) an imme-
diate change in assets, and (ii) elimination of current and future earnings from the previous
household member.39 In the context of a model with perfect capital markets, where indi-
viduals could freely borrow from their ex-spouses future income, then the two eﬀects would
be equivalent. In my dynamic model, assets are liquid wealth, and future expected spousal
earnings are illiquid wealth. Illiquid wealth cannot immediately be disbursed in divorce,
although it can be over time with alimony. Therefore if a single household has very little
liquid assets after the separation, the separation itself may spur a liquidity crisis (i.e. the
individual can’t aﬀord to consume their previous level of consumption), in turn forcing the
individual to increase work or take government income assistance.
The preferences of a newly single household is primarily altered by: (iii) household
economies of scale, s, and (iv) changes in preference for consumption relative to own-leisure
after the separation,
⇣
 ˜m    m
⌘
+ ("˜m   "m). If the economies of scale from marriage are
large (i.e. s is close to 1) then the utility equivalent amount of consumption for a given level
of leisure that a household needs with two people is equal to the amount it needs as a one
person household. This would imply that simply living as a one person household would
entail little decrease in consumption costs, forcing an individual to work more in order to
finance consumption. Alternatively, the newly single household might trade oﬀ consumption
for leisure diﬀerently than they would have during marriage. Depending on the direction,
the change in relative preference for leisure could increase or decrease the magnitude of the
change preference for consumption.
39Assets do not necessarily have to decrease. Assets could increase if life insurance payments exceed funeral
and other end-of-life expenses.
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11 Estimation
This section translates the model (§10) into a tractable fixed-eﬀects framework that can be
used to understand how a separating individual alters his or her labor supply in response
to the separation. I then conduct robustness checks to examine how sensitive the point
estimates are to alternative specifications.
11.1 Empirical Specification
In this section I present the specification to be estimated based on the theoretical model in
§10. I use the leisure demand functions of married and single individuals, based on equation
(10.9) before divorce and equation (10.11) after divorce.40 I suppress the gender of the
household member, m, to simplify the notation.
As discussed in §10.5, a divorce or death’s impact on the marginal utility of wealth can
persist after the separation takes place and, to the degree that it is anticipated, may have
an eﬀect prior to the separation. This eﬀect cannot immediately be separated from changes
in the household’s preference for leisure that might result from the household transitioning
from two persons to one person. I follow a non-parametric approach by including a dummy
variable, SEP ki,t, that can take a value of one if the separation leading to divorce takes place
k periods before current year t (k may also take on negative values if year t is before the
separation). Similarly if the household is widowed,WIDki,t. This approach is used in case the
household cannot respond immediately to the separation or if it is anticipated. For example,
if a divorce is anticipated, we might expect to see an increase in labor supply prior to the
household separation. Additionally, if the separated household is unable to immediately find
40The first order condition with respect to assets of the household problem in §10, yields:
 t =  (1 + rt)Et [ t+1]
where   is the household’s discount rate, and rt is the known rate of return on assets in period t. Uncertainty
over the future marginal utility of wealth arises from uncertain changes in survival, health, and medical
expenses. If, as in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), I assume that ln t = Et 1 [ln t]+⌘t, then I can characterize
the stochastic process of the Euler equation by ln t = ln t 1   (ln [ (1 + rt)] + ln (Et 1 [e⌘t ])) + ⌘t. With
repeated substitution, this relationship yields:
ln t =
tX
j=1
bj + ln 0 +
tX
j=1
⌘j
where bt =   (ln [ (1 + rt)] + ln (Et 1 [e⌘t ])) and ⌘t is independently distributed N(0, ✏). This equation
suggests that the joint household sets  0 in the first period and updates it as uncertain and unforeseeable
events are realized. Specific to the discussion here, I am interested in the adjustment following divorce or
widowhood. Note also, that the first term,
Pt
j=1 bj , implies a period fixed eﬀect, while ln 0 implies a time
invariant fixed eﬀect for the household.
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a job, or some other factors hinder an immediate change in labor supply, then the newly
single household’s response may be delayed.
The empirical specification is:
ln (L Ni,t) =  ageagei,t +  healthhealthi,t    ln
✓
@Y
@Ni,t
◆
(11.1)
+
7X
k= 3
⇣˜SEPk SEP
k
i,t +
7X
k= 3
⇣˜WIDk WID
k
i,t
+⇢i +
10X
j=3
bj + ⇠i,t
where the change in income based on work, ln
⇣
@Y
@Ni,t
⌘
, is controlled by a quadratic in years
of actual experience. Since Social Security and other pension incentives significantly alter
the decision to retire at specific ages, I take a non-parametric approach and use a dummy
variable for each age. The sixth term in (11.1) corresponds to individual fixed eﬀects, and
the seventh term is represented by survey wave dummies (for a total of 10 survey waves).
The last term represent the transitory shock to preferences for leisure.41
I examine the impact of divorce on both labor force participation and hours worked.
When examining participation, the dependent variable in (11.1) is replaced with a binary
outcome for whether an individual is working for pay. Alternatively, when I examine hours
worked, I set L = 365⇥ 24 = 8760.
11.2 Initial Regression Estimates
I use a within or fixed eﬀects estimator to estimate (11.1) because it exploits the advantages
of the panel data set by using time variation within individuals to consistently estimate
time-varying coeﬃcients. The model is estimated separately for men and women.
Table 11.1 reports the estimates for equation (11.1) for women and men. These tables
restrict the sample to only those individuals who (i) have been married during the HRS
observation period, 1992-2010, (ii) never applied for disability, and (iii) are part of the at-
risk population. It also does not include observations if an individual remarries following the
initial separation. I observe that poor health leads to lower participation, and greater work
41My results will be able to examine the time-varying eﬀects of the household separation on changes to the
total fixed eﬀect, ⇢i =  m+"m+ ln 0. The subscript i on ⇢i is included to emphasize that it is an individual
fixed eﬀect since it relies on an individual’s own realization of "i and the individual’s initial marginal utility
of wealth. Additionally ⇠i,t =
Pt
j=1 ⌘j + ◆i,t where ⌘t represents transitory shocks to the marginal utility of
wealth and ◆i,t represents transitory shocks to leisure.
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experience increases the likelihood of work for women and men, but has diminishing returns.
The results from the dummy coeﬃcient estimates on divorce and widowhood indicate
that asset loss is the primary driver of women’s return to the labor force after a separation.
Relative to the period before separation, women are more likely to participate in the labor
force, jumping an average of 100 hours in the first wave after the separation (wave 0) and
increasing to 500 hours by the 2nd full wave (4-6 years) after the separation (see figure 11.1).
Relative to the wave before the divorce, the probability of participating in the labor force
increases by 9.1% following the divorce and increases to 17.1% in the 3rd full wave following
the separation. After the 3rd full wave, the eﬀect of separation falls and becomes less precise.
Widows, who do not lose their assets on average, show no indication of returning to the
labor force (see figure P.5 in appendix P). We observe that women’s labor force participation
is insignificantly higher in the waves before the husband’s death. This could indicate that
the wife exits her job to take on the role of caretaker. Following the husband’s death, there
is little evidence of the widow returning to work. Household separation, either through
widowhood or divorce, causes a loss of future income flow from the ex-spouse, eliminates
economies of scale, and changes the household’s preferences. The key diﬀerence, however,
is that asset loss mainly occurs in divorce. Since we only observe a major labor supply
response following a divorce, this suggests asset loss is the main driver of women’s return to
the workforce.
Alternatively, consider the case of men. I observe that divorce has no significant impact
on labor force participation or hours worked for men (See figure P.6 in appendix P). It does,
however, appear that widowing leads to a reduction in hours worked for men (see figure
11.2), which could support either an asset loss/economies of scale argument or an end to
household bargaining argument. For example, if the household has one less mouth to feed,
and the widower was the primary earner, then the loss of the spouse might lead the man to
work less because the lifetime assets required for the household’s retirement plan are lower.
Alternatively, if the man was only working to finance the wife’s high demand for leisure,
than the death of his wife would permit him to work less and consume more leisure himself.
In summary, I find that women respond significantly to a separation leading to a divorce,
by increasing labor supply by up to 500 annual labor hours, or increasing labor force partici-
pation by 17.1 percentage points. Little eﬀect is found for divorcing men or widowed women.
Widowed men decrease their labor force participation prior to the widowing event, and this
decreased level continues after the event.
These results are consistent with a household life-cycle model where the wife is less
attached to the labor force and the husband works full-time. A divorcing husband does not
respond immediately. If he is already employed full-time, time constraints may limit his
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Table 11.1: Estimates of Leisure Demand and Labor Force Participation
Women Men
Leisure Demand Labor Force Participation Leisure Demand Labor Force Participation
Divorces Widows Divorces Widows Divorces Widows Divorces Widows
(1w) (2w) (3w) (4w) (1m) (2m) (3m) (4m)
A
ft
er
S
ep
ar
at
io
n
(w
av
e)
0t
h -0.00916 -0.00914 0.0912** 0.0289 0.00851 0.0247 0.00336 -0.0123
(0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0415) (0.0366) (0.0143) (0.0241) (0.0398) (0.0639)
1s
t -0.0339*** -0.0112 0.122*** 0.0252 0.00791 0.0276 -0.0122 -0.0317
(0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0425) (0.0409) (0.0167) (0.0253) (0.0499) (0.0775)
2n
d -0.0650*** -0.0232* 0.154*** 0.0589 -0.0102 0.0183 0.00284 -0.0212
(0.0231) (0.0125) (0.0482) (0.0467) (0.0197) (0.0244) (0.0560) (0.0833)
3r
d -0.0368 -0.0128 0.171*** 0.0828* -0.0162 0.0330 -0.00353 -0.0628
(0.0228) (0.0119) (0.0571) (0.0478) (0.0272) (0.0314) (0.0636) (0.109)
4t
h -0.00507 -0.0135 0.0379 0.0607 0.00132 0.0285 0.00973 -0.0462
(0.0199) (0.0127) (0.0636) (0.0523) (0.0270) (0.0326) (0.0747) (0.113)
5t
h -0.0131 -0.0135 0.0706 0.0325 -0.00129 0.0174 -0.0404 0.0850
(0.0191) (0.0130) (0.0741) (0.0553) (0.0230) (0.0342) (0.0773) (0.117)
6t
h 0.0227 -0.0244 -0.0541 0.0372 0.0185 0.0354 -0.0305 0.0335
(0.0211) (0.0154) (0.0769) (0.0570) (0.0304) (0.0358) (0.0861) (0.126)
7t
h 0.0143 -0.0503** 0.0487 0.0575 0.0192 -0.00503 -0.0159 0.0547
(0.0239) (0.0204) (0.0867) (0.0646) (0.0415) (0.0321) (0.0944) (0.138)
B
ef
or
e
S
ep
ar
at
io
n
(w
av
e)
1s
t (control) (control) (control) (control) (control) (control) (control) (control)
2n
d 0.00554 -0.00454 0.0108 -0.0145 -0.0183 -0.0295 0.0385 -0.00692
(0.0124) (0.00913) (0.0397) (0.0387) (0.0187) (0.0305) (0.0483) (0.0408)
3r
d 0.00291 -0.0256* 0.00909 0.0626 -0.0250 -0.0384 0.0285 0.0903
(0.0191) (0.0135) (0.0630) (0.0537) (0.0276) (0.0319) (0.0668) (0.102)
4t
h -0.0158 -0.0259 -0.0249 0.0770 0.0259 -0.0452 -0.0816 0.336***
(0.0238) (0.0210) (0.0746) (0.0769) (0.0210) (0.0362) (0.0717) (0.0993)
5t
h 0.0307 -0.0196 -0.0336 0.150* 0.00118 -0.0300 0.0340 0.226*
(0.0276) (0.0148) (0.0940) (0.0793) (0.0296) (0.0309) (0.0706) (0.117)
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Women Men
Leisure Demand Labor Force Participation Leisure Demand Labor Force Participation
Divorces Widows Divorces Widows Divorces Widows Divorces Widows
(1w) (2w) (3w) (4w) (1m) (2m) (3m) (4m)
Health
(lagged) 0.00265* -0.0161*** 0.00661*** -0.0279***
(0.00151) (0.00520) (0.00197) (0.00578)
Actual
Experience -0.00271*** 0.0164*** -0.00650*** 0.0493***
(0.00104) (0.00330) (0.00214) (0.00556)
Actual
Experience2
8.69e-05*** -0.000232*** 7.61e-05*** -0.000314***
(1.55e-05) (4.50e-05) (2.20e-05) (5.67e-05)
Observations 50,376 50,806 43,263 43,693
R2
(without F.E.)
0.137 0.150 0.241 0.227
R2
(with F.E.)
0.660 0.703 0.695 0.697
Notes: Person-level fixed eﬀect regressions. The 0th wave is the wave interview wave immediately
after separation, and may not be a full two years (the time period of a normal interview wave).
All regression use dummies for each interview wave and age between 51 and 75. The first and
third columns report coeﬃcients where the base year is the year prior to separation leading
to divorce. Alternatively, the second and fourth columns report the same models except that
the base year is the before widowhood. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are
reported in parentheses. Results for the remaining regressors are available from the author.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ability to respond by working more hours. The wife, if she is not working full-time, can
increase her labor hours or return to the labor force. In widowed households, the survivor
has reduced long-term costs implying that accumulated savings, in combination with life
insurance or old age pension income, may be enough to permit an early retirement.
This first specification does not allow for the separation of the diﬀerent factors that might
be driving the result. Is it the fact the wife loses assets in divorce that causes her to work
longer? Or, is it driven by new found freedom to make decisions independent of pre-ordained
household roles? In order to answer this question, I relax the specification used in equation
(11.1) to separate out how changes in the marginal utility of wealth are amplified by the
relative changes in a household’s finances.
11.3 Accounting for Financial Losses
As mentioned above, the initial specification does not permit the separate identification of
the labor supply eﬀects of (i) asset loss, (ii) future spousal income loss, (iii) changes to
80
Figure 11.1: Eﬀect of Divorce timing on Women’s Labor Force Participation
(a) Labor Force Participation, Ages 50-70
(b) Hours Worked, Ages 50-70
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. See table 11.1 for additional notes.
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Figure 11.2: Eﬀect of Widowhood timing on Men’s Labor Force Participation
(a) Labor Force Participation, Ages 50-70
(b) Hours Worked, Ages 50-70
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. See table 11.1 for additional notes.
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preferences, and (iv) changes to economies of scale. In the data, households vary in both
whether the separation leads to large asset loss and in the pre-separation income levels of
the spouse. The post-divorce asset change and the pre-divorce spousal income level can be
included in the empirical specification to capture the contribution of each of these eﬀects. If
the household faces a liquidity crisis after a separation, then the household would be forced
to return to the labor force. If asset loss is what is driving the majority of labor supply
change from the last subsection, then the remaining eﬀects should be rendered insignificant.
A similar analysis would hold if the household was counting on the spouse’s income as a
primary means of survival.
Building on the specification in equation (11.1), I interact the divorce and widowhood
dummy variables with asset loss (e.g. the household asset levels after the separation less
the asset levels before the separation), and lost potential spouse income (e.g. the amount of
future income the household would have received if the ex-spouse continued working in their
baseline occupation until age 65, conditional on mortality). The divorce and widowhood
dummy variables are retained, and capture the residual eﬀect that cannot be described by
asset loss or lost future spousal income. This residual eﬀect will capture, as described in
§10.5, changes in preferences and economies of scale resulting from these events.
Tables 11.2 and 11.3 present the results for wives and husbands of this new specification.
For divorced women, a loss of $100,000 in assets leads to an increase in the labor supply
of 2.27-4.13% for the decade following divorce. To put this number in perspective, recall
that 62% of divorced women worked before the separation. If I use the point estimate of
0.0405 in the second full wave since the separation, these results would then suggest that
the average non-working women would be (0.0405) / (1  0.62) = 0.107 or 10.7% more likely
to work per $100,000 lost during the divorce. The eﬀect of asset loss is persistent, raising
labor force participation for more than a decade by 6.0-10.9% per $100,000 lost during the
divorce. The fact that only asset loss is a significant driver of an immediate change in labor
force participation may indicate that divorce’s wealth shock depletes buﬀer stock savings,
forcing some women to return to work.
There is no significant eﬀect of loss in future spousal income, however the sign is generally
negative, which is what we would expect if higher spousal income meant a greater likelihood
for alimony. If liquid assets are important as a buﬀer against immediate expenses after
divorce, then in present value, $1 lost from assets should be diﬀerent from $1 lost from
future spousal earnings. A simple Wald test rejects the hypothesis that they are equivalent
at the 10% level.42 I interpret this as generally supportive of the importance of asset loss in
42If expected future spousal earnings are corrected for mortality probability, the simple Wald test would
reject the hypothesis at the 5% level.
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determining a woman’s decision to return to the labor force after a divorce.
For women, the residual eﬀect of the the time after divorce still indicates a large eﬀect
of the separation on labor supply, with the increase approaching 11.4% in the 2nd full wave
following divorce. These eﬀects are significant only at the 10% level. These residual, post-
separation eﬀects, which are uncorrelated with asset loss and the ex-spouse’s income, reflect
changes in the household’s preferences. These results suggest that either the loss of economies
of scale or leisure complementarities may impact the return to the labor force.
In the last subsection, I found that widowed women’s leisure demand and labor force
participation decreased in anticipation of the husband’s death. When I account for asset loss
and lost spousal income, you might expect that lost spousal income could be the major factor
in the woman’s decision to return to the workforce, since asset loss is rare in the widowing
event (unless significant sums are spent on medical care leading up to the husband’s death).
The estimates in models 1w and 2w of table 11.2 suggest that, if this is the case, the eﬀect
is very small. Counterintuitively, the marginal eﬀect of asset loss indicates that women are
(insignificantly) more likely to leave the labor force in the period following the husband’s
death. Since asset loss during widowhood could be positive or negative and is generally
small, it is not surprising that no eﬀect is found.
Men’s leisure demand and labor force participation are largely unaﬀected by a divorce,
even when controlling for asset loss and spousal income loss. This largely reflects that most
men are working in their 50s or are not dependent on their wife’s income. Widowers, like
widows, exit the labor force prior to their wife’s death. The significance of these factors
is reduced by the inclusion of variables capturing asset loss and spousal income loss. The
estimates in model 2w of table 11.3 suggests that men are much more likely to exit the labor
force if asset loss is significant. This could be the case if medical expenses are very high, and
the wife’s persistent disease alters the husband’s long-run preference for work. Since men are
largely working full-time, their response is limited. Even when accounting for other factors,
divorce or death seem to have little immediate eﬀect on men’s hours worked or labor force
participation. What these results do not comment on is the duration of employment. These
men might choose to retire sooner if the change in marital status has reduced their marginal
utility of wealth.
11.4 Robustness Checks
11.4.1 Leisure Complementarities
The specification estimated in §11.2 is based on a model where the spouse’s labor supply only
eﬀects an individual through the marginal utility of wealth. This is equivalent to arguing
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that a wife only cares about her husband’s leisure to the extent that it might impact the
household’s lifetime wealth. If individuals value joint leisure, then this assumption is no
longer valid. If a couple enjoys their time together (i.e. leisure is complementary), then,
assuming a spouse is still working full-time in their 50s and 60s, this may encourage the
individual to continue working. Once a separation occurs, however, these complementarities
are discarded, leading the individual to exit the labor force.
When the specification in §11.3 is re-estimated accounting for spousal labor force partici-
pation (full and part-time dummies) before the separation, I find that the eﬀect on women’s
leisure demand is significant and negative (or positive for women’s labor force participa-
tion), implying that women view their husband’s leisure as complementary for their own.
The eﬀect on men is similarly significant and in the same direction, implying that men view
their’s wife’s work as a complement to their own. Including leisure complementarities does
not substantively alter any of the previous results. The estimates are included in tables P.1
and P.2.
11.4.2 Pensions and Social Security
Section 9.4 described changes in pension and Social Security benefits which could be corre-
lated with divorce, asset loss, and loss of future spousal earnings. Defined benefit pensions
are often split following a divorce by the time rule formula, which is a function of time
married while employed relative to total time employed. If a couple is married for a shorter
period of time, then the nonmember spouse is entitled to a smaller fraction of the pension
member’s monthly benefit. Pensions are often not accessible until after the pension member
is retired. Using retrospective marital and employment histories from the HRS, I construct
measure for whether or not the ex-spouse has retired and the respective time rule formula
(conditional on having a pension).
Social Security requires that the ex-spouse must be at least the early retirement age (i.e.
62) before the individual (who also must be at least 62) may claim the divorced spouse’s
benefit. Furthermore, Social Security provides a survivor’s benefit that is the better of the
individual’s own benefit and the dead spouse’s own benefit. We, therefore, would expect
that households closer in lifetime earnings might be more aﬀected by the loss of their spouse,
because the combined household’s income is not protected in the event of survivorship.
I reestimate the model including dummies for whether the ex-spouse is retired, whether
the ex-spouse is at least 62, and continuous variables for the time rule formula for divorcing
households, and the relative value of survivor’s benefit to the household benefit if each
member claimed at 62 (or immediately if older). All factors have the expected negative
eﬀect on women’s labor force participation (i.e. if a wife’s ex-husband is older than 62, then
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she is eligible to collect the divorced spouse’s benefit, and hence less likely to work). The
eﬀects, however, are generally insignificant. For men, the eﬀects of whether the ex-spouse is
retired and at least 62 are positive but insignificant. The eﬀect of the time rule formula is
positive and significant at the 10% level. This implies that the more of a pension the husband
loses, the more likely he is to continue working. None of these factors significantly alter the
eﬀects of asset loss described above. The addition of these factors, however, increases the
residual eﬀects of divorce, although the eﬀects are still insignificant.
11.4.3 Children at Home
The eﬀect of divorce on labor supply was largest in the decade following divorce. Although
the median household consists of two people before divorce, many of the household still have
children at home or temporarily away at school. Whoever takes over responsibility of the
children following a separation may be able to collect spousal support, but generally this
amount is small. Being a single parent requires covering the costs of a child and, separate
from the preferences described in §10, could explain a person’s return to the labor force after
a divorce.
Accounting for children at home or temporarily away at school does not significantly alter
the estimates in the previous section. Children at home cause men to work longer, but have
only a small, insignificant, positive eﬀect on women’s labor force participation.
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12 Divorce and Delayed Retirement
The estimates in the last section show that women’s immediate response to divorce is to
return to the labor force, and the eﬀect is larger based on the level of assets lost during
the divorce. For many women and men, they can not return to work or increase their
hours because they are already working full-time. In this case, they might respond by
delaying their retirement. While our previous analysis shows the immediate response to an
individual’s labor supply, in this section I will consider divorce’s eﬀect on the individual’s
retirement decision.
12.1 Estimation Strategy
The previous analysis used a fixed eﬀect framework because the estimating equation followed
directly from the household life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption. This frame-
work cannot be extended directly to estimate the eﬀect of divorce on retirement decisions.
The retirement likelihood is a cumulative probability of continued labor force participation
until a given date. Ideally, the parameters of the model in §10 would be structurally es-
timated, permitting counterfactual simulations to test the retirement dates of individuals
should the divorce or widowing event not have occurred. Structural estimation, however, is
a time consuming process, and we instead follow a more straightforward estimation tech-
nique common in the reduced-form retirement literature (Coile and Gruber, 2007; Friedberg
and Webb, 2005).
Following our previous discussion, I construct a regression framework that uses the di-
vorce/widowhood variables in combination with asset loss, future spousal income loss, and
years since separation from our previous analysis. The regression form is:
RETi,t =  0 +  1SEPi,t +  1 (SEPi,t ⇥ AssetLossi,t) (12.1)
+ 2
 
SEPi,t ⇥ SpIncLossi,t
 
+  3
 
SEPi,t ⇥WvsSinceSepi,t
 
+ 4WIDi,t +  5 (WIDi,t ⇥ AssetLossi,t)
+ 6
 
WIDi,t ⇥ SpIncLossi,t
 
+  7 (WIDi,t ⇥WvsSinceWidi,t)
+ 8EARNi,t +  9ASSETSi,t +  10AGEi,t +  11WAVEt +  12Xi,t + "i,t
where RETi,t is a dummy variable for whether or not the individual retires in wave t; SEPi,t
[WIDi,t] are dummy variables for whether or not the individual has separated leading to a
divorce [become widowed] from her first marriage since her first interview wave; AssetLossi,t
is the negative change in assets following the separation/loss; SpIncLossi,t is the loss in future
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income had the ex-spouse continued to work until age 65; WvsSinceSepi,t [WvsSinceWidi,t]
is the number of interview waves since the separation [widowing event]; EARNi,t is the
individual’s earnings; ASSETSi,t are the individual’s current savings, not including defined
benefit pensions or Social Security; AGEi,t is a set of dummy variables for an individual’s
age from 50-70; WAVEt is a set of dummy variables corresponding to interview wave; and
Xi,t corresponds to a set of control variables including: race, education level, health status,
quadratic in actual experience, number of children, census division, 13 industry dummies,
17 occupational dummies, number of hospitalization events since last interview (i.e. 0,1,2+),
dummy variables for health insurance coverage (i.e. medicare, medicaid, VA, own-employer
coverage, spouse-employer coverage, other health coverage), and whether health insurance
includes retiree coverage.
I choose measures for future spousal income loss and asset loss that are exogenous from
post-separation/loss labor supply decisions. For spousal income loss, SpIncLossi,t, I use the
amount the ex-spouse was making prior to separation interacted with the age diﬀerence
between the ex-spouse’s age before separation and age 65. If the age diﬀerence is negative,
it is set to zero. This should be exogenous because it does not depend on the ex-spouse’s
actual labor supply decision. For asset loss, AssetLossi,t, I use the diﬀerence between the
period before the separation to the period immediately after the separation. This means
the individual has to be observed in both of these waves. I recognize that this is partially
endogenous: if the individual immediately responds and begins working, then they could
build up assets before the first interview wave after the separation causing the asset loss
to appear smaller. Alternatively, if the individual chose not to work, the asset loss could
appear larger if the existing assets are being used to finance consumption. This is only true
regarding the eﬀect on labor supply in the first interview wave after separation, and not the
subsequent interview waves.
I pool observations between 1992 and 2010 of individuals who are full-time employees in
the first interview wave, are at risk of divorce/widowhood between ages 50 and 70, and who
never apply for disability. If an individual remarries, his or her observations are dropped
from that period on. I estimate a probit of equation (12.1), with Huber-White standard
errors and adjusted for person-level clustering.
12.2 Estimation Results
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 report probit estimates based on equation (12.1) for women and men.
A positive coeﬃcient indicates a higher probability of retiring which I define as transi-
tioning from full-time work, part-time work, or unemployment into partial-retirement, full-
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retirement, or not in the labor force.43 The first model is a probit regression of retirement
on divorce/widowhood without the interactions in equation (12.1). The second model cor-
responds to equation (12.1), and includes interactions with asset loss and future spousal
earnings. The third model includes an interaction between asset loss and the time since the
divorce/widowhood. Each table includes the weighted and unweighted results.
Initially, controlling only for separation (leading to a divorce) and widowhood reveals
separation has a small negative eﬀect on women and men, while widowhood has a small
positive eﬀect on women and men. None of the eﬀects are precise.
Controlling for the interaction of asset loss, lost spousal earnings, and time since separa-
tion/loss reveals that divorce, outside of these interactions, has a significant eﬀect for women,
causing their probability of retiring to decrease by 13.2-14.6%. For women, asset loss has
a very small eﬀect, and in the unweighted case the wrong sign is observed. Loss of future
spousal income is positive, implying that the more the ex-spouse would have been eligible to
earn (between divorce and age 65), the more likely the wife is to retire in any given period.
This could be the result of wealthier individuals being more likely to provide alimony to
their ex-spouses. Longer time between the divorce and the current period implies that the
respondent is more likely to retire. This implies that the large eﬀect we found for divorce
begins to wear oﬀ as time passes, but it still persists even 10-12 years after the divorce. Since
asset loss and loss of future spousal income have negligible eﬀects on retirement, the major
drivers to retirement decisions are the residual eﬀects: the loss of economies of scale and new
preferences for consumption relative to leisure.
The third model, which includes an interaction between asset loss and time since the
marital separation, helps to clarify why the time since separation matters. Controlling for
this interaction removes the positive eﬀect of asset loss and captures most of the impact of
time passing since the divorce. We know from the previous section, that asset loss can be
a major reason for why women return to the labor force. If a woman returned to the labor
force following the separation due a substantial loss of savings, then the amount of time
that has passed will be correlated with her ability to retire. Controlling for this interaction,
however, does not eliminate the persistent, negative eﬀect of divorce on retirement.
Comparing the results for women with what we observed in the last section, we find that
while asset loss may eﬀect immediate labor supply decisions, with the passage of time, its
eﬀect on retirement is limited. The decision of when to retire is primarily driven by other
factors that are related to divorce, but that are not directly correlated with asset loss at the
time of the divorce. These long run consequences could be the divorced wife’s new found
43Partial retirement is part-time work where the respondent states in a separate question that they are
“retired”.
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Table 12.1: Probit Estimates of Retirement (Women)
Women Women (weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (1w) (2w) (3w)
SEP -0.171 -0.704** -0.636** -0.0679 -0.772** -0.739**
(0.139) (0.276) (0.281) (0.177) (0.304) (0.326)
[-0.036] [-0.146] [-0.132] [-0.015] [-0.165] [-0.157]
⇥AssetLoss 0.0575* -0.0338 0.0285 -0.0845
(0.0315) (0.0474) (0.0305) (0.0771)
[0.012] [-0.007] [0.006] [-0.018]
⇥SpIncLoss 0.00909 0.0122* 0.0199*** 0.0248***
(0.00661) (0.00739) (0.00703) (0.00923)
⇥WvsSinceSep 0.137** 0.0430 0.131 0.0222
(0.0694) (0.0908) (0.0814) (0.115)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥AssetLoss 0.119*** 0.187**
(0.0411) (0.0734)
[0.025] [0.026]
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥ SpIncLoss -0.00477 -0.0114**
(0.00328) (0.00513)
WID 0.0474 0.0660 0.0835 -0.119 -0.0641 -0.0480
(0.170) (0.239) (0.246) (0.205) (0.263) (0.268)
⇥AssetLoss 0.0468 0.00403 0.0208 0.0219
(0.0514) (0.101) (0.0650) (0.109)
⇥SpIncLoss 0.00466 -0.00335 0.00753 -0.00965
(0.0112) (0.0130) (0.0113) (0.0145)
⇥WvsSinceWid -0.0500 -0.0669 -0.0684 -0.0715
(0.0907) (0.0954) (0.104) (0.101)
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥AssetLoss 0.0153 -0.0281
(0.0590) (0.0594)
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥ SpIncLoss 0.0315 0.0424*
(0.0243) (0.0247)
EARN -2.60e-07 -2.91e-07 -3.10e-07 -1.70e-07 -2.55e-07 -2.88e-07
(5.21e-07) (5.25e-07) (5.27e-07) (7.62e-07) (7.69e-07) (7.74e-07)
ASSETS 0.00557*** 0.00555*** 0.00553*** 0.00702** 0.00701** 0.00700**
(0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00279) (0.00278) (0.00278)
N 8,022 8,022 8,022 5,944 5,944 5,944
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.135 0.137 0.1244 0.1265 0.1269
Notes: Dependent variable is retirement in the next period measured as a transition from employment
in the current period (full-time, part-time, unemployed) to retirement in the next period (retired,
partly retired, or not in labor force). Marginal eﬀects included in square brackets for select covariates.
Retirement is treated as an absorbing state, so observations after retirement are dropped from the
estimation. “weighted” indicates that data is weighted using person-level weights corresponding to the
specific HRS interview wave. Regressions are conducted only on individuals between ages 50 and 70
who worked full-time in their first HRS interview wave, were at-risk for a divorce/widowhood between
ages 50 and 70, did not remarry, and did not ever apply for disability. Descriptions of the included
covariates are in the text.
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Table 12.2: Probit Estimates of Retirement (Men)
Men Men (weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (1w) (2w) (3w)
SEP -0.237* -0.239 0.0516 -0.310* -0.235 -0.0146
(0.125) (0.226) (0.237) (0.169) (0.294) (0.302)
[-0.054] [-0.054] [0.011] [-0.066] [-0.050] [-0.004]
⇥AssetLoss 0.0266 0.0330 0.0334 0.0387
(0.0195) (0.0461) (0.0240) (0.0444)
⇥SpIncLoss -0.00605* -0.0187* -0.00643 -0.0153
(0.00346) (0.00980) (0.00484) (0.00936)
⇥WvsSinceSep 0.0672 -0.0536 0.0199 -0.0827
(0.0955) (0.103) (0.0990) (0.113)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥AssetLoss -0.00516 -0.00759
(0.0240) (0.0255)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥ SpIncLoss 0.00534 0.00482
(0.00337) (0.00355)
WID 0.355 0.512* 0.695** 0.475* 0.473 0.879**
(0.271) (0.281) (0.270) (0.257) (0.376) (0.351)
[0.080] [0.116] [0.157] [0.101] [0.100] [0.186]
⇥AssetLoss -0.103* 0.0185 -0.0712 0.166
(0.0547) (0.145) (0.0475) (0.115)
[-0.023] [0.004] [-0.150] [0.035]
⇥SpIncLoss 0.000812 -0.00866 0.00256 -0.00861
(0.00467) (0.0132) (0.00461) (0.0136)
⇥WvsSinceWid -0.350 -0.652** -0.218 -0.890**
(0.241) (0.325) (0.275) (0.410)
[0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000]
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥AssetLoss -0.321 -0.532***
(0.248) (0.195)
[-2.7e-06] [-3.7e-06]
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥ SpIncLoss 0.00991 0.0107
(0.00963) (0.00947)
EARN 2.90e-08 2.86e-08 2.82e-08 4.27e-09 3.83e-09 3.31e-09
(1.55e-07) (1.55e-07) (1.55e-07) (1.24e-07) (1.24e-07) (1.24e-07)
ASSETS 0.00364** 0.00362** 0.00363** 0.00440** 0.00440** 0.00441**
(0.00157) (0.00156) (0.00157) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00179)
N 10,461 10,461 10,461 9,854 9,854 9,854
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.141 0.142 0.1262 0.1266 0.1274
Notes: Dependent variable is retirement in the next period measured as a transition from employment
in the current period (full-time, part-time, unemployed) to retirement in the next period (retired,
partly retired, or not in labor force). Marginal eﬀects included in square brackets for select covariates.
Retirement is treated as an absorbing state, so observations after retirement are dropped from the
estimation. “weighted” indicates that data is weighted using person-level weights corresponding to the
specific HRS interview wave. Regressions are conducted only on individuals between ages 50 and 70
who worked full-time in their first HRS interview wave, were at-risk for a divorce/widowhood between
ages 50 and 70, did not remarry, and did not ever apply for disability. Descriptions of the included
covariates are in the text.
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desire to work (i.e. greater preference for consumption), or it could be driven by the loss of
marriage’s economies of scale. Using this straightforward specification, we can not identify
which of these eﬀects are causing divorced women to delay retirement.
Widowed women who are working at baseline have a higher probability of retiring, but
the coeﬃcient estimate is imprecise. This is similar to the previous analysis which indicated
that widowed women were more likely to withdraw from the labor force in advance of their
husband’s death.
Men are likely to delay retirement following a separation, but the point estimates are
small and imprecise. Widowed men are more likely to retire following the loss of their wife.
Asset loss and lost future spousal income have no eﬀect on the retirement decision of widows
or divorcées. Both men and women are more likely to retire as they have more assets.
Divorce’s eﬀect on delayed retirement is generally imprecise, but two general facts emerge.
First, asset losses during divorce do not have a persistent eﬀect on the retirement decision.
Women respond to asset loss by immediately returning to the labor force, thereby mitigating
its long-term impact on retirement. Second, there is a large residual eﬀect of divorce for
women and widowhood for men after controlling for the level of assets lost during divorce and
the forgone wages from the ex-spouse. This implies the long-term consequences stemming
from lost economies of scale or a shift in preference for consumption over leisure is encouraging
the delayed retirement of households. Preference changes are likely to be heterogenous: some
people will prefer more relative consumption when they are single, but some will not. On
the other hand, economies of scale is uni-directional. A single household’s consumption
will be much larger than half of the two-person household. While there is no clear cut
method of determining whether it is loss of economies of scale or changes in preferences for
consumption, I suspect that the magnitude of the retirement delay could only be driven by
changes in economies of scale. In future work, a structural model could be used to separate
individual heterogeneity in preferences from a common shift in economies of scale.
12.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I consider the eﬀect of my retirement definition on the estimated results,
as well as the same issues we considered for robustness in §11.4. Results of the robustness
checks are included in appendix P.
12.3.1 Retirement Definition
The results in the last section relied on retirement in the next period being measured as
a transition from employment in the current period (full-time, part-time, unemployed) to
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retirement in the next period (retired, partly retired, or not in labor force). This measure
relies partly on the individual to define when they are retired. For example, an individual
who transitions from being a full-time teacher to substitute teaching might consider himself
transitioning from full-time employment to partial retirement. My retirement measure would
treat this individual as retiring. Alternatively, in this section I consider a measure based on
annual hours of work. If an individual transitions from working more than 300 hours per
year to less than 300 hours per year, the individual is treated as retired (the individual is
still required to be working full-time in his or her first interview wave).
The alternative measure of retirement still produces a large decrease in the probability
of retirement from a separation, but the eﬀect is smaller. For women, the residual eﬀect of a
separation, after accounting for asset loss and lost spousal income, is around 10.6%, compared
with 13.2-14.6% using the other retirement measure. No eﬀect is found for the interaction
between asset loss and time since separation is found. The elimination of this eﬀect may be
due in part to how retirement is being defined. Using the alternative measure, which is based
on annual labor hours, would include individuals who are working in bridge jobs. Bridge
jobs may be more about enjoyment than they are about financing consumption. This would
imply that the individual derives utility from work, or disutility from leisure. As a result,
the alternative definition of retirement might not accurately capture the work/consumption
tradeoﬀ in the lifecycle model.
Tables P.3 and P.4 in appendix P demonstrate the new estimates from the alternative
definition of retirement.
12.3.2 Leisure Complementarities, Pensions and Social Security
I account for married couples’ leisure complementarities by including a dummy for whether
the spouse is in the labor force and whether the spouse is working full-time. Accounting
for leisure complementarities reveals little change to the estimates in §12.2. Couple’s leisure
time is complementary, although the eﬀect is not statistically significant.
I account for the eﬀect of pensions and Social Security by including dummies for whether
the ex-spouse is retired, whether the ex-spouse is at least 62, and continuous variables for
the time rule formula for divorcing households, and the relative value of survivor’s benefit to
the household benefit if each member claimed at 62 (or immediately if older). Accounting
for the eﬀects of Social Security and pension structure due to divorce/widowhood increases
the parameter estimates for divorce. The general results discussed in the previous section,
however, remain the same.
Tables P.5 and P.6 in appendix P demonstrate the new estimates from these robustness
checks.
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Since the retirement decision does not account for fixed eﬀects, I follow Coile and Gruber
(2007) who allow the present value of lifetime benefits to influence the retirement decision.
I include the expected present value of Social Security’s own-benefits, survivor’s benefit,
spouse’s benefits, and total household benefits (i.e. capturing what one’s spouse might be
eligible for) over the lifetime. A higher value of one’s own benefit decreases the likelihood
of retiring, while greater spouse, survivor, and household benefits increase the likelihood
of retirement. The coeﬃcients for the expected lifetime benefits are insignificant, and the
eﬀects of divorce and widowhood discussed earlier remain the same.
13 Discussion and Conclusion
The Baby Boomer generation has shown a higher propensity to divorce relative to younger
generations, and this trend appears to be lasting into retirement. Regardless of future trends,
marital separation near retirement has short-term employment eﬀects, forcing individuals
back into the labor force, as well as long-term eﬀects in the form of delayed retirement. I
have introduced a household life-cycle model of labor supply that captures the transition from
a two-person household to two one-person households. The model shows that a separation
alters labor supply decisions based on four contributing factors: household asset loss, lost
future spouse income, changes in fixed household preferences, and economies of scale.
I find that the labor force participation response to divorce is small for men but is as
large as 17.1% for women in the ten years following a separation leading to divorce. When
the eﬀects are separated to capture the relative influence of each of the contributing factors,
it is asset loss that drives the female labor supply response immediately after the separation.
A non-working woman is 6.0% to 10.9% more likely to work for every $100,000 lost in non-
housing assets. Other factors, such as lost future spousal income, exhibit limited influence
on short-run changes to labor supply. In the long-run, divorce primarily eﬀects retirement
decisions through the loss of economies of scale, or greater preference for consumption.
Women divorcing in their 50s or 60s will be 13.2-14.6% less likely to retire at any age after
controlling for losses in assets and future spousal income.
These results suggest that wealth shocks may be the primary reason for women returning
to the labor force following their divorce. Divorce courts currently give little consideration to
forward-looking household decisions. When assets are split at divorce, the woman’s earnings
potential is often exaggerated, particularly if she has not been working. She might have to
drawdown her remaining assets while finding a job and establishing her new home. Moreover,
she is more likely to move into a lower earning job relative to her ex-spouse, reducing the
likelihood that she will be able to accumulate savings to prepare for retirement.
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Policymakers and courts trying to ascertain equity in divorce are interested in the welfare
of post-divorce individuals. This study demonstrates that we do observe the predicted eﬀects
of a household life-cycle model of labor supply that incorporates divorce and widowhood.
It does not, however, calculate welfare eﬀects. It also documents other curious anomalies,
such as early Social Security benefit claiming among widows and divorced women, greater
disability application rates among divorced women, and persistently higher poverty rates
for divorced women. In future work, a structural model of household decision-making that
accounts for divorce may be better able to measure the life-cycle eﬀects, and provide stronger
evidence of changes in men and women’s welfare following divorce.
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Chapter 3:
Structured Contributions and Directed Search
14 Introduction
A common thread in the organizational design literature is that a business environment often
contains complex, tightly interconnected activities44 that play important roles in creating
and sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995a; Rivkin, 2000).
Firms facing these environments must consider that the marginal cost and benefit associated
with any activity depends on the configuration of others activities (Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2003). If activities are complementary then changing one activity amplifies the return from
the other activities. For example, if a firm oﬀers a digital music player, it might increase its
sales by oﬀering a music downloading service. Alternatively, two activities are substitutable
when changing one activity reduces the return from the other activity. In recent years, the
popular press has highlighted that the introduction of tablets may be responsible for declining
computer sales (Sherr and Ovide, 2013; Worthen and Sherr, 2012; Wingfield, 2013).
Authors wishing to analyze how organizational design aﬀects a business’ response to its
environment have oscillated between two modeling extremes. One assumes that a firm can
directly maximize its profit because activities interact in a perfectly known framework (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1990). The other assumes that the business landscape45 is complex: a firm
can only distinguish its optimal performance through exhaustively searching all possible con-
figurations of activities (Levinthal, 1997). Both literatures require performance-maximizing
firms to configure a set of interdependent activities in a consistent manner (Porter, 1996).
The outcome of such eﬀorts determines the firm’s competitive advantage and its sustain-
ability. The eﬀectiveness of an organization’s structure in adapting to a complex business
landscape is determined by the interdependencies among activities (Siggelkow and Levinthal,
2003). Can complementarities within these interdependencies alter the eﬀectiveness of an
44An activity is a discrete economic process within a firm, such as producing a completed product, training
employees, employee benefit programs, or marketing decisions, that can be configured in a variety of ways
(Porter, 1985).
45The business landscape is the realization of the firm’s total performance from every possible combination
of activities. Performance could be measured as the firm’s profit, or it could any other measure by which
the firm determines its success.
100
organization’s design in adapting to a complex business environment?
We find that complementarity or substitutability between activities, more than the quan-
tity of interactions, determines the eﬀectiveness of an organization’s design in adapting to
a new business landscape. If a business exists within a landscape where all of its intercon-
nected activities are complementary, than a positive improvement in one activity provides
positive feedback for other activities. As a result, an organization can speed its adapta-
tion by decentralizing its organizational structure. Additionally, we highlight the key role
that the variance of the performance gain from these interactions plays in determining the
eﬀectiveness of any organization’s structure.
The NK model, introduced from theoretical biology, oﬀers a useful platform to model the
configuration of firm activities (Levinthal, 1997; Kauﬀman, 1993). The NK model permits
the researcher to study whether turbulent or stable environments facilitate certain organi-
zation structures (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005), whether vacillating between organizational
structures can improve firm performance (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003), how decision au-
tonomy impacts the relative importance of that activity in optimizing the firm’s performance
(Ghemawat and Levinthal, 2008), and how the degree of interdependence influences industry
structure and dynamics (Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin, 2006, 2007). A critical assumption of
the NK model, however, is that the contribution of an activity to the firm’s total perfor-
mance is randomly drawn for every possible combination of activities, implying that two
activities do not interact in a consistent way. For example, if a firm oﬀers a digital music
player, this could interact with the firm’s decision to oﬀer a music downloading service or
to oﬀer its own brand of headphones. The structure of the NK model does not allow for
the complementary relationship between the decision to produce digital music players and
the decision to oﬀer digital music downloading services to be preserved regardless of whether
headphones are oﬀered. Recently, researchers have begun to pay attention to the fact that
this assumption may not be realistic. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) note that the original NK
model was developed for “biological systems that evolve by mutations to single, randomly
chosen genes, [but] it is dubious for organizational, social, and technological systems in which
human agents can employ more sophisticated forms of search.”
The economics literature provides an alternative framework to examine the interaction
of firm activities, recognizing the consistency of interactions through the complementarity
or substitutability of firm activities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995b). Under a strict set
of assumptions, firms will be able to calculate the optimal activity configuration. In reality,
however, the assumptions of Milgrom and Roberts’ framework (i.e. the diﬀerentiability
assumptions, functional forms) do not always hold, because firms operate in a complex and
uncertain environment. Moreover, their model focuses only on manufacturing firms, whereas
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NK models apply more broadly to any firm that oﬀers a combination of goods and services
where the method of aggregation of firm-level activities to determine final profitability may
not be fully known.
This paper bridges the gap between the complementary interactions of neatly structured
models in economics (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), and the models used in the organizational
strategy field to reflect interactions in complex business landscapes (Siggelkow, 2011). We
introduce a method of integrating complementary and substitutable interactions into the
determination of the firm’s business landscape. With the introduction of consistent comple-
mentarities into the business landscape, the natural methods of exploration and adaptation
reflect the formation of synergies within the landscape that provide important feedback to
the adapting firm.
In examining diﬀerent methods of search, we allow firms to incorporate information
regarding the complementarity of their activities. The purpose of this assumption is to
separate when additional information regarding activity interdependencies can be helpful
in improving a firm’s adaptation. Our results show that a small amount of information
regarding a firm’s interdependencies can significantly improve the speed and performance
gains from local adaptation under certain circumstances. This provides us with a theoretical
framework from which to test strategies for organizational adaptation that will permit a
firm’s management to exploit the “lowest lying fruit” for improving their firm’s performance.
This approach builds on the prior literature that incorporated managerial understanding of
these interactions through cognitive representation of high-dimensional landscapes (Gavetti
and Levinthal, 2000), modularization of interactions (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004b), and
broadened search with patterned interactions (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Ghemawat and
Levinthal, 2008). This literature, however, has yet to incorporate how consistent interac-
tions, whether complementary or substitutable, would impact the business landscape and the
consequences of these consistent interactions on the search and adaptation process (Rivkin
and Siggelkow, 2007).
A few examples demonstrate the importance of incorporating the complementarity of ac-
tivities within a business landscape for the eﬀectiveness of an organization’s design. Siggelkow
(2001) explored the interaction of Liz Claiborne’s activities as they moved from a position
of market dominance into a more competitive environment. Starting in the early 1990s,
Liz Claiborne began to oﬀer retailers the opportunity to reorder specific clothing lines after
Claiborne’s inventory had run out. The firm, however, changed this part of their production
model without accounting for the lead time it required to get the product to the retailer
which meant that in many instances there was either an inventory shortage or surplus in
Claiborne’s warehouses (Siggelkow, 2001). Liz Claiborne’s management did not account for
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“oﬀering reorderings” complementary eﬀect on shipping times. Had the firm accounted for
this interaction, it might have avoided costly shifts in its inventory levels.
More recently, the growth of digital music downloads demonstrated the complementarities
between the hardware and software divisions of technology companies. Apple’s management
exploited these aspects and used them to make a digital music library consumer friendly
so that a market for legal music downloads could be developed. Initially, Apple did not
have the resources to become a large digital music retailer. Other firms, such as Sony, were
in a better market position to bridge the computer and music divide. Sony had divisions
dedicated to computer hardware and software, in addition to being one of the largest music
companies in the world. Sony failed to exploit the missing market for digital music downloads
due to the firm’s decentralized organizational structure. This is just one example (of many)
where knowledge about activity complementarities within a company’s structure permitted
the management to direct their search in such a way as to improve the firm’s performance.
In Apple’s case, the decision to connect the hardware and software experience led them to
recognize the complementary nature of music listening and the retail experience which led to
their own direct music downloading service. This service, the iTunes Store, became the most
dominant retail source in the music industry by 2008, five years after opening. Examples
of entrepreneurs exploiting the complementarity in their businesses abound, including large
company examples such as IBM’s move from hardware to consulting, Google’s monetization
of search data for marketing, and small company examples of local restaurants expanding to
include catering services, specialized grocery stores, or bakeries.
Our analysis contains the following three components. First, we analyze the eﬀect of
structured contributions on the firm’s business landscape. Structured contributions mean
we specifically model the direction of performance gains from activity interactions, ensuring
that they are consistent (e.g. if activities A and B are complementary, they will always be so
regardless of other activities). This is in contrast to the existing literature, which assumes the
contribution from activity interactions is random. The randomness assumption results in two
activities interacting in an inconsistent way. For example, randomness could imply that more
marketing improves a firms performance if it sells a product in one or three color options, but
not with two color options. We introduce a simple method of endogenizing complementarity
and substitutability between activities, and permit for variance in the performance gains
from activity interactions. Variation in the performance gain from activity interactions
accounts for high-order contextual interactions.46 We demonstrate that it is the combination
of complementarities and performance gain variance that determines the eﬀectiveness of
46High-order contextual interactions are interactions between more than two activities (i.e. the perfor-
mance gain from the interaction of activities A and B is amplified/reduced by activity C).
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diﬀerent organizational designs, and not the quantity of interactions.
Second, we propose diﬀerent mechanisms for internalizing knowledge of how contributions
interact, and will revise the firm’s search methodology to endogenize this knowledge. If a
firm knows that decisions A and B are complementary, then a positive variation in decision
A increases the returns from decision B.47 Internalizing this knowledge is shown to speed
performance conditional on the underlying nature of the interactions, and is suggestive of
strategies in turbulent environments. We further study how the nature of activity interac-
tions combine with organizational structure to determine firm performance (Fang, Lee, and
Schilling, 2010; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996).
Finally, we explore the role of performance gain variance, which we call uncertainty, in
contextual interactions. Uncertainty reflects what Levinthal (2011) called “mapping of the
true underlying decision problem to a simple representation that is, in turn, amendable to
deductive reasoning.” Managers are not perfectly aware of how their choices are reflected in
the performance of the firm, because the firm is believed to exist in a complex and dynamic
environment. Expectations over the magnitude and variance of the performance gain from
activity interactions influences whether centralization/decentralization of an organization’s
structure is an optimal strategy in turbulent environments.
This paper makes three contributions to the organizational search literature: (1) it adapts
the NK model to incorporate consistency between activity interactions so that theoretical
models of organizational adaptation have business landscapes capable of reflecting feedback
from complementary activities, (2) it provides a framework for understanding which organiza-
tional designs benefit from the management learning more about the nature of their activity
interactions, and (3) it provides a tractable framework for understanding how complemen-
tarities and uncertainty impact the eﬀectiveness of organizational structures in adapting to
new or changing environments.
We abstract from interactions across firms, as this would require further characterizing
the number of firms within a given market, and the strategic nature of their interactions.
Instead, this paper focuses on how the introduction of complementary activity interactions
can be used to influence the process of local search and adaptation.
47This reflects the notion of strategic complements (substitutes) from game theory, as in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990, 1995b). This should not be confused with net complements (substitutes) which do not
require positive (negative) cross-second derivatives.
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15 Structured Contributions
Firms face a wide array of decisions a few of which include oﬀering multiple product lines,
choosing output levels, or outsourcing their human resource departments. The degree of
interaction between these activities can increase the diﬃculty of any manager’s task, whether
the CEO or a division manager, of optimizing the performance of his or her firm.
The organizational adaptation literature frequently uses the NK model to encapsulate
the complexity of organizational choices. This literature highlights the belief that economic
actors are boundedly rational, and therefore can not carry out a complex optimization prob-
lem of the kind frequently found in the literature (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a). Moreover,
firms can be large organizations with thousands of activities where many of these activi-
ties are discrete or yield nonlinear payoﬀs and cannot be solved with standard optimization
techniques. To this end, the NK model provides a tractable, structural framework where
simulated managers can explore a business landscape in an eﬀort to optimize the performance
of their combined choices. Bounded rationality is reflected in the model by each manager
being provided limited observational scope. The manager is only able to observe the total
performance of the firm, and cannot identify how the individual decisions contribute to the
total performance. For practitioners, this method can provide a way of understanding the
likely success of diﬀerent methods of organizational adaptation, such as the context within
which centralization versus decentralization of the organization structure can improve per-
formance (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003), or how to balance search versus stability (Rivkin
and Siggelkow, 2003; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004b).
The NK model assumes structured interactions. We introduce an additional assumption:
structured contributions. Structured contributions imply that interactions between decisions
operate in a consistent manner. For example, if greater marketing expenditures improve a
firms performance if it sells a product in one or three color options (i.e. the decisions are
complementary), then it should also do so if the firm sells it in two color options. The
contribution of each decision is structured in such a way that it provides a directionally
consistent performance gain if interactions are complementary, or consistent performance
loss if the interactions are substitutable. While the contribution to total performance may
be directionally consistent, the way we model it permits the magnitude of these interactions
to be variable.
In this section we will provide a brief background on how the traditional NK model works
and what researchers may achieve using it. We will then introduce a mechanism that will
provide for the consistent interaction of complementary and substitutable choices within the
NK model (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Consistent interactions lead to a landscape that
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has greater logical consistency and will provide feedback to improve the firm’s search and
adaptation process.
15.1 Modeling Complexity: Landscapes in the NK Model
The wide array of complex decisions that firm managers face are typically modeled using
the NK model which releases a simulated agent onto a business landscape where the agent
searches both incrementally and blindly to improve his or her performance.48 Unlike an
optimization problem, the NK model assumes the agent has no knowledge of the underlying
nature of his or her firm or market, which is like assuming a manager has no knowledge of
how his or her divisions interact to produce the product and how this product yields profit
for his or her firm. The manager can observe the value (or performance) of the combined
choices’ output, but knows nothing about how these choices aggregate. Intuitively, this
structure assumes that a manager can only see the firm’s balance sheet (i.e. whether a firm
earned more or less profit relative to the previous period) and what activities the firm has
changed this period. Levinthal (1997) describes this as the process of local adaptation, which
typically leads to a few dominant organizational forms within a market. In the next section,
we will focus more on this search process, but first we explore how the NK model generates
the business landscape.
Local adaptation relies on a manager making single changes to his or her activity set.
This implies that understanding how the NK model generates a business landscape is critical
to understanding any caveats to local adaptation results. If a firm’s manager only makes
incremental changes, then he or she could prematurely end adaptation upon finding a local
maxima. As interactions become more complex and local peaks populate the business land-
scape, the firm is susceptible to premature lock-in. Therefore, the model that determines the
business landscape determines the feedback firms receive and respond to while undergoing
local adaptation. In modeling complex interactions, the NK model as proposed by Kauﬀman
(1993), assumes that each combination of decisions yields its own unique performance level
and that this performance can change based upon how other decisions change. Specifically,
a firm makes N binary decisions about its organization, such as Apple might choose between
oﬀering the iPad in many colors or one color, or it may choose whether or not to have a mar-
keting campaign on college campuses, or it can choose whether or not to have promotional
oﬀers (such as oﬀering an iTunes gift card with each sale). For simplicity, we will assume
that N = 10, despite the fact that it is more likely that a company could have hundreds
if not thousands of activities. As a result, the space of possible decisions has a total of 2N
48The reader might find it helpful to consider a hiker trying to find the highest peak in a mountain range;
however, blinded by fog, the hiker can only see the path immediately in front of them.
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possible organizational combinations (i.e. the specific string of N decisions).
Additionally, each of theN decisions interact withK other decisions such thatK  N 1.
In our example, this might be that Apple’s choice of oﬀering the iPad in multiple colors may
interact with its marketing and promotional choices, but not with other choices such as
oﬀering health insurance to its employees. We refer to the structure of these interactions as
the interaction matrix. Figure 15.1 provides an example where each decision di is influenced
by itself and K other dj 6=i decisions (for a total of K+1 decisions). For example, d4 in figure
1 is influenced by d1 and d6.
The firm will make a set of decisions for every activity (total of N binary decisions) and
this organizational combination of decisions, denoted by d, determines the contribution for
each decision i, denoted Ci(d), via the interaction matrix. Ci(d) is a random number drawn
from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1 for each of the 2K+1 decision combinations,
or 8 in this specific case.49 This implies that Apple’s color choice (decision i), which interacts
with marketing and promotional choices, yields a specific contribution, Ci(d), that in the
NK model is a random number. The NK literature then assumes the firm’s normalized
performance is the sum of these contributions divided by the maximum possible performance
value for any d (therefore performance is always between 0 and 1):
P (d) =
⌃iCi(d)
maxd {⌃iCi(d)} (15.1)
Therefore, Apple’s final profitability is determined by the sum of the contributions of all of
49Note our delineation in terminology: organizational combination is the combination of N decisions that
the firm selects, where as decision combination for i is the combination of K+1 decisions that interact with
di (including di, hence the +1)
Figure 15.1: Interaction Matrix, (K = 2)
j
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
d1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
d2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
d3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
d4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
i d5 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
d6 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
d7 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
d8 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
d9 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
d10 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
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Figure 15.2: Landscape Characteristics - Random Contributions (K = 2)
(a) Distribution of Business Landscape
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
      0
 200000
 400000
 600000
 800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
Firm Performance
Qu
an
tit
y o
f D
ec
isi
on
 C
om
bin
ati
on
s w
ith
R
el
ev
an
t P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 V
al
ue
s
(b) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape
−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
500
1000
1500
Quantity of Local Peaks Per Landscape
Qu
an
tit
y o
f L
an
ds
ca
pe
s
Notes: Simulations done for N=10 over 10,000 landscapes. 100 interaction or influence matrices are drawn
and then 100 landscapes are simulated for each of the interaction matrices.
its decisions, Ci(d), such as its iPad color choice, and its marketing, promotional, employee
healthcare, and other choices with each given equal weight in the final profit (or performance)
of the firm.
An additive contribution structure where all choices are given equal weight creates a dis-
tribution of firm-wide performance that is skewed towards a performance of 1 (the maximum
possible performance), as seen in figure 15.2a. Due to the random nature of the performance
contributions, the landscape is often rugged meaning that it consists of many local peaks -
outcomes where no single deviation can improve firm performance, which is illustrated for
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Figure 15.3: Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape
(a) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape (K = 4)
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(b) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape (K = 7)
Notes: Simulations done for N=10 over 10,000 landscapes. 100 interaction or influence matrices are drawn
and then 100 landscapes are simulated for each of the interaction matrices.
the case of K = 2 in figure 15.2b. Levinthal (1997) showed that as K increased the land-
scape became more rugged, which is confirmed as we look at the cases of K = 4 and K = 7
in figure 15.3. This outcome is due to the increased number of decision combinations since
the number of organizational combinations is held constant, which is a partial explanation
of why researchers maintaining the total number of interactions but altering the pattern of
interactions observe increased ruggedness as well (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). Once we
introduce consistency across interactions and contextual uncertainty, we will have a more
complete picture of the driving factors behind increased landscape ruggedness.
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15.2 Consistency across Interactions
In the last subsection, we saw that Apple’s color activity (decision i), which interacts with
marketing and promotional activities, yields a specific contribution, Ci(d), that in the NK
model is a random number. This assumption may be appropriate in the context of evolu-
tionary biology, as in Kauﬀman (1993), where it is unclear how gene types interact with
each other, but in a business setting, markets and firms are more likely to have interactions
that influence the firm’s performance level in a consistent way. Using the Apple example
from earlier, if the marketing and color activities are complementary then a performance
improvement from marketing should always yield a performance improvement from choice
of iPad color. This performance improvement should be robust to changes in other choices
as well.50 Surprisingly, this is not the case with the NK model.
In this subsection we introduce a method of endogenizing complementary and substi-
tutable interactions in the NK model, so that when contributions are aggregated, the per-
formance of the firm reflects these interactions. We inherit the basic NK model setup for
§15.1, but permit the interaction matrix to take on a value of 0 for no interaction, -1 for a
substitutable interaction, and 1 for a complementary interaction (an example is provided in
figure 15.4). If a cell ij in an interaction matrix is drawn randomly as before, we now assign
it as a substitutable interaction or a complementary interaction with varying probability
(which we will refer to as the percent complementarity in figure 15.2).
Instead of setting Ci(d) by drawing from a uniform distribution, we introduce a new
50This line of logic is similar to the contextuality of interactions argument provided by Porter and Siggelkow
(2008), but they provide for interactions beyond the direct interactions considered in this paper. Specifically,
they permit all choices to interact with one another within a performance function with no uncertainty.
Figure 15.4: Interaction matrix with Structured Contributions (K = 2)
j
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
d1 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
d2 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
d3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
d4 1 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0
i d5 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
d6 0 1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
d7 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
d8 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 0
d9 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
d10 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1
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method of aggregating the contributions of each di 2 d. First, each decision i starts with
its own contribution Ci(di) which is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
Then each decision dj 6=i 2 d (that interacts with decision i) contributes Iij · Ci(di) · Cj(dj)
to i’s overall contribution. If decision j is complementary to i (i.e. Iij > 0), then a positive
change in j will lead to a positive change in i, or if j is substitutable for i (i.e. Iij < 0),
then a positive change in j will lead to a negative change in i. This setup is consistent with
the notion of strategic complements and substitutes in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) seminal
paper, but does so in a context that reflects a complex and non-linear relationship between
performance level and firm activities.
One of the most important attributes of the NK model is that its landscape is so random
that it is impossible for any agent to completely learn it, reflecting the concept of bounded
rationality. To preserve this feature, we obscure the contribution of each decision by a
random variable,  . If   = 1, then with repeated sampling, the agent would be able to
credibly distinguish the precise performance contribution of each component, implying that
there would be a unique global optima. If   is a random number, then it introduces variance
in the performance gains from activity interactions, which obscured the true contributions
of each activity. By obscuring the actual contributions of each component, we introduce
uncertainty into the landscape which provides the opportunity for ruggedness.51 Ruggedness
can be increased in the same ways as in the traditional NK model, by increasing K and by
increasing the number of possible organizational combinations. In equation form:
Ci(d) = Ci(di) ·
 
1 +
X
j
[Iij ·  ij · Cj(dj)]
!
(15.2)
Using the structured contributions in equation (15.2), we simulate 10,000 landscapes and
influence matrices as we did for the results in §15.1. The choice of what percent of the
interaction matrix is complementary has a significant eﬀect of the shape of the landscape.
For K = 2, the more complementary the interaction matrix, the less right skewed the
distribution of performance values across the landscape and fewer peaks. Comparing figure
15.2 to figure 15.5, we choose a 75% complementary matrix to preserve the same approximate
landscape distribution, but note that despite this, structured contributions continue to yield
many more peaks. This realization helps us understand how dynamic the landscape can be,
and it becomes necessary for us to understand how little changes can alter the landscape’s
51In our model, it is the randomness of   that prevents the agent from understanding the true underlying
model that generates the business landscape. In the standard NK model it is the random assignment to
every decision combination that instead generates the business landscape. The only diﬀerence is that we
permit a limited amount of structure that is preserved in the generation of the business landscape.
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ruggedness.
Once complements and substitutes are endogenized, we observe that the distribution of
the ruggedness of the landscape (i.e. the distribution of peaks) is driven primarily by the
variance in the performance gains of the activity interactions in the model, and the mean level
of peaks is driven by the type of interaction (complements or substitutes). This is notable,
since it has been assumed up until now, that it was the quantity of interactions, not the type
of interaction or the assumed uncertainty, that drives landscape ruggedness. This becomes
clearer if we hold the level of uncertainty (i.e. variance in the performance gains from activity
interactions) and quantity of interactions constant, and alter the complementarity of the
interactions. As shown in figure 15.6, as the interaction matrix becomes less complementary
(i.e. more of the interactions are strategically substitutable) the ruggedness of the landscape
increases in mean quantity of peaks, similar to the increase in K we observed in figure
15.3. Furthermore, if we hold K constant, and decrease the level of uncertainty, we can
also decrease the distribution and quantity of peaks. Intuitively, as the landscape becomes
more certain, you are in eﬀect making the landscape more consistent and hence smoother.
Finally, as K increases in a setting with zero uncertainty (no variance in  ) and a constant
level of complementarity, the eﬀect on the distribution is limited. As seen in figure 15.7, as
K increases the quantity of peaks remains largely unchanged.
As we will demonstrate in the next two sections, understanding the business landscape
is critical because the way activities interact will have a significant eﬀect on how search is
conducted. By providing a structured landscape design, we learn that the observation in the
literature - that an increase in the quantity of interactions implies an (i.e. K) increase in the
ruggedness of the landscape - masks the rich tradeoﬀ between the types of interactions and
the uncertainty or randomness that is built into the landscape design. Using the structured
contributions framework, as introduced in this section, will allow researchers to tease out the
eﬀects of complementary interactions on organizational adaptation in complex and dynamic
landscapes.
16 Directed Search
In the previous section, we introduced a way of incorporating complementary and substi-
tutable interactions into the NK model. These interactions allow the business landscape to
reflect the formation of synergies within the landscape, which provide important feedback to
the adapting firm. In this section, we demonstrate that a firm with a little bit of informa-
tion, for example, general knowledge regarding the type of interactions between activities,
can improve their performance more rapidly than the traditional method of local adapta-
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Figure 15.5: Landscape Characteristics - Structured Contributions (K = 2)
(a) Distribution of Business Landscape
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(b) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape
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Notes: Results presented assume 75% complementary interaction matrix. The distribution of  i is U [0, 1].
Simulations done for N=10 over 10,000 landscapes. 100 interaction or influence matrices are drawn
and then 100 landscapes are simulated for each of the interaction matrices.
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Figure 15.6: Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape with Structured Contributions
(a) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape (K = 2)
with a 25% complementary interaction matrix. (75%
substitutable)
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(b) Quantity of Local Peaks by Landscape (K = 2)
with a 0% complementary interaction matrix. (100%
substitutable)
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Notes: Simulations done for N=10 over 10,000 landscapes. 100 interaction or influence matrices are drawn
and then 100 landscapes are simulated for each of the interaction matrices. The distribution of  i is
U [0, 1] and is fixed across figures.
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Figure 15.7: Increasing Ruggedness of the Landscape with Structured Contributions
(a) Quantity of Local Peaks in a Landscape with no
uncertainty (K = 2) and a 50% complementary in-
teraction matrix. (50% substitutable)
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(b) Quantity of Local Peaks in a Landscape with no
uncertainty (K = 7) and a 50% complementary in-
teraction matrix. (50% substitutable)
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Notes: Simulations done for N=10 over 10,000 landscapes. 100 interaction or influence matrices are drawn
and then 100 landscapes are simulated for each of the interaction matrices. The distribution of  i is
U [0, 1] and is fixed across figures.
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tion. Perhaps more surprising, we also show that under certain circumstances, additional
information yields no benefit.
In the context of our Apple example, local adaptation suggests that the firm has no
knowledge of how the choice of iPad color would interact with a marketing strategy to
college students or Apple’s employee healthcare. Thus the CEO would randomly select one
of these activities, and alter it to observe the impact of this adaptation. If the CEO observes
an improvement, he or she is not capable of concluding how that impact reciprocates through
their organization. This is like a mountain climber who takes what appears to be a step up
the side of a mountain, but is unable to see that the space immediately around him either
rises or falls (in essence he is blind). This would be a very frustrating outcome for a CEO
(and the mountain climber) as it would likely imply that there movement would be very
slow and indirect as each improvement that is taken can result in randomly large or small
improvements.
Alternatively, we expect that a CEO has his or her own mental map of how activities
interact, or could conduct research to determine how activities interact. With a weak as-
sumption that the CEO has general knowledge of the the interaction matrix - whether the
interactions with a specific activity are predominately complementary or substitutable in
nature - we can demonstrate that pursuing a directed search strategy may improve the short
run performance of the firm. This would be particularly valuable for practitioners who face
very volatile landscapes. There are also scenarios, however, where additional information
regarding activity interaction yields only limited benefit. For example, we find that when
a firm follows a centralized decision-making structure, where the CEO makes all decisions,
and the activities within the business landscape are highly substitutable, then there are no
gains to directing search. In these circumstances, research into what activities have the most
interactions would not be worth learning. Knowing when to invest in learning about activity
interactions in a business landscape is an important component of firm management. Our
results are suggestive that very simple decision rules for adaptation can yield significant
performance gains even with limited information about how activities interact.
16.1 Directed Search Mechanisms
Providing a firm’s managment with a little information regarding the activity interactions in
its business landscape can greatly improve how it chooses to organize and adapt to changes
in the landscape. It is like giving a mountain climber an aerial snapshot of the terrain they
are facing - she will not know her position on the landscape, or the exact information about
how many peaks exist, or which peak is the tallest, but she will have some idea of what to
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expect and this will inform how she proceeds to climb the mountain. In corporate strategy,
knowledge of what information to collect (i.e. which activities to vary first) would be helpful
to practitioners who face the characteristics that the NK model is meant to reflect, such
as activity complexity, but have more information (or can learn) about how their activities
influence their business landscape than the typical NK model assumes.
In the organizational design literature, the most frequently chosen search mechanism
is local adaptation (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2003). Local adaptation is where only single deviations from the current organizational
combination are considered. In most of this literature, the firm accepts the first deviation
from its current form that yields improved performance, which is like a CEO considering
diﬀerent alternatives and taking the first available improvement they observe. The process
of local adaptation can be varied in diﬀerent ways, depending on the assumptions of the
model. First, we could assume that the CEO considers all N possible single deviations and
then chooses the best option, however, this requires the decision-maker to invest in learning
about the costs and consequence of N diﬀerent variations. A second alternative, is to permit
the agent to internalize some information that they can use when selecting which activity to
invest in learning about. We focus on this second alternative, as search is costly for agents
to undertake, so it is infeasible to expect a manager to test all possible single combination
deviations if they want to respond quickly to an ever evolving business environment.
In this section we propose a search mechanism that a CEO or division manager could use
to speed the process of organizational adaptation and achieve higher average performance.
The directed search mechanism described below is chosen to reflect the ability of the firm’s
leadership to understand the most general interactions between the activities they face. It
does not require them to know the magnitude, only the direction, of the interactions. This
simple assumption changes the process of how organizational adaptation is conducted by
allowing agents to internalize some of their expectations regarding their landscape, and
provides a new avenue for refining analyses of organizational design. First, we explore how
the current literature treats local search through random search with repeated sampling, and
then propose an alternative mechanism based on the agent’s limited information regarding
the structure of interactions.
16.1.1 Random Search Mechanisms
Random search mechanisms rely on the CEO only observing the aggregate performance
of the firm because it is impossible to discern each decision combination’s contribution.
Moreover, for these mechanisms, we assume that the CEO has no additional information.
Two firm-level search mechanisms are:
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Random with replacement This is the methodology used in the current literature where
a single activity is varied each time with replacement. This assumes that the firm is memo-
ryless, in that it will not be able to recall and learn from its search history.
Random without replacement A single activity is varied each time, and if no improve-
ment is found, then that activity is not repeated again until an improvement is found. We
include this mechanism to clearly delineate the gains from non-repetitive search versus the
gains from directed search. A “random search without replacement” mechanism makes the
assumption that a firm learns from its most recent search history (i.e. it does not retest
activities that have previously resulted in poorer performance). This memory is cleared and
all activities can be retested following the first successful variation.
16.1.2 Directed Search Mechanisms
Directed search mechanisms assume structured contributions of the type described in §15.2.
As a result we can exploit how contributions interact to speed and improve the adaptation
process. We introduce only one search mechanism here for brevity, but the NK model
provides a rich environment in which to test the plausible eﬀectiveness of other proposed
search mechanisms. Here, we keep the directed search mechanism simple to illustrate our
point that a little information can yield quick and substantial performance improvements
relative to a random search mechanisms.
Most Complementary In this method a firm varies the most complementary decisions
first (i.e. those with largest sum within a vertical column of the interaction matrix) because
these decision are likely to have the most positive impact on the overall performance through
the consistent interactions described above. Subsequently the firm varies the next most
complementary decisions which are those decisions with the next largest column sum. For
example, using figure 15.4, decision d1 would be the most complementary decision because it
has a complementary eﬀect (i.e. a positive change in this decision will increase the marginal
returns on the other decisions) on three decisions, and only one substitutable eﬀect (i.e. a
positive change in this decision will decrease the marginal returns on the other decisions).
Alternatively, decision d5 is the most substitutable, and hence is the last to be varied in this
setup. This process is repeated until no performance improvements are made. After the firm
has evaluated each decision once, it would evaluate the most complementary decision again,
and then repeat the cycle.
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16.2 Directed Search Results
Using the search mechanisms described in §16.1, we simulate the diﬀerent search mechanisms
under increasingly complementary influence matrices for K = 2 and the results are shown
in figure 16.1. If an interaction matrix is 0% complementary, then this implies that the
interaction matrix in figure 15.4 is comprised of only substitutes (i.e. -1) outside of the
diagonal. Alternatively, a 25% complementary interaction matrix implies that this is split
between 75% substitutable interactions and 25% complementary interactions, and a 100%
Figure 16.1: Averaged Performance Values by Search Mechanism with Structured Contribu-
tions (K = 2)
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(a) Interaction matrix - 100% Complementary
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complementary interaction matrix implies all interactions are complementary (i.e. +1).
Non-repeated local search yields substantial performance gains, but these gains are not
very informative. These improvements only result from a firm not investing eﬀort in learning
about activities that have already been tested. We observe, however, that as the interaction
matrix becomes more complementary, there are clear gains from pursuing the directed search
strategy. By the 10th period of directed search, a firm pursuing a most complementary
directed search mechanism will have, on average, achieved the 95th percentile of performance
levels within their business landscape compared to the 91st percentile with non-repeated
random search and the 86th percentile with repeated random search.52 These results suggest
that search mechanisms based on a little knowledge of the firm’s interaction structure can
yield substantial improvements in both speed and level of performance improvement.
Alternatively, consider what happens at the interaction matrix become more substi-
tutable. As the interaction matrix becomes more substitutable, the benefit from learning
about the interaction’s type diminishes. When the interaction matrix is perfectly substi-
tutable, the firm is equally well-oﬀ conducting non-repeated random search. If learning
about interactions is costly, or if the firm could possibly be wrong in its belief about how
activities interact, then it is optimal for the firm to conduct non-repeated random search.
Heuristics of this type can be very beneficial to practitioners facing complex and dynamic
landscapes. They suggest that knowledge about the types of interactions can be beneficial
in constructing a strategy for organizational adaptation.
52Anytime we are drawing comparisons across diﬀerent types of influence matrices, we use ranked perfor-
mance results. The reasoning for this is described in detail in appendix Q.
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17 Decentralization with Consistent Interactions
The core idea behind organizational design is that a firm’s choice of organizational structure
influences its performance. A firm could choose a centralized organizational structure where
the CEO makes all of the decisions. Alternatively, the firm could choose a decentralized
organizational structure by dividing into divisions and allowing each division manager to
simultaneously makes decisions that yield the best performance for his or her division.53
The choice of an organization’s structure will aﬀect how quickly the firm is able to respond
to its environment, whether it becomes trapped at local optima during the search process,
and the breadth of activities it is able to consider.
A series of papers have highlighted the importance of breadth versus the speed of search
(Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Breadth versus speed repre-
sents a tradeoﬀ between short run gains that are important in very volatile landscapes, and
long run performance. A firm that searches broadly is more likely to find a global optimum,
but the same method which yields this long-term gain may not be an optimal strategy if the
firm faces a very volatile landscape.
Organizational structures provide diﬀerent advantages. A centralized organizational
structure may find higher initial returns from search because the CEO is able to regiment the
adaptation process to ensure continuous improvement. It sacrifices the breadth of search.
Alternatively, in a very rugged landscape, where a firm may easily find a suboptimal local
maxima, a decentralized organizational structure can broadly search, increasing the like-
lihood of finding the global optima. The broad search of a decentralized organizational
53There are many organizational structures (e.g. hierarchial, lateral, liaison; see Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2003), but we present only two here as they represent the most commonly used.
Figure 17.1: Centralized versus Decentralized Organizational Forms (K = 2)
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structure has the downside that its divisions may work at odds with each other, stymy-
ing the firm’s growth. Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) demonstrated a third organizational
type, reintegration. Reintegration is a period of decentralized search followed by centralized
search. This organizational structure can improve performance over a centralized organi-
zational strategy, as in figure 17.1. The competitive nature of decentralization permits the
divisions to internally optimize before reintegrating, likely placing them in a better location
in the business landscape from which to search once the organizational decision-making is
centralized.
It is not immediately obvious, but this result relies heavily upon the randomness of the
underlying business landscape. If we assume that the underlying interaction matrix is 100%
complementary and that the business landscape is generated by structured contributions,
then we observe in figure 17.2(a) that decentralization is always the best response. Intuitively,
a 100% complementary interaction matrix implies that when one division changes their
decision and observes a performance improvement, it will increase the marginal returns on
other decisions, including the other divisions’ decisions. This means that decentralizing
allows a firm to adapt to its landscape faster because each divisions’ adaptations reinforce
each other.
Additionally, we observe in figure 17.2(b) and (c) that it is not until the interaction matrix
becomes very substitutable (i.e. the landscape becomes more rugged) that the centralized
organizational structure performs better in the short-run compared to the decentralized
organizational structure. In order to generate performance losses from divisions working
at odds with each other (as in Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003) the interactions have to be
substitutable and suﬃcient in number to decrease the marginal returns of the competing
divisions.
Only when we include directed search are we able to achieve the short run gains that
exceed those from decentralized search. This is because the directed search strategy exploits
the nature of the underlying contribution structure and uses this to inform the process
of search. It is notable that with a high complementary interaction matrix, like in figure
17.2(a), directed search and decentralization both garner their gains from the complementary
nature of activity interactions. These gains, however, are achieve faster with decentralization
because two divisions are searching (compared to a single CEO) and hence can explore a
larger portion of the landscape.
122
Figure 17.2: Centralized versus Decentralized Organizational Forms with Structured Con-
tributions (K = 2)
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(a) Interaction matrix - 100% Complementary
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Periods
A
ve
ra
ge
 F
ir
m
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
 
Centralized
Decentralized
Reintegrator
Most Complementary
(b) Interaction matrix - 25% Complementary
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18 Uncertainty
In §15.2, we introduced the idea of uncertainty along the business landscape. The   in
equation (15.2) represents the uncertainty an agent has regarding the underlying model that
generates the business landscape. More accurately,   can represent the aggregate eﬀect of all
the contextual interactions that an agent is unable to foresee because of his or her bounded
rationality (Levinthal, 2011; Porter and Siggelkow, 2008). The only assumption we impose
is that the eﬀect of the uncertainty surrounding the contextual interactions is unable to
reverse the complementary or substitutable nature of the interaction. In fact,   is capable
of amplifying or reducing the interaction eﬀects. It is through this lens that we begin to
understand the how complexity and substitutability combine with uncertainty to generate
the rugged landscapes previously assumed to be determined based solely on the quantity of
interactions, K.
As the mean and variance of   increases, the underlying parameters of the structural
model are further obscured to the agent. While the general interaction structure is preserved,
greater uncertainty (high variance of  ) will lead to more local peaks, as in figure 18.2.
More local peaks increase the likelihood of premature lock-in before reaching the global
optima following centralized search, but agents can avoid this by pursuing decentralized
search which permits broad search across the landscape(Levinthal, 1997). The complex
interactions of the underlying model that generate the business landscape can lead to high
order interactions (interactions between three or more decisions) that can impact the firm’s
performance. Intuitively, this is like the interaction of Apple’s choice of iPad colors and its
marketing decision to college students is influenced indirectly by the activity of whether or
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not to oﬀer Apple computers to high schools. This high level interaction may be part of
the true underlying model that generates the business landscape, but is too obscure to be
realized by Apple’s management. Premature lock-in can be observed in figure 18.1(a)-(c)
where increasing uncertainty reduces the average performance of centralized search every
period. However, decentralized search escapes the issue of premature lock-in by searching
more broadly (see figure 18.1(a) and (b)).
A higher mean will increase the jaggedness of the business landscape. A more jagged
landscape implies that deviations will yield more erratic swings in performance. While
this eﬀect will not impact the search performance of centralized search (either directed
or random), it has significant eﬀects on decentralized search. Specifically, a more jagged
landscape will amplify the eﬀects of divisions if they are acting at odds with each other due to
the decentralized decision-making process. This can be observed by comparing figures 18.1(b)
and (c), where in figure 18.1(b), single deviations have a relatively small eﬀect because of the
small mean of  , but as the mean of   increases a hundred-fold, then a deviation that is at
odds between the divisions will yield a steeper drop in firm-wide performance. Intuitively, if
a firm perceives that the net eﬀects of their interactions are large, then decentralized search
is inferior to a centralized search methodology because the implicit cost of divisional conflict
is greater. It is specifically in these situations where a reintegrator method, which benefits
from the initial broad, decentralized search before centralizing (Siggelkow and Levinthal,
2003) yields the best performance improvements.
Uncertainty surrounding the magnitude and variance of contextual interactions con-
tribute both ruggedness and jaggedness to the landscape. It is the tension between these two
eﬀects that can ultimately determine whether a landscape is very rugged and whether decen-
tralized or centralized search are more likely to generate short-run performance gains. This
theory provides justification for why the literature has observed conflicting results between
integration and flexibility in turbulent landscapes. Industries characterized by high comple-
mentary activity or non-jagged landscapes are likely to find decentralization optimal in the
short-run because divisional decisions tend to reinforce each other (see figure 17.2(a) and
figure 18.1(a)). Alternatively, industries characterized by many substitutable interactions
or jagged landscapes will find that centralization will be more optimal given environmental
turbulence (see figure 17.2(c) and figure 18.1(c)).
19 Conclusion
The wholesale adoption of the NK model from the evolutionary biology literature has ig-
nored some key realities of the business landscape, notably, that firms generally have some
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Figure 18.1: Averaged Performance Values by Variance of   and Method of Search with
Structured Contributions (K = 2)
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(a) No Variance (  = 1)
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(b) Low Variance (  ⇠ U [0, 1])
Notes: Results presented assume 50% complementary interaction matrix.
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(c) High Variance (  ⇠ U [0, 100])
Notes: Results presented assume 50% complementary interaction matrix.
Figure 18.2: Quantity of Peaks by Variance of   with Structured Contributions (K = 2)
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(a) No Variance (  = 1)
Notes: Results presented assume 50% complementary interaction matrix.
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Notes: Results presented assume 50% complementary interaction matrix.
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knowledge of how decisions are likely to interact with each other, even if they do not know
the magnitude of an interaction’s influence. We introduce a method for bridging the gap
between the simulation models used to model complex interactions with the complementary
framework created in the early work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Our model introduces
the notion of complementarities and uncertain contextual interactions into the NK model to
help researchers better understand the role of each of these mechanisms in driving both the
ruggedness and jaggedness of the business landscape. We have shown that with integrated
local search, ruggedness can result in premature lock-in, consistent with past literature, but
have discovered that landscape jaggedness, and not the number of peaks (ruggedness), is the
mechanism that drives the success or failure of broad, decentralized search.
Building on this new insight, we recognize that competent managers could optimally use
even limited information about their firm’s activity interactions to improve their search and
adaptation process. Thus we provide a simple mechanism that has varying levels of success
at improving the speed and performance level relative to the baseline case of non-repeated
random search. A natural extension to this current paper would be to expand and test a
larger number of simple mechanisms, such as a hybrid random and most complementary
mechanism, that could render a more significant improvement in the speed of adaptation.
Future research can build on this basic structure and further explore how centralized and
decentralized organizations that misperceive the nature of their interactions are impacted
by pursuing strategies based on these misperceptions. This issue is particularly salient given
previous work on how the environment often changes due to demand, technological, and
institutional factors increasing the likelihood of misinterpreting the interaction of decisions
(Henderson and Clark, 1990b; McGahan, 2004; Miller, 1992). Finally, this model can be
adapted to incorporate managerial understanding of these consistent interactions through
limited cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) and modularization of interactions (Ethi-
raj and Levinthal, 2004b) to see if the tension between complementarities and uncertain
contextual interactions will widen or reduce the scope of these adaptation methods.
Our hope is that this paper is an introduction to how complementary organizational
structures can be integrated into simulations of complex systems. The development of simple
mechanisms will be able to provide real world suggestions to firms’ leadership teams as they
weigh various methods of adapting their organization’s structure to ever changing market
landscapes.
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Appendices
A Tax Rates
I assume households jointly file their tax return if both individuals are alive, otherwise the
household files as a single. The household pays federal, state, and payroll taxes on income
from both household members. Income includes earnings from each individual’s job, pension
income, Social Security income, and asset returns (both defined contribution and savings).
In 1992, 50% of Social Security benefit income was taxed for jointly filing household with
incomes over $32,000, and single filers with income over $25,000. In December 1993, the 50%
threshold was kept in place, but a second bracket, 85% of Social Security benefit income,
was added for households with incomes over $44,000 for joint filers and $34,000 for single,
unmarried filers. In my analysis, I assume that the 1993 rules hold for every year. For
example, if single John received $10000 in Social Security benefits and earned an additional
$25,000 for part-time work, then 0.5 (32000  25000) + 0.85(35000  32000) = $6, 050 of his
Social Securiy benefit would be taxable as income. However, John will never have more than
85% of his Social Security benefits taxed, implying that if he earned $50, 000 for his part
time work, then only 0.85($10, 000) = $8, 500 would be taxable. Note that these rules and
levels have not changes since 1993, and therefore are not indexed for inflation.
I use the IRS tax rules from 1992 and reported state tax rates in NBER’s TAXSIM
calculator.54 I weight state tax rates by the U.S. Census’s projections of population in each
state in July 1992 for ages 50 and greater.55 I assume that all individuals are not self-
employed for tax purposes, meaning that he or she only pays half of the payroll tax. In table
A.1, I report the tax rates for married, jointly filing households and single households. For
joint households, the 3rd tax bracket (ending at $55,500) represents the maximum Social
Security contribution level. In table A.1b, I assume that only one individual earns a total
of $55,500. If both individuals are working, then the third through fifth tax brackets could
change depending on each individual’s earning levels. Notice that the addition of the fifth
54See http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/ for more details
55See State Characteristics, 1990 to 1999 Annual Time Series of State Population Estimates by Age and
Sex, 5-Year Age Groups by Sex at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/1990s/state.html
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tax bracket between the two tables is due to the correspondence between the top income tax
bracket and the maximum Social Security contribution level in 1992.
Table A.1: Taxes
(a) Single
Pre-Tax Income (1992 $) Marginal Tax Rates
Federal State Payroll Combined
0-3,600 0.00% 0.00% 7.65% 7.65%
3,601-25,050 15.00% 4.56% 7.65% 27.21%
25,051-55,500 27.86% 5.03% 7.65% 40.54%
55,500 + 30.68% 5.37% 1.45% 37.50%
(b) Married - Filing Jointly
Pre-Tax Income (1992 $) Marginal Tax Rates
Federal State Payroll Combined
0-6,000 0.00% 0.00% 7.65% 7.65%
6,001-41,800 15.00% 4.51% 7.65% 27.15%
41,801-55,500 28.00% 4.79% 7.65% 40.44%
55,501-92,500 27.83% 5.05% 1.45% 34.33%
92,500 + 31.34% 5.21% 1.45% 38.00%
Notes: For each household member above the age of 65, the income threshold increases by $900 for single
households and $700 for married housedholds.
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B Recursive Methods
Recursion is commonly used in structural models, but the typical design of a decision tree
taught in standard game theory can be diﬃcult or impossible to reproduce due to finite
computational time. Often this can arise when decisions are continuous (such as how much
to consume or save), when the number of periods covered are large, or when choices in
each period require historical variables. While this list is not extensive, it does represent all
the challenges faced in a life-cycle model of labor force participation and benefit claiming.
There exist significant computational tradeoﬀs that must be considered when developing a
structural model of this variety, and these can only be understood if the reader first has an
appreciation for how the backward recursion is actually conducted and approximated.
First, it is currently impossible to come close to calculating an entire decision tree. In-
stead, it is approximated at each decision period by a discretized set of the state variables.
In the model by French and Jones (2011), this is done with 9 state variables: (1) benefit
application decision, (2) preference type, (3) whether or not there is a cost of reentering the
labor force for that period (i.e. un-retire), (4) health insurance transition, (5) health status,
(6) health care cost transition, (7) Social Security AIME level, (8) wage change, (9) asset
level. Given their discretization, this implies 2⇥ 3⇥ 2⇥ 3⇥ 2⇥ 3⇥ 16⇥ 5⇥ 32 = 552, 960
state combinations. The calculation of decision rules through backward recursion is based
(in theory) on the history of choices an agent has made up until the current period’s deci-
sion node, but due to the continuous nature of state variables, such as assets, and the long
history required for other state variables, such as Social Security’s Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) measure, it becomes impossible to permit state variables to depend on
prior decisions.
The calculation of AIME provides an excellent example of the challenges presented by
backward recursion when future choices depend upon histories in addition to current states.
AIME is calculated using the best 35 years of earnings. Even if we coarsely discretize
potential earnings into 5 levels, and assume everyone started their significant earning at age
25, then just for the calculation of AIME at age 60, we would have 535 ⇡ 2.91⇥1024 possibles
wage combinations required to calculate the AIME at age 60 (think about how bad it gets at
age 61!). Instead, French and Jones (2011) take the AIME in the period as given, abstracting
from the history that led to its level. Since what is relevant for the current decision is both
the current AIME and the AIME for continuing to work, the lack of wage history requires
the modeler to approximate AIME if the agent continues to work. In French and Jones’
work, they use estimated replacement wages for the population based on age. For example,
for an agent continuing to work at age 62, they assume that the current wage replaces 58.9%
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of one year’s wages relative to the individual’s AIME:
AIMEt+1 = (1 + CPI) · AIMEt   1
35
{0,WtNt   (0.589) · (1 + CPI) · AIMEt}
In this setup, 58.9% is meant to approximate the ratio of the lowest earnings year to AIME.
As the population gets older, the ratio approaches 100%, such that the AIME does not grow
through replacement of the lowest earnings. At younger ages (before 55), they assume that
entire years are replaced (i.e. that the ratio is 0%).
This setup presents two major challenges to a life-cycle model of labor supply and benefit
claiming. First, it smooths out accruals in retirement programs (both Social Security and
defined benefit pensions), possibly reducing or eliminating the incentive to delay claiming
for some individuals. Moreover, since French and Jones’ tie pension benefits to the AIME,
it becomes less clear how to separate the actual eﬀects of Social Security from pensions
on labor supply outcomes. Second, since this setup only approximates AIME in the next
period, it cannot account for any possible notches in benefit calculations that might exist
from delayed claiming beyond a year. For example, an agent in good health who is replacing
a zero earnings year in the AIME calculation for each additional year of work (e.g. a woman
who took a decade oﬀ from the labor force) will not only have a significant incentive to delay
claiming at 62, but may face a much larger incentive to delay claiming beyond a single year
due to her likelihood of survival relative to Social Security’s delayed benefit adjustments.
In this paper, I take an approach similar Gustman and Steinmeier (2005a), where, in order
to capture the AIME and pension calculations, I take the wage paths for a worker as given,
allowing AIME and pension benefits to be calculated directly. This requires calculating the
decision rules for each individual in sample, and thus requires a simplification in the number
of states to achieve computational feasibility. Moreover, it eliminates the feasibility of a
modeler incorporating wage uncertainty into the model for fear of quickly increasing the
computational burden. Choosing a fixed wages allows my model to reflect the institutional
details of Social Security and individual pension plans, as well as be able to appropriately
account for individuals’ unique earnings histories. Since I estimate each household’s decision
rules separately, I use the husband and wife’s earnings history at baseline to determine the
rate at which lowest earnings are replaced.
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C Numerical Methods
The recursive formulation of a household’s value function is given by:
Vt (Xt) = max
Ch,t,Nh,t,Bh,t
 
U (Ch,t, Lh,t) +  ⌧
 
1  sht+1
   
1  swt+1
 
b(Ah,t+1)
+ ⌧
 
1  sht+1
 
swt+1E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Nh,t, wife survives)]
+ ⌧s
h
t+1
 
1  swt+1
 
E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Nh,t, husband survives)]
+ ⌧s
h
t+1s
w
t+1E [Vt+1 (Xt+1 | Xt, t, Ch,t, Bh,t, Nh,t, both survive)]
 
(C.1)
subject to a non-negative borrowing constraint and the consumption floor. The solution to
the recursive formulation requires solving for each household’s consumption, labor force par-
ticipation, and benefit claiming choices at every age at and after baseline (1992), collectively
referred to as the decision rules. These decision rules are calculated numerically, using the
model detailed in the paper because no closed form solution exists. No closed form solu-
tion exists for several reasons, including that future state variables depend upon the history
of those variables, and that there are several discontinuities in the budget set arising from
taxation, pensions, and Social Security Benefits.
The recursive formulation above is solved using value function iteration beginning in
period T , assumed to be age 110, and solved backward to the first period. The vector of
possible states is discretized into 13 state variables: (1) the husband’s stochastic preference
for leisure, "H , (2) the wife’s stochastic preference for leisure, "H , (3) household marital
status (this is important for widowhood), (4) household health insurance status, (5) husband
health status, (6) wife’s health status, (7) husband’s Social Security PIA, (8) wife’s Social
Security PIA, (9) husband’s pension level, (10) wife’s pension level, (11) household asset
level. Given the discretization, this implies 3 ⇥ 3 ⇥ 3 ⇥ 3 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 8 =
41, 472 state combinations solved for each of the 948 households in the sample. The time T
decision rule is found by assuming that everyone knows they will die at period T , such that
VT = U(CT , 0) +   · b(AT+1). For each set of state variables, XT , we calculate the optimal
consumption (and hence savings) decision for period T . This yields the value function at
time T , which can be used in calculating VT 1 to find the decision rules at period T   1
according to the Bellman equation in (C.1). This process is repeated from period T  1 back
to period 0, which in this model corresponds to the male household member’s age at baseline
(i.e. 1992).56
The value function is evaluated at each state combination and linear interpolation is used
for continuous variables (i.e. assets, AIME, pension benefit, "H , and "W ). Discretization is
56The appendix on Recursive Methods goes into greater detail about how I handle approximating next
periods assets given our discretization method.
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finer at lower levels of assets since I would expect greater responsiveness at lower levels to
changes in asset accumulation. In my initial estimate process I keep the number of states
for Social Security and pension benefits small (2 states each), but these states reflects the
individual’s worst and best possible benefits based on his or her own earnings history. In
robustness checks, I will investigate whether the results are sensitive to this rough discretiza-
tion.
Each period, the household chooses the level of consumption, labor supply, and benefit
application that maximizes their discounted lifetime utility. Consumption is a continuous
choice in the model, however, implying that for each state combination the household must
determine the optimal level of consumption. Given the discrete nature of the other choice
variables, there is no reason to expect the value function to be globally concave with respect
to consumption. I discretize the consumption space into 36 choice states and allow the
household to solve for VT based on each choice state, from which the household will choose
the level of consumption that maximizes its discounted lifetime utility. When the problem is
solved again for period T   1, the agent will test only a local range of consumption choices.
As the backward induction process continues, the range of consumption states tested will
depend upon the male household members’ age, with a larger range being used during periods
of critical life choices (e.g. age 65 when respondent reaches normal retirement age for Social
Security). If a value on the boundary of the consumption range is chosen, then the range is
expanded by three choice states in the direction of increasing utility until a local optimum
is found.
Once the decision rules are calculated, the rules are then used to generate simulated
household histories. 200 random outcomes of health, medical expenses, mortality, and un-
observed individual heterogeneity ("i,t) are generated per household. Using each household’s
period 0 state vector, the household’s decisions in period 0 are determined from the appro-
priate decision rules. When the state vector does not precisely lie on the discretized grid
of state combinations, I use linear interpolation to approximate the household’s decisions.
Combining the states and decisions from period 0, I use the budget constraint and asset
accumulation conditions from the model, in addition to the health, mortality and medical
expense shocks after period 0, and the appropriate Social Security and pension rules for the
household, to calculate the state vector in period 1. This process is repeated, creating a
life-cycle history for the household. In generating the shocks, the actual (not discretized)
value of the shock is used. In generated the pension and Social Security benefit levels, the
actual earnings history and pension rules are used in the calculation.
In order to reduce the computational burden, individuals are assumed to claim their
benefits and cease work by age 70.
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D Moment Conditions and Method of Simulated Mo-
ments
D.1 Moments Conditions
This section is a more detailed description of §5.2 in the main text. For expositional clarity, I
reproduce the moments cases as they are in the main text and describe the technical details
of the moments that are matched.
I divide any moments using household assets into three quantiles to capture the dis-
persion of assets in the data. I match the following moment conditions for ages 58-69
(T = {58, 59, ...69}) for a total of 34T = 408 moments.
1. Mean assets by quantile and men’s age, for the lowest two quantiles (2T moments)
I divide any moments using household assets into three quantiles to capture the dis-
persion of assets in the data. The  j percentage of households (h) with assets below
Q j (Aht, t) is defined as
Pr
 
Aht  Q j (Aht, t) | t
 
=  j
where the quantile index is denoted by j. Put another way, Q j (Aht, t) is the  jth
age-condition asset quantile. The model analog to Q j (Aht, t) is Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) from
the simulated asset distribution. Note that t = agei is individual i’s age, where here
it is assumed to be the male’s age (i = H). Let A¯j(t, ✓0; 0) represent the model’s
prediction of the mean asset level observed in asset quantile j at age t. The implied
conditional moment then becomes
E
⇥
Aht | t, Q j 1 (Aht, t)  Aht  Q j (Aht, t)
⇤
= A¯j(t, ✓0; 0) .
This can then be converted into an unconditional moment that can be estimated from
the simulation results by rearranging the previous equation and plugging in for the
model analogs:
E
⇥
Aht   A¯j(t, ✓0; 0) | t
⇤⇥ 1nQˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)o = 0 . (D.1)
2. Share of a preference type’s household population within each asset quantile by age
(lowest two quantiles only) for men (10T moments)
Let h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0) represent the model’s prediction of share of households, h, where
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the husband is t = agei years old in asset quantile interval j with preference type ⌧ . If
the model is true then:
E
⇥
h | Q j 1 (Aht, t)  Aht  Q j (Aht, t) , t, ⌧
⇤
= h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0) .
Empirically when estimating the moment vector, m (LCi, ✓0; 0) (see next section), I
convert this relationship into an unconditional moment equation:
E
⇥
h  h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⇤⇥ 1nQˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)o = 0 (D.2)
for asset quantiles j 2 {1, 2}.57 I exclude the share of the third asset quantile as the
shares are constrained to add to one, and so it is identified by the other two moments.
3. Percent participating in the labor force by preference type, age, and sex (10T moments)
Recall that each household, h, is comprised of two members of each gender i 2 {H,W}
at baseline. LFPRhit represents i’s labor force participation at t = agei. I match the
following unconditional moment for men and women by age:
E
⇥
LFPRhit   ¯LFPRi (t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⇤
= 0 , (D.3)
where ¯LFPRi (t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) is the model’s prediction of average labor force participation
for each gender with household preference type ⌧ .
4. Percent working full-time, conditional on working, by preference type and sex (exclud-
ing first preference type which does not work in the first period - 8T moments)
Similar to case (3), each household, h, is comprised of two members of each gender i 2
{H,W} at baseline. FThit represents i’s labor force status conditional on participation
at t = agei. If F¯ T i (t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) represents the model’s prediction of individuals working
full-time conditional on participation for preference type ⌧ at age t, then the implied
conditional moment condition becomes:
E [FThit | LFPRhit = 1, t, ⌧ ] = F¯ T i (t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) .
I then convert this relationship to an unconditional moment condition:
E
⇥
FThit   F¯ T i (t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⇤⇥ 1 {LFPRhit = 1} = 0 , (D.4)
57I define Qˆ 0 (agei; ✓0, 0) =  1 and Qˆ3 (agei; ✓0, 0) = +1
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which is used as 8T of the moment conditions. Note that I exclude the type where
both individuals are out of the labor force at baseline, ⌧ = 0, because the moment
condition may be empty for certain ages.
5. Labor force participation by individual health status, age, and sex (4T moments)
As in case (3), I match labor force participation moments conditional on health status,
health 2 {good, bad}, and sex. Therefore the moment condition is:
E
⇥
LFPRhit   ¯LFPRi (health, t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧, healthit = health
⇤
= 0 .
I then convert this relationship to an unconditional moment condition:
E
⇥
LFPRhit   ¯LFPRi (health, t, ⌧ ; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⇤⇥ 1 {healthit = health} = 0 . (D.5)
D.2 Method of Simulated Moments
Using the moment conditions discussed in the previous section, I use 408 moment conditions
to over-identify the 48 preference parameters, denoted by ✓. Letm(•) represents the moment
condition based on observed life-cycle histories LCi for individual i in household h, and let ✓0
represent the true value of the preference parameters ✓, from the data generating process,  0.
Note that the life cycle histories, LCi, comprises all observables, including endogenous out-
comes, exogenous or potentially endogenous state variables, Xt, and instrumental variables.
Given the vector of moment conditions such that
E [m (LCi, ✓0; 0)] = 0 ,
then the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, ✓ˆgmm minimizes:
Qn(✓) =
"
1
n
NX
i=1
m (LCi, ✓0; 0)
#0
Wn
"
1
n
NX
i=1
m (LCi, ✓0; 0)
#
,
where Wn is the symmetric positive definite weighting matrix that does not depend on ✓.
Now if there is no closed-form solution for m (LCi, ✓; 0) such that:
m (LCi, ✓; 0) =
ˆ
k (LCi, ui, ✓; 0) g(ui)dui
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then m (LCi, ✓; 0) can be replaced by mˆ (LCi, uis, ✓; 0), an unbiased simulator, and ui
denotes s draws from the marginal density g(ui). The method of simulated moments (MSM)
estimator ✓ˆmsm instead minimizes:
Qˆn(✓) =
"
1
n
nX
i=1
mˆ (LCi, uis, ✓; 0)
#0
Wˆn
"
1
n
nX
i=1
mˆ (LCi, uis, ✓; 0)
#
(D.6)
where mˆ (LCi, uis, ✓; 0) is defined by the moment conditions in (D.1)-(D.5) above, and Wˆn is
the optimal weighting matrix from the simulated data. Following Gourieroux and Monfort
(1996), as n ! 1 and for a fixed number of simulations s, ✓ˆmsm is both consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed:
p
n
⇣
✓ˆmsm   ✓0
⌘
d !
n!1
N
⇣
0, ⌥ˆ
⌘
,
where:
⌥ˆ = (D0WD) 1D0WSWD (D0WD) 1 (D.7)
such that D = @m(·)/@✓0 |✓=✓0 and W = plimn!1Wˆ , which is estimated by:
Wˆ =
⇢
V˜ (m (LCi, ✓; 0)) +
1
s
V˜ (mˆ (LCi, uis, ✓; 0))
  1
where V˜ (·) is the estimated variance with respect to a larger simulation sample and S is
the variance-covariance matrix of the simulated sample. Thus the first term represents
the moment condition from the data with respect to the larger simulated sample, and the
second term represents the moment condition with respect to the smaller simulation sample
from which the estimates are selected. Note that the optimal choice of W , corresponds to
W = S 1, simplifying the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix to
⌥ˆ =
⇣
D0WˆD
⌘ 1
In practice, I use only the diagonal terms of V˜ (m (LCi, ✓; 0)) when calculating Wˆ in order
to minimize (D.6). This is to ensure invertibility (non-singularity) and because S may be
biased in small samples. When I calculate the standard errors of the preference parameter
vector ✓ˆmsm and test the moment conditions (i.e. over-identified restrictions of the model)
against the zero restrictions implied by the model, I use equation (D.7) as the approximate
variance-covariance matrix, ⌥ˆ.
When calculating, D = @m(·)/@✓0 |✓=✓0 , most calculations are done by taking the straight-
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forward numerical derivative using a two-sided approach with a 1 percent variation in the
underlying parameter. However, the first two moment conditions, since they are based on
asset quantiles, require additional simplification. Recall that equation (D.1) was written as
E
⇥
Aht   A¯j(t, ✓0; 0) | t
⇤⇥ 1nQˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)o = 0 .
This equation can be rewritten as
ˆ Q j (Aht,t)
Q j 1 (Aht,t)
 
E [Aht | t]  A¯j(t, ✓0; 0)
 ⇥ f (Aht | t) dAht = 0.
Applying Liebnitz’s rule, the first-order condition becomes,
D =  Pr
h
Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) | t
i
⇥ @A¯j(t, ✓0; 0)
@✓0
+
n
E
h
Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) | t
i
  A¯j(t, ✓0; 0)
o
⇥ f
⇣
Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) | t
⌘
⇥ @Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)
@✓0
 
n
E
h
Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0) | t
i
  A¯j(t, ✓0; 0)
o
⇥ f
⇣
Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0) | t
⌘
⇥ @Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)
@✓0
.
Similarly, recall equation (D.2):
E
⇥
h  h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⇤⇥ 1nQˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)o = 0
It can be rewritten as
ˆ Q j (Aht,t)
Q j 1 (Aht,t)
 
E [h | Aht, t, ⌧ ]  h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0)
 ⇥ f (Aht | t) dAht = 0,
where the first order condition becomes,
D =  Pr
h
Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)  Aht  Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
i
⇥ @h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0)
@✓0
+
n
E
h
h | Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) , t, ⌧
i
  h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0)
o
⇥f
⇣
Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⌘
⇥ @Qˆ j (t; ✓0, 0)
@✓0
 
n
E
h
h | Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0) , t, ⌧
i
  h¯j (⌧, t; ✓0, 0)
o
⇥f
⇣
Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0) | t, ⌧
⌘
⇥ @Qˆ j 1 (t; ✓0, 0)
@✓0
.
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E Data and Sample Selection
This appendix provides greater detail on the data used in estimating the model described in
§3.
E.1 Data
I use the original cohort of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which was born between
1931 and 1941, and has 12,652 respondents and 7,704 households in the main analysis.
However when calculating the transition probabilities for health and mortality, as well as
medical expenses, I also use the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD)
cohort from the HRS, which consists of non-institutionalized individuals born before 1923.
I use the RAND HRS cross-wave supplement (version L) as the initial data set. I then
import Social Security earnings history from a separate file where I have calculated, condi-
tional on the assumptions specified in §F, each individual’s AIME and PIA as of 1992 as
well as each individual’s defined benefit levels for every possible age of retirement between
1992 and 2010. Using the combined data set, I use the RAND tenure variable to determine
the number of jobs, including baseline job, that are observed between 1992 and 2010.
I define an individual to have retiree health insurance if they report having health in-
surance coverage that persists after retirement or have access to VA or CHAMPUS benefits
(retired or active duty U.S. military benefits). An individual who has health insurance but
does not meet these criteria is considered to have tied health insurance. If an individual has
medicaid, private health insurance, or another type of means-tested health insurance, I treat
them as having no health insurance, since these individuals are more likely to resemble to
pool of individuals with no health insurance. I create a household health insurance variable
by assuming that if one individual is eligible for retiree health insurance then everyone is.
If no one in the household has retiree health insurance, but at least one individual has tied
health insurance, then the household acts as if it has tied health insurance. Finally, no
member of the household has health insurance, then the household is treated as having no
health insurance.
Since the HRS is conducted at two year intervals, I use the reported labor force status in
the RAND HRS supplement for labor force participation in years that correspond to survey
waves, and then use information regarding last job and data on Social Security earnings
history to fill in labor force participation between survey waves. To be participating in
the labor force, an individual must report being employed full-time, employed part-time,
unemployed, or partially retired. Additionally, the individual must work more than 300
hours per year. If an individual continues in the same job, then I assume that the hours
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in non-survey years are the same as the previous survey year. I use information on when a
person ended his or her last job to deduce between-wave labor force participation and job
changes. I only use Social Security data, when an individual has changed jobs and cannot
use the surrounding waves’ information regarding the employment (i.e. the inter-wave job
was very short, or the individual was not surveyed in adjacent waves). When I do use the
Social Security data, I assume the individual is participating in the labor force if they have
a positive earnings history.
I consider an individual to be working full-time if he or she reports working full-time and
if he or she reports working in excess of 1600 hours per year. An individual is considered
working part-time if he or she reports being employed part-time or reports being partially
retired with between 300 and 1600 annual hours of work. If I am relying on Social Security
reports to determine the individual’s work status, then I assume that 4 quarters of coverage
corresponds to full-time work and between 1 and 3 quarters corresponds to part-time work.
Using Social Security’s earnings records is an imperfect measure since the burden for reaching
4 quarters is low, but this is rarely used since most people’s work histories can be achieved
based on respondent’s reports of when they stopped working at his or her last job.
As described in the section on health, individuals provide a self-reported health status
to the interviewer on a scale of excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor. I reduce these
self-reports to a binary measure good 2 {excellent, very good, good} or bad 2 {fair, poor}.
I use the RAND HRS measures of household assets. To create my measure of household
assets, I sum the value of the household’s primary residence, and the net value of other real
estate, businesses, vehicles, stocks, mutual funds, other investment trusts, checking accounts,
certificates of deposits, savings accounts, government savings bonds, treasury bills, bonds,
bond funds, and any other reported savings, and subtract debt from the household primary
residence’s mortgage, any other debts based on the primary residence, and and remaining
non-residence based debt.
E.2 Sample Selection
The original HRS sample has 7,704 households, which includes 5,813 households with at least
one male. Of the male households, 1 is eliminated because the birth year of the respondent
is unknown [5,812], 968 are not married [4,844] and 260 are eliminated for missing spousal
information in the first wave [4,584]. I keep households that (1) are married in wave 1 and
not missing spousal information [4,584], (2) are not missing information on their labor force
participation in 1992 [4,575], (3) have never applied for Social Security disability benefits
[3,300], (4) are without missing pension [2,628] or Social Security information [2,197], (5)
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have a spousal age diﬀerence of less than 10 years [1,943], (6) are not missing information on
either household member’s baseline earnings [1,899], and, for computational tractability, (7)
households with no more than one defined benefit pension [1,729]. Additionally, I drop annual
observations if employment or health status of either household member is not reported, and
if health insurance status cannot be determined when the household is less than age 65
(Medicare age) [1,728].
Figure E.1: Sample Selection by Labor Force Participation of Men
After this sample selection, I am left with 1,728 married households. I use the Social
Security Administrative data for earnings and labor force participation histories and respon-
dent reports for periods not covered by the Social Security data. Doing so yields an average
of 14.95 annual observations per household (out of a maximum possible of 20), providing a
long history of observations. Figure E.1 shows how my sample selection eﬀects the average
rate of male labor force participation. The omission of divorced, separated, and widowed
households increases labor force participation slightly, but eliminating those household that
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ever apply for Social Security disability benefits increases labor force participation at all ages
by approximately 10%. This result is not surprising since individuals who credibly apply for
disability will likely have a reduced ability to participate in the labor force.
Table E.1 provides sample statistics for the entire sample, while table 4.1 in the main
text provide the sample statistics for the estimation sample. Finally, table E.2 provides the
sample statistics for the model validation sample.
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F Pensions
F.1 Defined Benefit Plans
DB plans provide a guaranteed payment to an employee who is vested. An employee typically
becomes vested after 5 or 10 years of service, at which point they will be eligible for a pension
benefit based on years of service. Many pension plans define the workers annual benefit (dbi,t)
as:
dbi,t = (Years of Service)⇥ (PoFS)⇥ (AFS)
where PoFS is the percent of final salary, usually between 1.5% and 2.5%, and AFS is the
average final salary, usually the best three or five years of service. PoFS may follow a bend
point system based on years of service (e.g. 2.2% for the first 20 years of service and 2%
thereafter). Note that to accommodate more gradual retirement, most plans take the best
average annual salaries over a worker’s lifetime. Depending on the plan, these best years may
be required to be consecutive. Most plans oﬀer an early retirement option, usually at ages
50, 55, 58, 60, or 62 assuming the employee is vested. Individuals taking early retirement
may have their annual benefit reduced, but this reduction can vary widely by plan. For
example, the California State Teacher Retirement System reduces monthly benefits by 50%
of the PoFS for each month before age 60 and then keeps it at this rate for the same number
of months after age 60.58 Alternatively, Michigan’s teacher pension system permanently
reduces monthly benefits by an annualized amount of 6% for each year before age 60.
Once an individual reaches the full-retirement age, usually age 60, 62 or 65, some plans
may oﬀer delayed retirement benefits, such as a higher PoFS, but many oﬀer no benefit
beyond increased years of service increments. Other employers may oﬀer a longevity bonus
to a monthly benefit (e.g. an extra $300 for employees with at least 3 years of service). Re-
employment at the same place of employment after claiming a pension plan is discouraged
by most plans through benefit reduction or elimination. Alternatively, some employers in
an eﬀort to retain older workers have implemented deferred retirement option plans (often
called DROPs) which permit a worker to claim his or her benefit, but this benefit is placed
in an interest bearing account payable upon retirement.
Those employees who are not vested can receive a refund with interest on the amount
that they personally contributed to the pension plan. Some non-vested plans allow for some
payment of the employer portion if the employee has greater than 5 years of service.
In the model presented in §3, if an individual has too few years of service to qualify for
58For example, consider Jane who is eligible for a $2000 monthly benefit if she retires at her full retirement
age in June. If Jane claims in April and she will receive a $1000 monthly benefit from April to August of
that year and then she will receive $2000 per month thereafter.
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an annual benefit, then the vested benefit level is treated as a lump sum benefit when the
individual leaves the baseline job. Additionally, if the individual’s plan is like the California
plan above (lower benefits early, higher benefits later) or has a Social Security topper (higher
benefits before age 62 and lower benefits after) then the long term rate (i.e. what the benefit
level is 10 years after claiming) is treated as the monthly benefit level and the individual has
to pay a lump sum payment at claiming that makes up for the diﬀerence. This is done for
computational feasibility.
Some individuals have access to multiple defined benefit pension plans. I assume that
the individual cannot claim until the early eligibility date of his or her largest DB plan. If
smaller plans are not yet eligible, then I still assume that the individual receives the same
annual benefit that they would receive in the long-term, but he or she makes lump sum
payment upon claiming to cover those additional benefits.
Employees eligible for a benefit can generally elect to have a survivor benefit that is
0-100% of their benefit amount, where benefits are reduced according to the actuarially fair
rate of adjustment (i.e. the pension provider will consider the possible survivor’s gender
and relative age). Most plans include a survivor option should the employee die prior to
retirement that pays a fixed benefit at death (similar to life insurance) and may pay a
monthly benefit that makes an assumption about what the employee would have done if
he or she had survived and chosen a plan. For example, in the California State Teacher
Retirement System, the survivor receives a benefit based on a 50% beneficiary option, so
that the survivor would be eligible to receive 50% of the employee’s benefit, which would be
reduced based on the survivor’s gender and relative claim age.
DB plans work much like Social Security, often providing disability insurance to the
employee and life insurance benefits to spouses and children. Due to data limitations, and
similar to what I do for Social Security, I ignore these benefits here as most couples in
the HRS do not have children living with them. For survivor benefits, I will assume that
individuals have claimed a 0% beneficiary option to simplify the analysis. Otherwise, benefits
from DB plans will be defined as in the summary plan descriptions provided to HRS.59
F.2 Defined Contribution Plans
DC plans do not provide a guaranteed payment to an employee upon retirement. Many
plans require an employee to be vested, usually 3 to 5 years, before he or she is eligible
59This assumption can be quite strong since it is possible that the diﬀerent household types, described in
§5.1.4, could vary in their choice of benefit plan. However, this reflects an income eﬀect, and does not induce
further notches in the budget constraint, so I view this as a reasonable assumption to make in light of the
computational diﬃculties that this would otherwise entail.
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to retain employer contributions. Employers generally match employee contributions, up to
some maximum level, such as a $1 match for every $1 contributed or $1 match for every
$2 contributed. Most of these plans are administered by private entities, and provide the
employee with a wide range of investment possibilities. These plans generally do not act as
a form of insurance for the employee, so employees have to separately subscribe to disability
or life insurance plans. Any surviving beneficiaries receive access to the DC plan’s account
balance.
Taxation of defined contribution plans is based on the taxable amount, which is generally
considered the amount that has not previously been taxed. In most cases, this is comprised
of the deferred wage, taxed based on your income tax bracket in the year the individual
receives the annuity and any gains in those contributions over the lifetime. There are only
two major notches in a household budget constraint based on DC plans: the 10% tax penalty
for withdrawals before age 5912 and the required withdrawals from investment retirement
account in the year after an individual turns 7012 . I do not expect these constraints to be
binding for the majority of the HRS sample. One of the major reasons an agent would want
to withdraw from a DC plan before 5912 would be due to a medical expense shock, which
would be exempted under Internal Revenue Service rules.
I will treat defined contribution plans as additional post-income tax assets, therefore
these plans will be subject only to a personal income tax on any growth and I will assume
that they grow at the rate of return, r. This is a strong assumption because standard 401(k)
contributions by the worker and all contributions made by an employer are generally are not
taxed as income until disbursement. I omit this detail for computational feasibility because
a more accurate model of these assets would require both knowledge on HRS’s part of which
assets are and are not pre-tax (which HRS does not know) and an additional state variable
in the estimation of the model that tracks pre-tax assets.
F.2.1 Defined Contribution Imputations
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has released imputations for DC plan wealth
through the sixth wave (2002). To fill in DC plan wealth for 2002 to 2010, I impute the DC
plan wealth following a procedure similar to how RAND imputes income and wealth levels,
and compare my imputations with the earlier imputations done by the HRS staﬀ for the
overlapping years (2000,2002 or waves 5 and 6).60
The HRS collects information for up to 4 pensions each interview wave. If the respondent
reports having either a DC or a combination plan and is missing information on the plan’s
60See Imputations for Pension-Related Variables, Final, Version 1.0 (June 2005) by the Health and Re-
tirement Study for a description of the HRS’s imputation process for waves 1-6.
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balance, I impute a balance amount. Individual’s who did not know their balance amount
were asked a series of unfolding brackets to help approximate the balance (i.e. if you do not
know your pension, is it greater or less than $20,000). Unlike RAND’s imputation procedure,
I do not impute ownership. Conditional on reported ownership of a DC plan, I impute the
bracket if none is given, and then conditional on bracket, I impute an account balance.
I impute brackets for individuals who report a DC or combination plan, but do not
provide a complete range. I begin by estimating an ordered logit model of the DC balance
bracket on the sample of individuals who report complete brackets but do not report a
balance. The covariates include dummies for if there is greater than 50% chance of leaving
a bequest of more than $10,000, greater than 50% chance of leaving a bequest of more than
$100,000, high school diploma or higher, college degree or higher, whether the respondent
self reports excellent or very good health, whether the respondent self reports poor or fair
health, whether the respondent works in a professional occupation, self-employed, married,
spouse-age missing, and non-white, as well as continuous measures of tenure, own-age, own-
age squared, spouse-age, and spouse-age squared. All covariates with the exception of the
bequest arguments are interacted with the individual’s gender. Second, I use the fitted
model to predict the probability of being in each of the five brackets, and then use these
probabilities to generate a cumulative distribution. Third, I draw a random number from
a uniform distribution, and compare the random number to the cumulative distribution in
order to assign each of the individuals with missing bracket information to a bracket.
Finally, I impute account balances for all individuals who report a DC or combination
plan, but do not provide a specific balance amount. I begin by estimating a standard regres-
sion on log account balances using the same covariates as used in the bracket imputation in
addition to the dummies for each individual’s respective balance level. Second, I use the fit-
ted model to predict DC account balances for all individuals who report a DC or combination
plan. Using a modified hot-deck approach, I sort the data by the imputed account balances
and then assign account balances to missing observations based on a weighted average of the
nearest-neighbors.
This imputation procedure produced similar results to the HRS imputation procedure
used for the first six waves. Waves 5 and 6 were estimated for both samples. In the 6th wave,
the imputation procedure produced 558 additional balances, bringing the total observed to
1,569. The mean [standard deviation] of log account balances before imputation was 10.19
[1.84] and after this imputation procedure it was 9.87 [2.00]. HRS’s imputation procedure
produced a mean [standard deviation] of 9.79 [1.99]. In the 5th wave, the imputation pro-
cedure produced 524 additional balances, bringing the total observed to 1,882. The mean
[standard deviation] of log account balances before imputation was 10.05 [1.90] and after
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this imputation procedure it was 9.84 [1.91]. HRS’s imputation procedure produced a mean
[standard deviation] of 10.07 [1.89]. Since both imputation methods produce similar re-
sults, I use the HRS’s imputations for the first 4 waves (1992-1998), and the aforementioned
imputation method for the remaining waves (2000-2010).
F.2.2 Tax Treatment of IRAs and tax-deferred accounts
At baseline, 1992, I observe the respondent’s report of how much money the household has
saved in defined contribution plans, such as 401(k), 403(b), and IRA accounts. Standard
accounts like these are usually composed of pre-tax earnings, meaning the individual has not
paid income tax on this money. Therefore, when the money is disbursed, it would be taxed
as unearned income (i.e. it will not be subject to payroll taxes, but it will be subject to
income tax). The model, as currently estimated, does not include a distinction between pre-
and post-tax savings because of the computational burden associated with estimating these
separately. Since defined contribution plans are treated as post-tax savings in the model, I
must make an assumption about how much of the account at baseline should be reduced to
reflect the future payout of income taxes.
I assume that the money is disbursed based on the expected joint life-expectancy from the
1994 IRS joint life expectancy table.61 I account for the couple’s estimated Social Security
benefits and defined benefit if both claimed their Social Security at age 62 and DB pension
benefits at age of first eligibility, and assume the DC disbursements start at age 70. Put
simply, an individual will draw on his or her DC account starting at age 70, and will take
the minimal disbursements required by the IRS. Therefore, the respective amount that they
will be taxed will be based on their annual income comprised of Social Security benefits,
DB benefits, and DC disbursements. I account for the limited amount of Social Security
income that is taxable. I set the tax attributable to the DC disbursement assuming that DC
disbursements are the last dollars taxed. I then sum tax payments from the DC plan across
years and subtract this from the total DC account at baseline. The account is then assumed
to be comprised of post-tax dollars.62
61The 1994 IRS publication 590 was the earliest I could locate. Age 62 corresponds to the mean age people
plan to begin collecting benefits.
62Note that this procedure is ad hoc: While I account for age diﬀerences within the couple, I do not
account for the individual decision of when it is disbursed and whether the couple continues to work. Since
the only source of income for these individuals is via annuity payments from Social Security, DB plans and
minimal DC plan disbursments, and not based on earnings from work, the taxed amount should be lower
than expected.
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G Earnings Profiles
The model described in §3 assumes that each individual can choose between employment in
her baseline full-time job (FT-B), a non-baseline full-time job (FT-NB), a part-time non-
baseline job (PT), and no job. Earnings in these employment states are assumed to be non-
stochastic and known to the individual, similar to Blau and Gilleskie (2006). However, unlike
Blau and Gilleskie (2006), I allow earnings to change with age in all possible employment
states. This is done to reflect diminished employment prospects with age and the fewer hours
worked after age 58 among those participating in the labor force. In this section, I will first
specify how baseline full-time earnings are determined, and then consider how non-baseline
full-time and part-time earnings are determined.
I define the baseline job as the full-time job an individual currently holds at baseline
(1992). If an individual leaves there FT-B job for any other state, then he or she cannot
return to the FT-B job. Annual earnings for FT-B jobs are determined from individual self-
reports in the Health and Retirement Study, and grow at a constant rate, consistent with
the HRS pension calculator. The HRS pension calculator uses information collected from
employer reported “summary plan descriptions” in combination with the worker’s reported
annual earnings and user-specified assumptions regarding nominal wage growth, inflation,
and real interest rates to predict the worker’s annual benefit levels by respective quit dates.
Consequently, the earnings model must reflect the same assumptions used in the pension
calculator to ensure that the correct benefit levels are predicted. The assumptions used in
the pension calculator are a real interest rate of 4%, inflation of 2%, and nominal wage growth
of 0%. This is consistent with the realized negative real wage growth rate of approximately
2%, following baseline, among individuals with pension plans in the sample specified in §4.
The situation is more complicated for non-baseline earnings. Approximately 56.6% of
men and 32.0% of women are in a FT-B job at baseline. From the men (women) who have
a FT-B job at baseline, 18.1% (24.9%) will transition to a PT job from the FT-B job, and
16.4% (15.5%) will transition to a FT-NB job from the FT-B job. Of the men (women)
transitioning from FT-B to a FT-NB job, 31.9% (33.3%) will receive earnings increases after
the move. Median annual earnings for men at FT-NB jobs rise until about age 57 and then
decline, as seen in figure G.1. This is despite median annual hours falling prior to age 57
and then remaining relatively constant for FT-NB jobs (as in figure G.2). Alternatively, the
story for women in FT-NB jobs is that annual earnings decline after 54 and then becomes
noisy for ages 60+, despite annual hours remaining largely unchanged. Finally, part-time
earnings decline as hours decline for both sexes.
Non-baseline jobs represent an alternative employment option for individuals at baseline
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Figure G.1: Median Earnings - Non-baseline jobs
Figure G.2: Median Hours - Non-baseline jobs
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and each subsequent period (up until the maximum working age of 70). Therefore, it is
important to assign a feasible wage that a worker might believe is available to her outside of
her baseline job (if she is working), or if she was to return to the workforce (if she was not
working at baseline).
I estimate individual log earnings profiles (separately by sex and employment status),
ln wit, for jobs that begin after baseline - the first sampling wave of the HRS in 1992. Baseline
in my full sample corresponds to an average age of 57.8 for men and 54.9 for women. These
jobs represent alternatives to the individual’s baseline job, which most individuals have held
for a long time. The independent variables, xit, include a quartic in age and a quadratic in
tenure (tenure is only included for FT-NB jobs). At this late age, I model wages as being
primarily determined by an individual i’s time invariant ability, cji , if he or she is working in
job j 2 {FT-NB, PT}:
lnwjit = x
0
it 
j + cji + "
j
it , (G.1)
where "jit is a the model error term such that E
⇥
"jit|j, xi1...xiTi , cji
⇤
= 0, and Ti corresponds
the last observed period for individual i . The model can then be used to predict the time
invariant fixed eﬀect, cˆji = ¯lnw
j
i   x¯i ˆ where ¯lnwi =
P
t(lnwi,t/Ti)
When (G.1) is estimated, a value of cˆji can be calculated for all individuals with at
least two periods where non-baseline jobs are observed. The  j terms in equation (G.1) are
identified by variation within individuals over time.
Some individuals will not have a predicted fixed eﬀect, cˆji . Specifically, individuals who
(i) never work in another job after quitting his or her baseline job, and (ii) individuals who
never work. In order to predict a fixed eﬀect for these individuals, I regress
cˆji = ✓
j
0 + ✓
j
1educi + ✓
j
2AIME1992i + ✓
j
3EarningsBaselinei + ⌘
j
i (G.2)
on the same individuals used in estimating equation (G.1), and then use (G.2) to predict cˆji
for those missing individuals due to (i). I do the same thing for individuals who never work,
but exclude baseline earnings.
Predicted earnings profiles for individual i at each age t in job j are made by substituting
the respective values into equation (G.1). Predicted profiles for the mean worker are included
in figure G.3.
I do not estimate a combined model in (G.1), because this model specifically prevents the
change in the quality of the match,  "it, from being correlated with change in employment
status, which rules out most types of endogenous job search. This is particularly problematic
in my setting, where I observe workers occasionally getting higher wages on part-time jobs
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Figure G.3: Annual Earnings by Employment Status
relative to full-time jobs. In fact, since 23% of individuals who have both a PT and FT-NB
jobs after baseline have higher part-time wages, it is very likely that changes in observed
employment status may be driven by positive shocks during job search.
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H Health and Mortality Transitions
Health and mortality transitions are estimated using logit model based on a cubic in age,
and lagged health status.
Figure H.1 shows the 1 year transition probabilities from good to bad health and bad to
bad health, for men and women. Men are more likely to move into and stay in bad health
(relative to women) as they age. The probability of the average man (woman) remaining in
bad health steadily increases from around 72% (72%) at age 50 to 98% (96%) at age 100.
Likewise, the probability of the average man (woman) transitioning from good health to bad
health increases from 7% (7%) at age 50, to 50% (40%) at age 100.
Figure H.2a shows the probability of death for men conditional on health status. As a
point of reference, I include information from the Social Security actuarial tables for the
1933 birth cohort. The figure indicates that at younger ages, my model under-predicts
the conditional population mortality rate, which is to be expected since the sample used is
going to be more likely to have worked and includes younger cohorts. At older ages, the
model over-predicts the mortality rate, which is also expected since members of the AHEAD
cohort, comprised of birth cohorts before 1924, are used identify mortality rates at these
ages. Additionally, figure H.2b shows the comparable result for women.
Figure H.1: Probability of being in bad health
Conditional on previous health status
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Figure H.2: Probability of Death by Sex
Conditional on previous health status
(a) Men
(b) Women
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I Medical Expense Distribution
Each period, the household faces a medical expense shock based on its health status. As
discussed in §5.1.3, I use a transitory shock from a distribution that is based on the the
original HRS sample.
The HRS collects data on self-reported out of pocket medical expenditure (Mi,t) , which
is imputed by the Labor and Population Program at the RAND Institute on Aging. In
estimating the medical expense distribution, I include members from the Asset and Health
Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) cohort from the HRS. This sample consists of
individuals born in 1923 or before. The combined sample is used to identify the distribution
of medical expenses into old age.
I estimate the distribution of medical expense separately for ages above and below age
65, by regressing the logarithm of out-of-pocket medical expenses on a quadratic in age
conditional on health insurance, labor force participation, and health status, which represent
states of the structural model. Age 65 is chosen as a break-point since most individuals
qualify for Medicare at this age and it becomes the primary insurer of the population above
65. As a result, the expense distribution can be expected to diﬀer across groups on either
side of age 65.
Previous work has used estimates of total medical expenses, and has generally used
another data source for total medical expenditure because it is not observed by the HRS. I
compare the distribution of Mi,t to total medical expenditure found by Blau and Gilleskie
(2006), who use an external survey - the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. I observe
that my medical expenditure estimates are generally lower at every level, particularly they
are much lower at higher levels of medical expenditures. This is to be expected since they
were attempting to estimate total medical expense, and health insurance limits catastrophic
medical expenses.
Past literature that has included medical expense uncertainty has usually been focused
on how health insurance alters retirement behavior. Due to computational limitations, I
am unable to include a persistent process for medical expenses. Persistence in medical
expenditures does exist indirectly through persistence in health status. I expect that this
will lead to underestimating the household’s lifetime medical expense risk.
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J Preference Types
As described in §5.1.4, households can vary based on characteristics that will be reflected in
their preference for consumption versus leisure, but are not otherwise captured by the typical
state variables. For this reason I include a preference index, as in Keane and Wolpin (1997),
van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), and French and Jones (2011), to capture heterogeneity
in preferences for consumption, own-leisure, spousal leisure, time, and household decision-
making.
I construct my preference index by regressing each individual’s labor force participation
on a quartic in age, household health status, assets, earnings, health insurance status, the
individual’s AIME, defined benefit flow (if eligible), marital status, and a full set of interac-
tions of these terms. Furthermore, I include in this regression three variables pertaining to
the individual’s preference for work:
1. Even if I didn’t need the money, I would probably keep on working. (Agree or disagree)
2. When you think about the time when you and your husband or wife will retire, are
you looking forward to it, are you uneasy about it, or what?
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you enjoy your job?
and, I include four more variables the pertain to the individual’s preference for his or her
spouse:
1. Generally speaking, would you say that the time you spend together with your hus-
band or wife is extremely enjoyable, very enjoyable, somewhat enjoyable, or not too
enjoyable?
2. When it comes to making major family decisions, who has the final say – you or your
husband or wife?
3. Some couples like to spend their free time doing things together, while others like to
do diﬀerent things in their free time. What about you and your husband or wife?
(together, separate, or sometimes together and sometimes separate)
4. I am going to read you a list of things that some people say are good about retirement.
For each one, please tell me if, for you, they are very important, moderately important,
somewhat important, or not important at all. Having more time with husband or wife.
For each of the above questions, I create a binary variable for each, either lumping answers
such as agree and strongly agree together, or partitioning it by the median answer. I estimate
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the above regression separately for men and women. For each individual, the work preference
index is the sum of the work preference coeﬃcients multiplied by their respective independent
variables, and similarly for the spouse preference index. The household’s work or spouse
preference index is simply the equally weighted sum for each household member’s respective
preference indices. The household preference indices are then converted into binary measures
by partitioning them at each measures’ median.
I observe that the work preference index is positively correlated with marriage, earnings,
assets, AIME, defined-benefit pension flows, and negatively correlated with health. The
spouse preference index is positively correlated with assets and health, but negatively corre-
lated with earnings and AIME. An “out’ preference index is created for households who were
not asked the work questions in the first period because they were not working. As noted in
table 4.1, the initial distribution consists of 17.4% of the “out” preference type, and then a
relatively even distribution between the four other preference types.
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K Additional Figures depicting Moment Matching
Figure K.1: Asset Quantiles (by thirds) by Male Age
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Figure K.2: Asset Quantile Shares by Preference Type
(a) Type 0 - the Out Type
(b) Type 2 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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(c) Type 3 - High Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(d) Type 4 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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Figure K.3: Men Labor Force Participation by Preference Type
(a) Type 2 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(b) Type 3 - High Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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(c) Type 4 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
Figure K.4: Women Labor Force Participation by Preference Type
(a) Type 2 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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(b) Type 3 - High Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(c) Type 4 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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Figure K.5: Men Full-time work by Preference Type
(a) Type 1 - High Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(b) Type 2 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
167
(c) Type 3 - High Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(d) Type 4 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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Figure K.6: Women Full-time work by Preference Type
(a) Type 1 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(b) Type 2 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, Low Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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(c) Type 3 - High Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
(d) Type 4 - Low Preference for Own Leisure, High Preference for
Spousal Leisure
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Figure K.7: Participation Rate by Health Status
(a) Men
(b) Women
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L Calculating Divorce Rates by Cohort
In the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a respondent is asked for a retrospective marital
history, that includes questions on how many times he or she has been married, and when his
or her marriages began and ended. Individuals are only asked retrospective marital histories
in the first wave that their cohort enters the HRS. Individuals born between 1931-1941 are
part of the original HRS cohort (data from 1992-2010), individuals born between 1924-1930
are part of the Children of the Depression cohort (1998-2010), individuals born between
1942-1947 are part of the War Baby cohort (1998-2010) and individuals born between 1948-
1953 are part of the Early Baby Boomer cohort (2004-2010). From this information I can
approximate the individual’s age at divorce for marriages prior to the respondent’s partici-
pation in the HRS. Furthermore, since the HRS is a longitudinal study, I can track whether
or not the individual has become divorced since the HRS began.
Divorces can be observed either through retrospective marital histories or during the
survey waves of the HRS. In both cases, so that the proportion of divorces can be viewed
as a proportion of those households which are eligible to get divorced, it is important to
determine what share of the population is at-risk for the divorce . I restrict my observations
to age ranges (i.e. ages 41-50, 51-60, 61-70) and by gender, as individuals’ labor supply
behavior appears to vary along these dimensions.
Using the retrospective marital history, I create an indicator of whether an individual
is at-risk for divorce (i.e. has been married during the restricted age range) which takes a
value of 1 if (1) the individual is divorced or widowed within the age range, (2) the individual
is married within that age range, (3) the individual was married before and divorced after
the age range, or (4) the individual’s current marriage pre-existed the age range. Using the
retrospective marital histories, I construct a dummy variable for divorce if it falls within the
age range of interest. When calculating years married, I use the first divorce in the age range
(i.e. if I am examining the age range from 41-50, and an individual is divorced at 41 and
again at 49, then I use the length of marriage for the divorce at age 41).
Using the survey waves of the HRS, an individual within the age range of interest is
considered at-risk if (1) the individual is currently married, (2) the individual was married
since the previous interview wave, or (3) the individual was divorced or widowed since last
interview. In the same manner as retrospective histories, I construct a binary variable for
divorce within the age range of interest and calculate marital length based on the first divorce
within the survey.
M Age Standardization
The statistics reported in tables 9.1 and 9.2 report statistics for the continuously married,
divorced, and widowed populations in the HRS who are at-risk for divorce or widowhood
between ages 50 and 70. Death, however, is an event that is more likely to happen later in
a couple’s life, while divorce is an event that is more likely to happen earlier in a couple’s
life. In tables M.1 and M.2, I standardize the same statistics by age. In order to do this, the
data are weighted based on the age distribution of divorcées.
Comparing table 9.1 in the main text, to the weighted and age-standardized table M.1,
we observe several diﬀerences. First, before the age-standardization, widowed and divorced
women appear to have worked the same length on average, but afterward, divorced women
appear to have have worked longer by 2.89 years. Age diﬀerences with the spouse appear
to be much less for continuously married women and divorced women, with divorced women
being only 0.18 years younger than their ex-husband. Divorced women also claim their Social
Security benefits later than the other groups, once age is controlled for.
Controlling for age results in some substantial changes for men. Continuously married
men and divorced men have more education on average, 13.3 years, once we control for age-
diﬀerences. Other major changes include: widowed men’s average years worked is 2.0-2.3
years less than that other groups, remarriage rates increase to nearly 50%, and continuously
married and divorced men are much more likely to have worked the previous survey wave.
Widowed men’s salaries increase substantially once ages are standardized, but this is likely
the result of smaller sample sizes amongst widowers.
Comparing table 9.2 in the main text, to the weighted and age-standardized table M.2, we
observe a few diﬀerences. The diﬀerence between the percentage of divorcées and widow(er)s
that are working before and after the separation/loss shrink from about 20 to 10 percent-
age points once ages are standardized. Additionally, the increase in women’s expectation
of working at 62 and 65 following a separation rises by 2.03 and 2.51 percentage points,
respectively.
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Table M.1: Summary Statistics from HRS Sample
Women Men
Population Divorced Widowed Population Divorced Widowed
Age (Mean) 53.84 53.81 53.83 54.18 54.19 54.21
Before Separation 56.67 55.57 57.76 58.24
White (%) 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.86
Education in Years 12.95 12.83 12.22 13.32 13.31 11.43
Average years worked 23.29 25.67 22.78 33.15 32.86 30.85
Before Separation 27.31 24.53 34.45 33.03
Marriage Length (Mean) 26.91 19.10 28.16 24.78 17.61 24.48
Before Separation 20.25 28.55 18.75 31.06
Remarried after 3 waves (%) 0.31 0.20 0.49 0.52
Age diﬀerence with spouse 1.36 0.18 4.59 -3.51 -5.55 -2.00
Number of Children 2.62 2.55 3.00 2.56 2.50 2.34
Worked last survey wave 0.79 0.86 0.70 0.92 0.92 0.80
Before Separation 0.77 0.60 0.80 0.75
Worked in last five years,
but not last survey wave
0.09 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.16
Before Separation 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.19
Not worked in last five years 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04
Before Separation 0.12 0.25 0.10 0.06
Hourly Wage 21.71 18.69 17.04 36.70 29.54 56.56
Before Separation 21.39 16.21 26.90 20.44
Ever Applied Disability (%) 0.13 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.19
Age begin Social Security 62.46 62.55 61.28 63.06 63.35 62.53
Sample Size 8409 235 239 8475 237 102
Notes: Age’s standardized by the age distribution of divorcées. Data weighted using person level weights.
Separations occurring between age 50 and 70. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics refer to the first
wave.
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Table M.2: Before and After Separation - Summary Statistics from HRS Sample
Women Men
Population Divorced Widowed Population Divorced Widowed
Number in Household 2.80 2.54 2.89 3.02 2.92 3.17
Before Separation 2.48 2.60 2.73 2.64
After Separation 1.68 2.05 1.70 2.01
E
xc
lu
di
ng
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 2.84 2.81 1.65 2.98 2.87 0.89
Before Separation 3.21 1.58 3.01 1.28
After Separation 1.61 1.66 1.67 2.26
In
cl
ud
in
g
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 4.11 3.78 2.47 4.13 4.12 1.71
Before Separation 4.42 2.55 4.30 1.81
After Separation 2.31 2.90 2.56 3.16
Renting (%) 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.15
Before Separation 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.17
After Separation 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.16
1st wv. After Separation 0.36 0.17 0.39 0.26
Working (%) 0.68 0.73 0.52 0.86 0.88 0.70
Before Separation 0.62 0.51 0.76 0.63
After Separation 0.65 0.56 0.73 0.60
1st wv. After Separation 0.64 0.52 0.65 0.53
Applied for Disability (%) 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Before Separation 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.07
Ever Apply 0.13 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.19
Prb. Work at 62 (Self-rpt) 36.18 45.23 45.99 51.70 58.13 56.90
Before Separation 48.60 36.21 58.69 48.89
After Separation 54.18 32.91 51.19 42.36
Prb. Work at 65 (Self-rpt) 20.29 26.72 23.55 31.79 30.59 31.21
Before Separation 26.54 20.38 35.10 25.79
After Separation 37.29 18.29 36.12 20.67
Sample Size 8409 235 239 8475 237 102
Notes: Age’s standardized by the age distribution of divorcées. Data weighted using person level weights.
Separations occurring between age 50 and 70. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics refer to the first
wave. Separations occur between waves. The interview wave response before the separation is marked
as “Before Separation”, and similarly for the response “After Separation”. “1st wv. after separation”
refers to the interview response in the first full wave since the separation occurred (minimum of 2
years). All assets are reported in 2010 dollars.
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N Changes in Household Size around Divorce/Widowhood
When considering old-age divorce/widowhood, we typically think of a household transition-
ing from a two-person household to two one-person households. For the median household,
this is correct (see table N.1). For some households, they may also have a child or parent
living at home. This can explain why the average household size is greater than 1 in table
N.1.
The Health and Retirement Study collects information regarding the number of other
household members at each interview wave. The HRS consistently asks whether children
are “at home or temporarily away at college” versus not living at home. It is often unclear,
however, what would happen to a divorcing household with shared custody of children,
and who comprise the other, non-child, household members. Controlling for the number of
children “at home or temporarily away at college” substantially reduces the average number
of people in a household. Accounting for the remaining household members is diﬃcult, as the
HRS does not consistently track the relationship between the other, non-children members
of the household and the respondent.63
We might be concerned that household composition is biasing the results we find in this
paper. In table N.1, I examine couples that have no other people in the household in the
first wave, and before/after the separation or loss. Relative to the full sample in table 9.2,
we find that these couples are generally wealthier. Comparing the two samples, we observe
that all of the key relationships are preserved. Women receive less than 50% of pre-divorce
assets, and widows on average slightly lose assets.
The median household size does not change for widowers following the wife’s death. Only
three households have remarried or become partnered with another person by the interview
wave after the wife’s death. Controlling for reported children at home does result in the
expected change in median household size. It is possible that widowers are more likely to
have their children return home following the wife’s death, or to move in with their children.
While assets including housing wealth are stable around the widowing event, the average
non-housing assets fall sharply. While non-housing assets decreased for widowers in the entire
sample (from $153,000 to $145,000), these assets decreased by a much larger amount, from
$256,000 to $175,000, in the sample of widowers who went from two to one person households.
This sharp change is due to large asset changes by two households with substantial assets
63It is possible, for example, that divorcing men move in with a girlfriend and the household might now
reflect both of their assets, but this scenario would require the man to report being divorced or separatednot,
instead of reporting being partnered or married. The HRS interviewer typically asks whether the respondent,
or his/her spouse or partner, owns any of a particular asset. Therefore it is unlikely that asset measures
would be confounded by post-marital relationships.
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(greater than $1 million). Dropping these two households from the analysis, we observe a
slight increase in assets. There is no evidence to support that asset loss is common following
the death of a wife. If anything, there appears to be a median increase in assets, which is
suggestive that many of these widowers may receive a payout from a life insurance policy.
Table N.1: Before and After Separation Summary Statistics from HRS Sample (controlling
for household size)
Women Men
Population Divorced Widowed Population Divorced Widowed
Household Size (Median) 2 3 2 2 3 3
Before Separation 2 2 2 2
After Separation 1 1 1 2
Household Size (Mean) 2.89 2.95 2.95 2.89 2.99 3.12
Before Separation 2.70 2.56 2.76 2.72
After Separation 1.82 1.95 1.70 1.99
E
xc
lu
di
ng
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 2.82 1.97 1.88 2.94 3.32 1.39
Before Separation 3.26 1.82 3.46 2.56
After Separation 1.33 1.74 1.74 1.75
Assets ($100,000 - Median) 1.21 0.97 0.86 1.26 1.51 0.77
Before Separation 1.35 0.50 1.36 0.51
After Separation 0.48 0.59 0.71 1.04
In
cl
ud
in
g
H
ou
si
ng Assets ($100,000 - Mean) 3.86 2.95 2.93 3.95 4.44 2.25
Before Separation 4.27 3.02 4.43 2.77
After Separation 1.92 2.83 2.60 2.90
Assets ($100,000 - Median) 2.36 1.71 1.77 2.42 2.66 1.64
Before Separation 2.44 2.24 2.57 1.48
After Separation 0.75 1.54 1.30 2.54
Sample Size 7564 212 233 7609 221 98
Wave 1 Sample Size 3796 72 88 3813 74 28
Before/After Sample Size 87 100 82 29
Notes: Author’s calculations, Data from Health and Retirement Study. Separations occurring between age
50 and 70. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics refer to the first wave. Separations occur between
waves. The interview wave response before the separation is marked as “Before Separation”, and
similarly for the response “After Separation”. All assets are reported in 2010 dollars.
Household size statistics reported using full sample size noted in table 9.2. The full sample
size may diﬀer from main text because the household size could not be established for some
households. Wave 1 sample size reports households who either never divorce between 50-70, divorce,
or widow, and were 2 person households in wave 1. Before/After sample size reports the sample size
of households where the household had 2 people before and 1 person after the separation.
Asset statistics referring to the first wave are dependent on the household being comprised of
two individuals (Wave 1 Sample Size). Asset statistics referring to before or after separation are
dependent on the household being comprised of two individuals before separation and only one
individual after separation (Before/After Sample Size).
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O Impact of marital separation/loss on retirement ben-
efits
When a household divorces, or one member dies, the change may aﬀect its employer-provided
retirement benefits or the household’s Social Security benefit. Employee’s are generally
eligible for two types of retirement benefits: defined benefit (DB), defined contribution (DC)
or a combination plan that consists of both. Table O.1 provides a summary of the impact
of marital separation/loss on diﬀerent retirement benefit types.
Table O.1: Retirement benefit options for divorcées and widow(er)s
Defined Benefit
(DB)
Defined Contribution
(DC)
U.S. Social Security
(SS)
Divorce
before
retirement
Separation of Accounts
Time Rule Formula
Flat Dollar/Percentage
Separation of Accounts
Rollover to IRA
Flat Dollar/Percentage Better of
{50% ex-spouse’s benefit,
100% own benefit}
if married 10+ yrsDivorce
after
retirement
Time Rule Formula
Flat Dollar/Percentage
Separation of Accounts
Rollover to IRA
Flat Dollar/Percentage
Widowhood
before
retirement
Lump Sum Payment
Survivor Share of
Joint Life Annuity
Assumes account
ownership Better of
{100% spouse’s benefit,
100% own benefit}
& early claim age
reduced to 60Widowhood
after
retirement
Single Life Annuity
Joint Life Annuity
Certain Period Annuity
Cash Refund Annuity
Assumes account
ownership
Notes: Table provides a summary of changes to retirement plans due to a marital separation/loss. A person
is retired in this context if they have left an employer and claimed the DB/DC benefit provided by
that employer. SS is claimed separately from the employer plans. Terms are defined in the text. This
summary is not an exhaustive list, as the options vary by plan, state, and whether it is a public or
private employer.
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O.1 Laws governing employer-sponsored retirement plans
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) establishes rules for employer-
sponsored retirement plans.64 Two important provisions for this paper include the establish-
ment of spousal consent and qualified domestic relation orders.
ERISA requires that the default payout for DB plans includes a surviving spouse provi-
sion. This provision required that a beneficiary’s surviving spouse must receive at least half
of the monthly benefit received while the beneficiary was still alive. The spouse may consent
to receiving less than half, but this requires her to provide written confirmation of her intent
to forgo survivorship rights.
ERISA also provides for the creation of qualified domestic relation orders (QDRO).
QDROs are court orders that recognize the rights of an alternative payee to receive all
or part of the benefits from another person’s retirement plan. QDROs are restricted to
an individual’s spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent. They are separate from
divorce orders, and pension plans will only make benefit changes based on QDROs. The
retirement plan administrator determines whether an order is a QDRO. By law, a QDRO
cannot require a plan to do anything beyond what the plan’s administration permits. It is
common for plans to provide sample QDRO language that delineate the options the plan
makes available in the case of a divorce.
ERISA only applies to private plans. Federal, state and local government entities, such
as state public employee retirement systems, establish similar rules for their plan. State
pension plans are not required to establish a spousal consent provision.65 Most state pension
plans have established orders similar to QDROs, often referred to as “division of property
order” (Ohio), “eligible domestic relations order” (Michigan), or simply a “domestic relations
order” (New York).
O.2 Defined Benefit Plans
DB plans guarantee the retiring worker a monthly benefit based on a formula that accounts
for years of service, average or final pay, and the age at which the benefit begins. These
plans are typically referred to as pension plans, and are common in public sector jobs.
The employee who is eligible for the pension is considered a plan member, while his or her
64It was subsequently amended in 1984 by the Retirement Equity Act. I refer to the act, including the
amendments, as ERISA.
65“Nineteen states and the District of Columbia do not require their retirees to notify their spouses or
get their spouse’s consent when they elect a single-life annuity: Alabama, the District of Columbia, Col-
orado, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia.”
(Pension Rights Center, 2013)
179
spouse would be considered a nonmember. Members and nonmembers are only entitled to an
annuity, or lifetime, benefit if the member is vested, meaning they have worked for minimal
number of years at the employer. Non-vested members are generally able to withdraw their
contributions and, depending on the plan, part of the employer’s contribution. DB plan
administrators establish diﬀerent rules for before and after an individual begins receiving
monthly benefits. Three common methods of dividing marital retirement assets include:
Separation of Accounts. This provision can generally only occur prior to the first
receipt of benefits. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System defines separation
of accounts in the following way.
The nonmember spouse no longer relies upon the member to determine when
benefits become payable. The nonmember spouse may choose to receive a refund
of the accumulated contributions while the member continues to work. Should
the nonmember elect to refund, they have the right to withdraw, by direct refund
or rollover, the contributions and interest credited to their nonmember account,
plus interest earned at 6 percent per year through date of payment. The taxable
portion of the benefit would be subject to 20 percent federal withholding, unless it
is rolled over to an IRA. If the member was not vested on the date of dissolution
or dies prior to reaching the minimum retirement age, the nonmember’s only
right would be to withdraw their contributions by a direct refund or rollover.
(California Public Employees’ Retirement System, 2013)
Specific provisions for separated accounts vary by plan and state. Employers do not have
to provide separate accounts for nonmembers, although this option is common to prevent
the pension fund from needing to make lump sum disbursements to nonmembers following
divorces or other life events.
Time Rule Formula. This provision occurs before or after the plan’s beneficiaries first
receipt of benefits. The time rule formula (referred to as the Majauskas Formula in New
York) is the most common across states. Benefits to the nonmember spouse are calculated
according to the following formula:
Nonmember Benefit = 50%⇥
Total service credits earned
while married and employed
Total service credits
at retirement
⇥ Retirement Benefit
The time rule formula need not be the 50% specified above. The actual percentage is agreed
to as part of the QDRO. The domestic relation order will also provide for what happens to
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the benefit when either the member or ex-spouse dies. For example, some plans include a
“pop-up” provision that converts the benefit payment to a single life annuity when one of the
members dies. In some private plans, the ex-spouse may have the option of receiving their
benefits as a lump-sum payment. Plans, however, are not required to oﬀer this provision.66
Flat Dollar/Percentage. This provision occurs before or after the plan’s beneficiaries
first receipt of benefits. As part of the QDRO, the ex-spouse may receive a flat dollar amount
or a percentage of the final monthly retirement benefit. For example, an ex-wife might settle
for $1,500 of her ex-husband’s future retirement benefit. A flat dollar amount is rare, as it
would not include the ex-spouse in any COLA adjustments that might be part of the plan.
Should a couple remain married, several common options exist for ways to receive the
benefits from a DB plan. These options specify whether the annuity payment includes a
survivorship option, and what share of the original benefit the survivor would be entitled to.
Benefit options include:
Lump Sum Payment. The nonmember may choose to receive all of the benefits in a
single, lump sum payment. This is common in survivorship cases when the dying spouse
would not have qualified for a retirement benefit at the age of their death.
Single Life Annuity (SLA). A single life annuity provides a retirement benefit based
on the member’s years of service, total service credits, their average or final pay, and the age
they begin their benefit. The annuity payments last only for the duration of the member’s
life, and their are no benefits for the survivor. Since the passage of ERISA, choosing a single
life annuity requires the written consent of the spouse. In this case, the survivor would
receive no benefits.
Joint Life and Survivor Annuity (JLSA). This annuity is the most common form of
benefit since the passage of ERISA. A JLSA provides a benefit to the member while they are
alive and to a nonmember (e.g. wife) after the member dies. A 100% JLSA would provide a
benefit of equal size to a surviving nonmember after the death of the member. A 50% JLSA
would provide a benefit of half the size of the original benefit to a surviving nonmember after
the death of the member. The nonmember beneficiary generally cannot be changed after the
initial assignment since benefit levels are based on the age of the member and nonmember.
Certain Period Annuity. This annuity provides a guaranteed income for a certain
66In a legal case involving Continental Airlines, nine pilots were sued by the airline after they divorced and
received QDROs assigning their ex-spouses complete pension rights. The ex-spouses proceeded to cash out
the retirement plans, costing the airline $10-11 million. The pilots subsequently remarried their ex-spouses.
The airline was entering bankruptcy, and it was likely that their pension benefits would have been reduced
in the bankruptcy proceedings. In 2011, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower-court ruling
that employers are prohibited from considering or investigating why their employees get divorced or whether
their divorce is fraudulent.
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duration (e.g. 5, 10, 20 years), and specifies a beneficiary in case the recipient does not
survive the entire certain period.
Cash Refund Annuity. This annuity guarantees that the member will receive total
annuity payments equal to his or her contributions (alternatively, the plan’s initial value). If
the member dies before this occurs, the remaining balance is paid to a specified beneficiary
(e.g. wife). The cash refund annuity can be used in combination with a SLA or a JLSA, but
doing so reduce the member’s monthly benefit level.
The benefits a nonmember beneficiary receives if the plan’s member dies before collecting
benefits will often depend on the member’s years of service. If he has enough years of service,
the nonmember beneficiary will often be able to collect a 100% JLSA. If the member did
not have enough service credits, the nonmember beneficiary is often constrained to taking a
lump sum distribution.
Divorcing couples where the plan’s member has not begun collecting their benefit gen-
erally can choose from separation of accounts, time rule formula, or flat dollar/percentage
payment. The method of division, however, may vary by employer, and so this is not meant
to be a comprehensive list. Once the plan’s member begins collecting his or her benefits,
often the set of options is reduced. Once a payment plan is chosen, changes from a divorce
cannot make the retirement plan’s finances worse oﬀ. This would be grounds for a plan’s
administrator refusing to certify a court order as a QDRO. For example, if a household chose
a SLA and subsequently divorces, the household cannot convert the SLA to a JLSA because
that would alter the actuarial plan. Instead the household would be likely to opt for a flat
percentage of the retirement benefit.
O.3 Defined Contribution Plans
DC plans, such as 401(k), 403(b), 457, or thrift plans, are voluntary contribution plans
where the employer and employee can elect to contribute. Contributions to DC plans can be
made pre-tax (i.e. traditional) or post-tax (i.e. Roth). Similar to DB plans, most DC plans
have a vesting provision based on years of service if the employer is making contributions.
Non-vested members are generally able to withdraw their contributions and, depending on
the plan, part of the employer’s contribution. Since DC plans have a specific balance, the
rules associated with divorce/widowhood are simpler than DB plans.
In the case of divorce, the balance of a DC account can be split between the couple. In
some cases the employer will allow the non-employee to remain on their plan, however, the
non-employee is often required to rollover the balance to an individual retirement account
(IRA). Similar to DB plans, it is also possible for a DC plan’s assets to be split in flat dollar
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amounts or percentages at the end of the employee’s service.
In the case of widowhood, DC plans have an assigned beneficiary who receives the balance
when the member dies. The default beneficiary is the member’s spouse. DC plans, like DB
plans, are required under ERISA to provide a survivorship option. A nonmember spouse
must provide written permission if the member specifies a person other than his or her spouse
as the DC plan’s primary beneficiary.
O.4 Social Security
Social Security provides benefits to an earner, and the earner’s spouse, ex-spouse, and sur-
vivor. A person may collect Social Security benefits as early as age 62, but benefits are
reduced when claimed before a person’s normal retirement age (i.e. age 65 for individuals
born before 1938, and incrementally increasing to 67 for people born after 1959). If an indi-
vidual claims at 62, his benefit is reduced by 20%, if born before 1937, or up to 30%, if born
after 1959.
While alive, a spouse is entitled to the better of her own earner benefit or 50% of her
spouse’s benefit. If the couple divorces, conditional on having been married for 10 or more
years, she may still collect this benefit. In order to claim the spouse’s/divorced spouse’s
benefit, the high income earner must first have claimed their benefit. If the couple has been
divorced more than two years and the high earner is at least 62, the divorced spouse does
not have to wait for the high earner to claim his benefit in order to begin collecting her
divorced spouse’s benefit. If the divorced spouse remarries, then she is no longer eligible
to receive the divorced spouse’s benefit (although she may be eligible to receive a spouse’s
benefit based on her new spouse’s earnings history). If a currently divorced person has been
married to multiple individuals for more than 10 years, she will receive the greater of the
divorced spouses’ benefits. The actuarial reduction for spouse and divorced spouse’s benefits
is greater than the earner’s benefit reduction. If a spouse claims at 62, her spouse’s benefit is
reduced by 25%, if born before 1937, or up to 35%, if born after 1959. The spouse’s benefit
is based on the high earner’s unreduced benefit (i.e. if he claimed at his normal retirement
age).
When the high earner dies, the surviving spouse is entitled to the better of her own benefit
or 100% of her spouse’s benefit. A surviving spouse is entitled to collect their survivor’s
benefit as early as age 60. If the couple divorced prior to the high earner’s death, the
surviving ex-spouse is entitled to a divorced survivor’s benefit. The divorced survivor’s
benefit is equivalent to the survivor’s benefit. The rules governing whether an ex-spouse
qualifies for a divorced survivor’s benefit are similar to the rules governing who qualifies for
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a divorced spouse’s benefit. The actuarial reduction for survivor and divorced survivor’s
benefits is generally lower than the earner’s benefit reduction. If a survivor claims at 60,
her survivor’s benefit is reduced by 28.5%. The survivor’s benefit reduction factor has not
changed like the earner and spouse’s benefits. The survivor’s benefit is based on the dead
earner’s unreduced benefit if he had not claimed his benefit. If the dead earner had claimed
his benefit, then the survivor’s benefit would be based on the greater of the dead earner’s
reduced benefit or 82.5% of his unreduced benefit.
Social Security has a maximum family benefit that can be derived from a single earner’s
earnings history. This amount is typically around 150% of the earner’s benefit level. Divorced
spouse and survivor’s benefits, however, do not count against there family maximum. For
example, an earner could divorce a spouse every 10 years, immediately marry another spouse,
and after 40 years have 4 divorced spouses’ benefits, 1 spouse’s benefit, and his own earner
benefit (a possible total benefit of 350% of his normal retirement benefit). When he died,
each would convert to a divorced survivor’s benefit (a possible total benefit of 500% of his
normal retirement benefit).
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P Figures and Tables
Figure P.1: Women - Percentage whose most recent marital status is Widowed (by Age)
Notes: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
Figure P.2: Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is married (by age)
Notes: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
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Figure P.3: Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is divorced (by age)
Notes: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
Figure P.4: Men - Percentage whose most recent marital status is Widowed (by Age)
Notes: Author’s calculations for 1940-2000 using U.S. Census (1% samples), 2010 using the American
Community Survey.
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Figure P.5: Eﬀect of Widowhood timing on Women’s Labor Force Participation
(a) Labor Force Participation, Ages 50-70
(b) Hours Worked, Ages 50-70
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Figure P.6: Eﬀect of Divorce timing on Men’s Labor Force Participation
(a) Labor Force Participation, Ages 50-70
(b) Hours Worked, Ages 50-70
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Table P.3: Probit estimates of retirement using alternative retirement definition (women)
Women Women (weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (1w) (2w) (3w)
SEP -0.332** -0.507* -0.494* -0.209 -0.843** -0.773**
(0.134) (0.279) (0.273) (0.164) (0.335) (0.340)
[-0.069] [-0.106] [-0.103] [-0.045] [-0.179] [-0.164]
⇥AssetLoss -0.000386 -0.0138 -0.00643 -0.0388
(0.0318) (0.0365) (0.0305) (0.0391)
[-0.000] [-0.003] [-0.001] [-0.008]
⇥SpIncLoss 0.00135 0.00308 0.0144 0.0141
(0.00888) (0.0101) (0.00882) (0.0128)
⇥WvsSinceSep 0.0660 0.0630 0.167* 0.131
(0.0709) (0.0789) (0.0856) (0.0931)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥AssetLoss 0.00735 0.0196
(0.0202) (0.0196)
[0.002] [0.004]
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥ SpIncLoss -0.00225 -5.87e-06
(0.00591) (0.00682)
WID 0.219 0.0266 0.0542 0.118 -0.0635 -0.0171
(0.151) (0.240) (0.259) (0.189) (0.245) (0.267)
⇥AssetLoss 0.0239 -0.141 0.0194 -0.0967
(0.0421) (0.162) (0.0595) (0.125)
⇥SpIncLoss 0.0145* -0.00465 0.0174* -0.0102
(0.00863) (0.0151) (0.00998) (0.0151)
⇥WvsSinceWid 0.0641 -0.0165 0.0407 -0.0105
(0.0861) (0.124) (0.0960) (0.119)
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥AssetLoss 0.100 0.0403
(0.103) (0.0778)
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥ SpIncLoss 0.0810** 0.101***
(0.0331) (0.0308)
EARN 1.14e-07 1.07e-07 1.22e-07 6.64e-07 6.34e-07 6.47e-07
(4.55e-07) (4.55e-07) (4.54e-07) (6.25e-07) (6.22e-07) (6.22e-07)
ASSETS 0.00124 0.00122 0.00119 -0.000351 -0.000397 -0.000433
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00153) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00218)
N 8,225 8,225 8,225 6,209 6,209 6,209
Pseudo R2 0.0842 0.0847 0.0861 0.0737 0.0752 0.0766
Notes: Dependent variable is retirement in the next period measure by annual hours of work. If an indi-
vidual transitions from working more than 300 hours per year to less than 300 hours per year, the
individual is treated as retired (the individual is still required to be working full-time in his or her
first interview wave). Marginal eﬀects included in square brackets for select covariates. Retirement
is treated as an absorbing state, so observations after retirement are dropped from the estimation.
“weighted” indicates that data is weighted using person-level weights corresponding to the specific
HRS interview wave. Regressions are conducted only on individuals between ages 50 and 70 who
worked full-time in their first HRS interview wave, were at-risk for a divorce/widowhood between
ages 50 and 70, did not remarry, and did not ever apply for disability. Descriptions of the included
covariates are in the text.
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Table P.4: Probit estimates of retirement using alternative retirement definition (men)
Men Men (weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (1w) (2w) (3w)
SEP -0.132 0.127 0.115 -0.178 0.107 0.0802
(0.128) (0.207) (0.220) (0.160) (0.287) (0.294)
[-0.028] [0.026] [0.024] [-0.036] [0.021] [0.016]
⇥AssetLoss 0.00111 -0.0332 -0.0280 -0.0736
(0.0274) (0.0491) (0.0410) (0.0660)
⇥SpIncLoss -0.00747* -0.00439 -0.00685 -0.00367
(0.00424) (0.00529) (0.00491) (0.00571)
⇥WvsSinceSep -0.0345 -0.0362 -0.0427 -0.0416
(0.0711) (0.0804) (0.0967) (0.115)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥AssetLoss 0.0263 0.0371
(0.0264) (0.0320)
⇥WvsSinceSep⇥ SpIncLoss -0.00280 -0.00361
(0.00267) (0.00307)
WID 0.347 0.426 0.549* 0.447* 0.393 0.660
(0.245) (0.295) (0.299) (0.265) (0.436) (0.436)
[0.074] [0.091] [0.117] [0.091] [0.080] [0.134]
⇥AssetLoss -0.0917 0.00847 -0.0752 0.122
(0.0673) (0.133) (0.0601) (0.118)
[-0.020] [0.002] [-0.015] [0.024]
⇥SpIncLoss 0.00361 -0.000579 0.00466 -0.000472
(0.00549) (0.0137) (0.00539) (0.0138)
⇥WvsSinceWid -0.238 -0.413 -0.146 -0.517
(0.199) (0.254) (0.244) (0.395)
[-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000]
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥AssetLoss -0.206 -0.370*
(0.216) (0.202)
[0.000] [0.000]
⇥WvsSinceWid⇥ SpIncLoss 0.00413 0.00345
(0.0114) (0.0117)
EARN 1.81e-07 1.79e-07 1.81e-07 1.14e-07 1.13e-07 1.15e-07
(1.33e-07) (1.33e-07) (1.33e-07) (1.21e-07) (1.20e-07) (1.21e-07)
ASSETS 0.000738 0.000724 0.000735 0.00181 0.00180 0.00181
(0.000959) (0.000959) (0.000960) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00179)
N 11,424 11,424 11,424 10,693 10,693 10,693
Pseudo R2 0.0942 0.0949 0.0952 0.0886 0.0892 0.0899
Notes: Dependent variable is retirement in the next period measure by annual hours of work. If an indi-
vidual transitions from working more than 300 hours per year to less than 300 hours per year, the
individual is treated as retired (the individual is still required to be working full-time in his or her
first interview wave). Marginal eﬀects included in square brackets for select covariates. Retirement
is treated as an absorbing state, so observations after retirement are dropped from the estimation.
“weighted” indicates that data is weighted using person-level weights corresponding to the specific
HRS interview wave. Regressions are conducted only on individuals between ages 50 and 70 who
worked full-time in their first HRS interview wave, were at-risk for a divorce/widowhood between
ages 50 and 70, did not remarry, and did not ever apply for disability. Descriptions of the included
covariates are in the text.
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Q Performance Comparisons across Landscapes
In this paper, anytime we are drawing comparisons across diﬀerent types of influence matri-
ces, we use ranked performance results. Performance measures can not be compared directly
across separate aggregation regimes (i.e. landscapes generated from diﬀerent   or Iij in
equation (15.2)), because the distribution of performance values diﬀers significantly based
on the firm level aggregation measure that is chosen. Figure (15.5)(A) shows the distribution
of the performance landscape with a 75% complementary influence matrix (i.e. Iij), whereas
figures Q.1(A) and (B) show the distribution of the performance landscape at both extremes
in complementarity of the influence matrix. Due to the diﬀerences in distributions, com-
paring these two landscapes directly would likely result in a misinterpretation of the results
because performance is not normalized to some consistent measure.67
When Kauﬀman introduced the NK model in his Kauﬀman (1993) book, he originally
ranked the performance levels and treated them only ordinally; however, he later begins to
treat these values as cardinal without a discussion why. It is possible that this might make
sense in the case of evolutionary biology, but there is no clear reason why business strategists
should expect a performance of 0.8 versus a performance of 0.88 to be 10% better. In fact,
given figure Q.1(B), we might expect this change in performance to be better than over 10% of
the possible performance levels or, alternatively, much smaller for figure Q.1(A). As a result,
we propose that treating performance measures as ordinal measures and rank ordering the
results is the only correct way of comparing one performance measure to another. In this
way, a rank ordering permits the author to argue that a performance level of x could be
better than a certain percentage of other possible organizational combinations.
67For example, in figure (Q.1)(B), 0.8 would correspond to the average possible performance level, whereas
in figure (Q.1)(A), the same 0.8 would correspond to a possible performance level in the top 10% of all
possible performance levels.
197
Figure Q.1: Landscape Characteristics - Structured Contributions (K = 2)
(a) Distribution of Business Landscape with a 100%
complementary interaction matrix. (0% substitutable)
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(b) Distribution of Business Landscape with a 0% com-
plementary interaction matrix. (100% substitutable)
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